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Abstract 
The dearth of research on short and long-term effects of divorce on financial behaviors 
warrants further investigation. This study investigates the effects of divorce on precautionary and 
retirement savings, proportion of assets in risk investments, and bequest intentions. Using data 
from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics from the University of Michigan Center for Social 
Research, exponential fractional regression models (EFRM) were specified to examine changes 
in savings behaviors and risky asset share post divorce. Binary logistic regressions were 
specified on bequest intentions for leaving assets to children, religious organizations, and non-
religious charities. For all subgroups, precautionary savings behaviors and retirement savings 
intially decreased post-divorce, then stabilized and increased in later years. Similarly, for all 
subgroups risky asset share decreased over time. Sub-analyses also indicate differences between 
divorced individuals for single income versus double income households, as well as differences 
between the sexes. Divorced individuals were more likely to hold bequest intentions for children 
and less likely to bequest to religious and non-religious organizations than married individuals. 
Practical implications are discussed and recommendations for future research are provided.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Introduction and statement of the problem 
Financial planning is a general term for the process of gathering and analyzing financial 
personal in order to meet short-term and long-term goals (www.cfp.net). Financial plans are not 
meant to be static documents (CFP Board, 2015) and are subject to change as circumstances 
change. These adjustments are usually minor provided there are no major inputs to the plan that 
change (Van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2012). A change such as a divorce provides a major 
disruption to a financial plan, forcing short-term and long-term ramifications (Kothakota & 
Heckman, 2017). An important area of financial planning that may be altered substantially is 
wealth management. 
While there are many definitions of wealth management, the term has been described as: 
 
“…the utilization of processes, services and products designed to grow,  
protect, utilize and disseminate one’s wealth” (Chamberlain, 2018).   
For purposes of this study, wealth management is further narrowly defined as the accumulation, 
management and distribution of wealth. Within financial planning this often corresponds to 
savings, investment allocation of savings and the distribution of savings. Savings involves the 
tradeoff between current discretionary spending and the future non-discretionary and 
discretionary spending. The amount an individual or household chooses to save has a large 
impact on their ability to consume resources over time (Meghir & Pistaferri, 2011). Investment 
allocation of savings is a strategic decision process that separates long-term and short-term 
savings by use of risky and non-risky assets in a manner that aligns with the wealth management 
goals (Duchin, Gilbert, Harford, & Hrdlicka, 2017). The distribution of savings involves the 
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spending of those monies when an individual or household no longer has wage or business 
income (Medina, 2016) in addition to how accumulated savings will be distributed upon the 
death of an individual. 
Divorce is an event that can drastically alter a financial plan (Morgan & Kothakota, 
2012). This disruption can turn a single, two-person household operating under a specific income 
into two, one-person households operating under a reduced income (Kothakota & Heckman, 
2018). While there is a legal process for getting a divorce where rights and entitlements matter, 
law is driving the outcome and not the plan. Therefore, when a divorce occurs new plans must be 
examined. A couple operates under a joint utility paradigm (Browning, Chiappori, & Lewbel, 
2013), while individual households may often share little in regards to the same utility (Lim, 
2013). Priority of saving versus discretionary spending, along with the allocation of that savings 
may be adjusted to account for the new paradigm (Light & Ahn, 2010). Further, the disruption to 
the family dynamic may cause individual former spouses to re-examine how they will distribute 
their wealth upon their death. 
In short, divorce causes trauma to both finances and emotions (Amato, 2000). This 
trauma may cause a temporary or prolonged change involving prioritization of financial goals 
and execution of a plan to reach those goals. Thus, in a post-divorce paradigm, individuals are 
constrained both financially and by the emotional toll taken by the divorce process. 
 Purpose and justification of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of divorce on wealth management as 
defined above over time. First, it is important to determine if there are significant changes to 
wealth management behaviors following a divorce. After determining if a change to wealth 
management behaviors occurs, it is then necessary to determine whether these effects persist 
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over time, or if they are temporary. Identifying aspects of wealth management more prone to 
chronic adjustment (i.e., behaviors that persist and become the “new normal”) and aspects more 
likely to be temporary (i.e., behavior is short-term and situational) will allow practitioners to 
better assist individuals in planning during and after their divorce. 
 Background 
The majority of work related to divorce has focused on family effects. Psychology, social 
work and sociology has done a good deal of work in the area related to trauma to both the divorced 
individuals and children of divorce. Some of these studies (Amato, 2000; Amato, 2010; Amato, 
Kane, & James, 2011; Carbone, 1994; Hetherington & Blechman, 2014; Jordan, 2016; Symoens, 
Bastaits, Mortelmans, & Bracke, 2013; Symoens, Colman, & Bracke, 2014) have dealt with 
longer-term consequences associated with divorce, especially as it relates to children. However, 
few studies focus on the long-term financial outcomes related to divorce.  
Financial planning as a discipline has many sub-disciplines. Financial planning for 
divorcing or divorced individuals is one of them. The Institute for Divorced Financial Analysts is 
the most widely recognized certifying body for financial planners assisting clients before and 
after divorce. They sanction and allow members who have passed their exams to use the 
Certified Divorce Financial Analyst™ or CDFA™ marks. The Association of Divorce Financial 
Planners (ADFP) is a body that puts out informational and best practice information for those 
financial planners specializing in divorce. Divorce and finance is ubiquitous as it relates to 
financial planning that the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants puts on an annual 
conference to discuss financial issues surrounding divorce. 
 Need for the study 
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For financial planners, the need for someone versed in the intricacies of divorce and 
finance is clear. This niche has attracted many practitioners over the years who have followed 
best practices. Unfortunately, in a legal-driven process, academic research surrounding financial 
best practices in divorce has been lacking (Kothakota, 2018). 
Most research has focused on the economic or mental health consequences of divorce. 
Financial planning and wealth management are action-oriented processes in a profession 
requiring skilled decision-making (Lurtz, Kothakota & MacDonald, 2017). The idea is to process 
information and use it to map resources to short- and long-term financial goals. By 
understanding the financial behaviors of individuals post-divorce, best practices can be 
developed to assist those individuals in their wealth management needs. Meeting these needs 
may assist in divorced individuals having better outcomes. 
As of this writing, no research has been found examining wealth management of divorced 
households longitudinally. Previous research has outlined the immediate economic consequences 
of divorce. Knowing which aspects of wealth management are affected, the magnitude of the 
effect and the persistence of the effect can help individuals and the planners assisting them to 
recognize, adjust for and reduce any negative structural or behavioral financial issues associated 
with their plan. Given this gap in the literature, this study sought to examine the following 
research question.  
 Research question 
Given the broad nature of financial planning, it is important to narrowly define the scope 
of research. Since financial planning is a collection of various concepts and is made of many 
parts, this study examines some of the more common inputs within a financial plan, specifically 
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wealth management. The overarching research question is: What effect does divorce have on 
wealth management? 
Additionally, in order to narrow the scope of the study, only certain aspects of wealth 
management were examined. The study plan is to examine the following areas: 1) savings rates, 
2) riskiness of investment portfolio and 3) bequest intentions. Of note, there was no examination 
of insurance (i.e., protection of wealth), retirement income adequacy, college planning or tax 
planning as those planning techniques are beyond the scope of this study.  
 Theoretical framework 
Stress adjustment has been used to describe many phenomena in psychology, social work 
and sociology (Ross, Coltrain, Duffy, & Buriel, 2004; Papp, Cummings & Schermerhorn, 2004; 
Scott & Spivey, 2010). Further, stress adjustment has been used to describe aspects of consumer 
science (Lim, Heckman, Letkiewicz, & Montalto, 2014). While stress may be an obvious part of 
a trauma such as divorce, empirical research has confirmed the stress on both individual and their 
families can cause adjustments to behavior. 
These psychological impacts can inhibit the ability of an individual who has gone 
through divorce to complete many tasks. Over the course of years, many theories have been used 
to explain the effects of divorce in various domains. Feminist theory (Carbone, 1994), 
attachment theory (McMullen, 2011), attribution theory (Votruba, Braver, Ellman, & Fabricius, 
2014) and systems theory have all been used to explain economic and psychological effects. 
However, the majority of research used to describe the effects of divorce have been stress models 
(Pearlin & Bierman, 2013; Hetherington & Blechman, 2014; Symoens et al., 2013; Symoens et 
al., 2014). 
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In financial planning, the stress adjustment model has been used to describe the effects of 
factors related to financial stress in college students (e.g., Lim, Heckman, Letkiewicz, & 
Montalto, 2014). Stress adjustment models where finances are affected are particularly important 
for divorce, as financial aspects are at the core of divorces. Thus, a stress adjustment perspective 
can be useful in examining how divorced individuals accomplish various day to day and lifelong 
tasks. 
 General conceptualization of the theory 
One model of examining how a stress adjustment model may work comes from 
sociological research (Amato, 2000). Amato’s meta-analysis of divorce literature from a divorce 
stress adjustment perspective allows for a generalization of how the divorce process affects 
certain domains. The model in Figure 1 is adapted from the Divorce-Stress Adjustment Model. 
The divorce process instigates stressors such as: sole parenting responsibility, loss of emotional 
support from a partner, negative economic effects and other stress events related to divorce 
(Amato, 2010). Divorce can cause a lack of focus (Starnes, 2011), which may make it more 
difficult to complete wealth management tasks. This may in turn lead to more stress. 
Figure 1 Divorce-Stress Adjustment Model 
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These stressors create an adjustment in the psychological, behavioral and health domains 
within an individual. Short-term and long-term behavioral effects related to wealth management 
as a result of divorce are differentiated as some behavioral effects may dissipate over time. Both 
short-term and long-term behavioral effects are moderated by certain protective factors that can 
include demographics, what divorce means to an individual, and the resources an individual may 
have. Despite pushes for access to justice in divorce (Starnes, 2012) divorced individuals often 
need the professional help of attorneys in order to complete the dissolution of their marriage. 
This proximity to attorneys may place those individuals in the frame of mind to reach out to 
professionals for wealth management. In particular, divorced individuals often need to adjust 
estate plans following a divorce.  
In order to adapt this model to wealth management, an action step is added (Figure 2). In 
addition, this model outlines the lack of an ability to focus on the long term and may include 
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items such as identity changes and priority shifts (e.g., “not my responsibility to leave a 
bequest”). A moderator in this case would include professionals involved in the divorce process 
that can help facilitate a smoother and more informed process (e.g., having a lawyer, accountant 
or financial planner involved). Other mediators include the type of divorce (i.e., pro se, mediated, 
collaborative, negotiated or litigated) (Morgan & Kothakota, 2012), the level of self-efficacy of 
the individual (Warrener, Koivenun & Postmus, 2013), and demographic characteristics (i.e., 
income, net worth, supporting or dependent household role, etc.). 
Figure 2 Adapted Divorce-Stress Adjustment Model for Financial Behaviors 
 
 
It is appropriate to use a model that describes both a crisis moment (short-term) and 
chronic strain (long-term) effect of divorce on aspects of financial planning. The goal of this 
study is to describe changes that occur post-divorce and how long those changes persist. Divorce 
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is a stressful event (Amato et al., 2011) and the subsequent trauma to both the financial and 
emotional aspects of an individual life are likely to cause a need for adjustments. 
Each aspect of the wealth management process may fit appropriately in this model, which 
is simple and falsifiable. A reduction or increase in savings may be the result of information 
gained in the divorce process, such as finding out they were not saving as much as they thought, 
or a reduced ability to meet expenses resulting from the division of households. This may cause 
the individual to “panic save” or alternatively to disregard the importance of saving in lieu of 
meeting lifestyle needs. 
Replacing retirement savings may matter less to an individual in the moment of divorce, 
as more immediate needs may take priority. As the individual gets closer to retirement however, 
living in retirement may become more salient and the ability to afford retirement may be more 
concerning. In that situation the individual would need to save as much as they could. 
While there may be a prima facie concern for the well-being of children post-divorce, 
many individuals may be more concerned with their own future. They may also abrogate some of 
their responsibility to their former spouse as it relates to the welfare of the children. Thus, if 
there were a joint intention to leave a bequest, there may be a need to not have such an intention 
post-divorce as the individual may wish to ensure their resources are available for their later 
years. As the individual gets closer to retirement however, this may again shift. Evidence 
suggests that the leaving of a bequest is less of a priority for individuals post-divorce (Hendricks, 
2001). 
Risky assets are needed for portfolio growth absent saving (Blanchett, Finke, & Pfau, 
2017). A reduction in saving may increase the perception that more risk needs to be taken. 
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However, as a portfolio grows, this need may be reduced by actual growth or a change in the 
savings rate. 
 Limitations 
This study is exploratory in nature. To date, no comprehensive review of the effects of 
divorce on wealth management has been conducted. However, the design of the study is around 
an existing data set not created specifically for this study. Thus, proxies will need to be used and 
may not be exact representations of the concepts being measured. Every effort is made to 
approximate these concepts. 
In addition, because the PSID is nationally representative and covers all age 
demographics, there may not be much data on risky asset share as many younger people do not 
have assets. This also may affect bequest intentions, as younger individuals may not be thinking 
about leaving money they do not possess to a next generation. Further, many poorer households 
find it difficult to save in the best of circumstances (Karlan, Ratan, & Zinman, 2014), and poorer 
households are more likely to divorce than wealthier ones. 
Wealth management is a dynamic and complex process, where one aspect of a plan 
influences another. This can result in interactions between various aspects of a financial plan. For 
example, an increase in insurance premiums may reduce the ability to save. Further, individuals 
may share household expenses in the future with someone they do not marry, or they may 
become married again. 
Importantly, this study does not examine financial planning as defined by the CFP Board 
of Standards and is focused instead on the narrow definition of wealth management outlined 
previously. Examining financial planning would require an experiment examining actual 
financial plans and the effect on the plans post-divorce. 
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For purposes of this study, divorce is assumed to cause some sort of financial trauma. It is 
further assumed that household expenditures are higher due to household size post-divorce. 
Savings is assumed to be proportional to income before and after divorce. That is, if household 
income is higher prior to divorce and the savings rate is a specific percentage of that income, it is 
assumed that proportion should be close to the same after divorce, ceteris paribus. This study 
does not account for income specific savings proportions. As an example, someone who earns a 
high income may need to save a lower proportion of their income for precautionary reasons but 
may need to save a higher proportion for retirement needs. Conversely, an individual earning 
lower income will not need to save as much for retirement due to entitlement programs but may 
need a higher percentage of their income saved as a precaution. 
The population of interest is divorced individuals. The study only includes divorced 
individuals only in the precauationary savings, retirement savings and risky asset share analyses. 
It includes divorced and married individuals for the bequest intention analysis. Results are not 
generalizable to the overall population. The study does not examine the financial effect on 
retirement planning, tax planning and college planning, which are three aspects of wealth 
management and financial planning. Retirement planning includes pensions and Social Security, 
which are not presently examined in this study. Further, not knowing what the proper savings 
ratio is for each individual circumstance limits the power of any finding as it relates to 
retirement. Ignoring taxes can also have an impact as taxes are payable and good plans can 
prevent overpayment of taxes, which can increase the ability of someone to save. College 
planning in particular has an impact in this study as there are measurements of money an 
individual spends on college for children, which may have an effect on savings and risky asset 
share. There is no examination of  life insurance or disability insurance or other sub-categories of 
 
 
12 
wealth, such as business planning or advanced income planning techniques. Not including life 
insurance does not help with any sort of catastrophic loss, and not looking at disability insurance 
does not help with a job loss. Businesses are often the largest asset people have (Juster, Smith & 
Stafford, 1999) and not accounting for them may bias risky asset share higher. Advanced income 
planning techniques can be useful in multiple life stages and not knowing if these techniques are 
being used, there are variables not being examined. Financial planning and wealth management 
have many moving parts and one aspect of a plan may influence another. By not examining these 
other aspects, financial behaviors may be getting missed. 
 Summary and potential implications 
This study seeks to help individuals and financial planning practitioners understand the 
needs of a divorced population as it relates to wealth management. Currently, financial planners 
and wealth managers working with divorced individuals only have anecdotes and personal 
experience to operate off of as it relates to how individuals behave with their savings post-
divorce. Knowing what may happen post-divorce can assist financial planners and wealth 
managers in advising their clients and also helping them make new plans to meet their new 
goals. Going from a joint utility, single household paradigm to individual utilities as separate 
households is a reality professionals in the field will have to navigate. 
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Chapter 2 -  Review of the literature 
 Historical context discussion 
Empirical research on divorce and various aspects of financial planning and wealth 
management is thin (Kothakota & Heckman, 2018). Divorce has been a part of human life for a 
long period of time. The Code of Hammurabi discusses divorce in detail as it relates to how 
economic resources are shared or not post-divorce. There are passages related to the reasons 
behind the re-allocation of resources that have to do with future care and responsibility for 
children, relevant to financial planning. 
“If a man wish to separate from a woman who has borne him children, or from his wife 
who has borne him children: then he shall give that wife her dowry, and a part of the 
usufruct of field, garden, and property so that she can rear her children. When she has 
brought up her children, a portion of all that is given to the children, equal as that of one 
son, shall be given to her. She may then marry the man of her heart” (Harper, 1904). 
More relevant to the present day in the United States is the English version. Women prior 
to the year 1857 could not own property and any property inherited passed to her husband who 
would then control any assets (McCoy, 2005). This stemmed from the laws of coverture wherein 
a woman who married become part of the single unit. In return for ceding control of financial 
assets, women were supposed to be supported by their husbands for the rest of their lives. 
The early system of alimony was predicated upon this marital arrangement. The 
Ecclesiastical system could not grant absolute divorces. They would not technically be divorced, 
as only Parliament could grant an absolute divorce (Oldham, 2008), and only rarely did so, 
typically when the couple was wealthy. Married couples could be divorced “from bed and 
board.” The couple could live separate and apart, and the husband was required to continue 
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paying for the wife’s expenses. Divorce from bed and board is still used in some states in abuse 
situations. 
 Law and divorce 
Divorce is a legal process (Starnes, 2012) with household dynamic consequences as well 
as economic and psychological effects. The law outlines parameters for the distribution of 
property, income allocation and child custody arrangements post-divorce (Morgan & Kothakota, 
2014). Among the economic consequences for divorce are the increase of household expenses 
due to the need for two households (Kothakota & Heckman, 2018; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). 
In the past, this has been ameliorated through transfer payments in the form of tax-transferrable 
spousal support (Wery, Kothakota, & Morgan, 2017). However, changes to the tax code 
surrounding this tax-advantaged status have eliminated this (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017) for 
2018 and the years following. This creates larger issues surrounding household finances after 
divorce, as there is even less income to cover more expenses (Kothakota, 2018). 
State laws do not specifically mandate individuals should save at their previous rate. 
However, many legal disputes involve a “standard of living” argument wherein an individual 
may argue they are entitled to live at their previous standard of living. This often includes both 
precautionary and retirement savings. This argument is used to negotiate for more household 
assets or income redistribution (i.e., alimony). Whether a divorced individual saves at the rate 
claimed during court proceedings is unknown. 
State laws also do not mandate a specific investment allocation for long-term savings 
either. Experts may be used in a court situation to describe how a given allocation of assets will 
help an individual spouse meet certain goals (e.g., current income, retirement, etc.). The 
individual is not beholden to this recommended allocation however. 
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Individual states and courts may have influence on when an individual retires however 
(Kindregan, 2013). An individual may be required to continue working in order to meet spousal 
support or child support obligations beyond when they would have wished to retire (Hebenstreit, 
2014). Courts may also order individuals to secure obligations from their death with their 
assets (Miller, 2015). In addition, the state of Illinois can legally obligate an individual to pay for 
their children’s post-secondary education (Hinckey, 2017). 
 Psychological research in divorce 
Divorce is described as a traumatic event (Rosenfeld, Thomas, & Falcon, 2015). Trauma 
can cause individuals to change previous behavior and creates tunnel vision (Furnham, 2014), 
often excluding what may be termed “non-essential” tasks by the individual. Divorced 
individuals are often diagnosed with adjustment disorder (Brinig & Crafton, 1994; Strain & 
Friedman, 2011). Often this is used as a catch-all for a traumatic event so mental health 
professionals can bill care for a divorced individual through health insurance (Jordan, 2016). 
Both the financial and the emotional strain caused by divorce may interfere with the 
ability to accomplish tasks (Amato, 2000). Individuals who have experienced divorce may often 
lose part of their identity (Kisthardt, 2008), which has been shown to be particularly true for 
dependent spouses (e.g., stay-at-home spouses). This typically will mean self-efficacy plays a 
large role in how a divorced individual adapts to their lives post-divorce (Warrener, Koivunen, & 
Postmus, 2013). 
Wealth management, financial planning, estate planning or even general life planning 
may take a back seat to more immediate concerns. This could include employment changes, 
taking on more childcare responsibility or individual financial degradation (Amato, 2000; 
Carbone, 1994). The psychological impact of divorce can have a great influence on how these 
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individuals think about whether or not they leave a will or other estate planning instrument 
behind. 
 Wealth management 
 Savings behavior 
Fisher and Montalto (2011) discuss savings asymmetry as a function of reference group. 
This study asks how earnings in relation to the household’s reference group affect savings 
behavior. The authors present evidence of asymmetry in savings and also indicated that those 
who divorce are less likely to save. The asymmetry found by Fisher and Montalto (2011) may be 
from a reduction in economies of scale and misallocation of resources via support. 
Evidence from Sweden indicates that savings post-divorce varies depending upon gender 
makeup and power differential as a function of income (Zetterdahl, 2015). In practice, a lower 
wage-earning spouse will likely spend above their current income because prior existing 
expenses still occur. A higher wage-earning spouse not paying domestic support will be more 
likely to save. A higher wage-earning spouse paying domestic support may not have enough to 
support themselves and a possible new spouse. Controlling for income, divorced/separate 
individuals may be less likely to save and adjust to a lower standard of living (Amato, 2010). For 
both a paying and receiving spouse, particularly in non-remarried households, there may be a 
loss in economies of scale. There is possible asymmetry in this re-allocation of income, as one 
spouse may have spent more than the other during the marriage.  
Research in marriage dynamics suggests that when U.S. laws changed to force equal 
division of property that household savings rates increased, suggesting women influence a 
household to save more (Voena, 2015). However, evidence that women save less post-divorce 
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and men save more post-divorce suggests that divorce may have at least a temporary effect on 
savings (Grossbard & Pereira, 2010). 
There is evidence to suggest women tend to spend more on the household, implying that 
post-divorce their income is directed at consumption for child well-being (Eastman, 1992). 
Conversely, men are more likely to direct their attention to future consumption post-divorce and 
as such have been shown as more likely to save (Grossbard & Pereira, 2010). 
In Italy, increased precautionary savings is associated with a higher risk of divorce 
(Pericoli & Ventura, 2011). However, estimation of both precautionary and durable savings post-
divorce has not been researched. Further, whether there is a directional effect that persists post-
divorce has not been assessed either. 
 Risky asset share 
Investigations in risk tolerance (Light & Ahn, 2010)  play a role in divorce and may play 
a role in savings behavior (Fisher & Montalto, 2011). Light & Ahn indicated those who get 
divorced are more likely to have higher risk tolerance, and the effect was greater in higher risk 
bands. This may indicate a willingness to allocate more resources to current income and less to 
savings for the future. There also may be a predilection towards not savings for emergencies 
because of this risky behavior (Light & Ahn, 2010). This is consistent with the previous research 
indicating less willingness to save (Fisher & Montalto, 2011). 
In general, risky asset share tends to be a result of inertia (Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2008). 
Individuals often do not change the status quo unless there is some sort of catalyst (e.g., major 
capital market movement, changing financial advisors, etc.). Over time, risky assets increase in 
value at a higher rate than non-risky assets (Herring, 2005), thus if inertia is in effect individuals 
will have increased their risky assets share by doing nothing. 
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Divorce often acts as a catalyst for changes (Berkowicz, 2019) and many times, at least 
one divorced spouse changes advisors (Cummings & James, 2014). This catalyst may trigger a 
change in risky asset share that may or may not persist over time. Further, often the assets an 
individual receives as a result of a divorce may be imbalanced (Tessler & Thompson, 2007). For 
example, a household may possess a retirement portfolio and a marital home, and the distribution 
will be uneven because the marital home may be worth more than the retirement portfolio, or 
vice versa. Still another example is where much of the household wealth is tied to company stock 
for one spouse, causing the other spouse to take assets that are more diversified and maybe tax-
sheltered in a reirement plan. 
Evidence garnered from Denmark suggests men decrease their risky asset share when 
married, and increase it after divorce (Christiansen, Joensen, & Rangvid, 2015). Women on the 
other hand increase their share of risky assets when married and decrease it after divorce. The 
Danish researchers find the effects are muted with men, and do not examine if this effect persists, 
nor do they have information on how the asset distribution occurred post-marriage. It is possible, 
as noted above that men receive most of the risky assets post-divorce. 
 Bequest intention or asset distribution 
 Even within the professional wealth management world, work on estate planning is seen 
as the domain of attorneys, so little attention is paid to it by the financial professionals who often 
work directly with clients. However, this can be a mistake, given how many people die intestate 
(DiRusso, 2009). Examining the effects of divorce on estate planning are even less ubiquitous 
(Crozier, 2007). 
There is some evidence wealthy households are less likely to distribute their assets to 
children or other relatives intentionally (Cox & Stark, 2008). In particular, it may depend upon 
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how those individuals or couples came about their wealth, such as inheriting it themselves or 
having built the wealth from scratch. Even when they do distribute wealth to their heirs, it is 
often done unequally among them (Francesconi, Pollak, & Tabasso, 2015). Alternatives to 
leaving assets to heirs can include religious organizations or other charities (James, 2018). 
A disconnect between intent and actual action taken exists (James, 2009). This 
phenomenon exists mainly for charitable intentions, since as noted many people die intestate. 
Thus, the blood relatives or other legal heirs may end up receiving the assets of the deceased 
individual. The percentage of people who actually follow through with charitable intentions is 
37% (James, 2018; Cox & Stark, 2008), suggesting while people may have those intentions, they 
do not act on them in time. The same applies to bequests to individuals (Hurd & Smith, 2001). 
 Hypotheses 
In order to form hypotheses, it is necessary to clearly define the possible outcomes. Due 
to the influence of the law on divorce outcomes, the expected directional effect of each aspect 
may be different. As an example, savings is not a requirement prior to divorce but may be 
required after divorce. Given these constraints, the following hypotheses are outlined: 
H1: Individuals will have lower precautionary savings rates post-divorce. 
H2: Single-income households prior to divorce will have lower precautionary savings 
rates post-divorce than double-income households. 
H3: As wage income increases, post-divorce precautionary savings rates will increase. 
H4: Individuals will have lower retirement savings rates post-divorce. 
H5: As wage income increases, post-divorce retirement savings rates will increase. 
H6: Individuals will have a higher proportion of their assets in risky assets post-divorce 
than prior to divorce. 
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H7: The proportion of risky assets will not change over time post-divorce. 
H8: Single-income households will have a higher proportion of their assets in risky assets 
than double-income households. 
H9: Divorced individuals will be less likely to leave money to children or other relatives. 
H10: Divorced individuals will be less likely to leave money to religious organizations. 
H11: Divorced individuals will be more likely to leave money to non-religious charities. 
 Summary and analysis of the literature as applied to the research problem 
Given the legal-driven nature of divorce, and the historical view regarding sharing of 
resources post-divorce, the literature is ready for expansion into the realm of how to plan given a 
divorce event. The history of divorce has been driven more by religious context and historically 
most religions have looked at marriage as a state of being for life and planning for it should not 
happen. Studies into how dependent spouses are more likely to experience poverty as a result of 
divorce are important when discussing how to plan around the areas of savings, retirement, life 
insurance, bequests and investments. 
The psychological effects are just as important as the legal framework, as the trauma 
caused by divorce may change behavior and cause specific financial behaviors. The research 
illustrating the strain of divorce, both in the moment and over time is compelling enough to 
examine how an individual financial plan may change. 
Divorce stress adjustment is an appropriate lens with which to view wealth management 
behavior changes. The frequent diagnosis of adjustment disorder for individuals going through 
divorce illustrates that mental health intervention takes this adjustment into account. It is 
important to view aspects of wealth management through an adjustment to the “new normal” a 
divorced individual may be experiencing. 
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While there has been literature related to various aspects of financial planning and wealth 
management, little focus has been related to divorce, nor the long-term consequences of divorce. 
Financial plans are long-term living documents. Given the prevalence of wealth management and 
financial planning firms specializing in divorce and the need to assist in these changes and 
transitions, research in these areas may allow for evidenced-based practices as it relates to 
helping divorcing or divorced individuals in wealth management and financial planning. If 
changes to a plan negatively influence that plan, both the magnitude and duration are important 
in order for practitioners to help. 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
This study examined primarily whether divorce leads to wealth management changes. 
Specifically, the study examines the effect of divorce on the following aspects of wealth 
management: precautionary savings, retirement savings, risky asset share and bequest intention. 
This study uses the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) to answer these questions. 
 Study design 
Panel data were obtained from a large, nationally representative data set. In order to 
answer the research question and test the hypotheses, variables were created from questions 
within the survey. These variables were examined over time by using regression techniques 
suitable for longitudinal data. In addition, cross-sectional data were used to examine bequest 
intentions. 
 Data and sample 
The Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) collects data on U.S.-based respondents. 
The survey is housed at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research and was 
originally sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity of the United States Department of 
Commerce. Currently the sponsors include the National Science Foundation, the National 
Institute on Aging, the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development, the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and the Economic 
Research Service and U.S. Department of Agriculture. The purpose of the study is to gather data 
to examine trends in income and expenditures by individuals in the United States. These data 
include general wealth questions and detailed income questions. The survey comprises a RAND 
compiled survey dataset, Leave-Behind Psychosocial and Lifestyle surveys, and exit interviews 
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after the death of a respondent. The dataset has over 37,000 individual participants and covers 
over 8,000 families. The PSID is the longest running longitudinal survey in the world and has 
been collecting data since 1968. Prior to 1997 data were collected every year but have since been 
collected every two years.  
A useful characteristic of the PSID as compared to other large-scale surveys is that if a 
couple divorces, the survey follows both divorced individuals and not just the head of household. 
This allows for comparisons at different times where someone may not be divorced, then get 
divorced and answer questions differently. This is necessary in order to answer the research 
question. 
The PSID has previously been used in research assessing marriage and divorce 
characteristics (Ciscato, 2018; McGonagle, Schoeni, Sastry, & Freedman, 2012). In addition, the 
data has been used on multiple occasions in assessing risky asset share (Christiansen et al., 
2015). Studies have also examined savings data  (Grossbard & Pereira, 2010) and bequest 
intentions (Hanke, Englebrecht, Di, & Bisping, 2012). 
The PSID has been used in a number of ways and is found to be data of good quality 
(McGonagle, 2010). As with most surveys, there are a variety of challenges that can occur in 
self-reported data such as the PSID. In particular, national surveys have issues with 
representativeness, non-response bias, and self-reporting error. These can affect the validity and 
reliability of the instrument. Each of these potential concerns are addressed in the following 
discussion. 
 Representativeness 
The PSID has been examined for representativeness as it relates to wealth data (Juster, 
Smith, & Stafford, 1999; Duncan & Hill, 1989) as well as data on marriage and divorce (Lillard 
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& Waite, 1995). Curtin and colleagues compared the PSID data against the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and found the 
PSID data, while less suited to detailed wealth data, was more robust with respect to income 
data. The researchers concluded the measurement error in the PSID was better than either the 
SIPP or SCF. Lillard and Waite (1995) concluded the data of when and whether individuals were 
married and divorced lined up well and were internally consistent. Further, as with other national 
datasets, weights have been computed in complex sample design to compensate for other 
demographic non-response. 
 Non-response bias 
One issue with longitudinal surveys is the problem with repeated responses. That is, 
people may not respond in follow-up years. The PSID estimates small amounts of attrition from 
cohorts beginning in 1968, that added up to a total response rate of 56.1 percent in 1988. 
However, the Unicon Study (Bound, Brown, Duncan, & Rodgers, 1989) found that this attrition 
had negligible effects on parameter estimates. 
 Self-reporting bias 
To combat self-reporting bias, the PSID committee has over time attempted to collect as 
much physical evidence associated with reported values as possible. For example, respondents 
are directed to input information from bank statements, W-2s and other financial-related 
documents. This has been shown to reduce (but not eliminate) the measurement error. Lower 
income individuals over-reported income, and higher income individuals underreported income, 
and men tended to over-report, while women under-reported (Duncan & Hill, 1989). This is 
consistent with other literature in consumer sciences (Goldin, 2014; Tharp, Lurtz, Mielitz, & 
Kitces, in press). 
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 Sample description 
Data including divorced individuals was first reported in 1982 and observations from 
1987 through 2007 were extracted from the PSID data repository. Both weighted and unweighted 
analyses were conducted on a reduced sample. The sample was reduced from 45,518 to 13,465 
number of observations by only including divorced individuals. Total cross-sectional units 
examined ranged from 878 to 1,121. Since the goal is not to examine a between groups effect 
(i.e., divorced versus non-divorced), but within group and within person observations, all non-
divorced individuals are excluded for purposes of precautionary savings, retirement savings and 
risky asset share analyses. Separated status is ignored. While it is estimated only 13% of all 
separated individuals eventually reconcile (Centers for Disease Control, 2017), this may bias 
estimates if included. Separated individuals divorcing will eventually be captured in the sample 
because of the longitudinal nature of the study. The sample was further reduced to only evaluate 
years 1997 through 2007, as those were the only years where savings rates and risky asset share 
could be measured. Individuals who remarried are included in order to examine the effect 
remarriage has on each variable. For bequest intention analyses, married individuals were 
appended to the dataset, resulting in 7,595 cross-sectional units to be examined.  
Each individual questioned in the PSID survey is issued an identification number for 
tracking purposes. Identification numbers were checked against individuals identifying as 
divorced and subsequently identifying as single to be sure those individuals stayed in the sample. 
Care was taken to identify an individual who was not head of household previously and then 
subsequently as a single person as head of their individual household. Since the PSID follows 
both individuals, it is possible to do this, but care is taken to recognize each individual post-
divorce.  
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 Missing data 
 Missing data is assumed to be either missing completely at random (MCAR) or missing 
at random (MAR). Prior wave carryover is used for variables where prior wave data is likely to 
be similar to the current wave, such as wage income (Duffy, 2011). For continuous variables 
where prior wave information is not helpful, multiple imputation is used. Missing data for 
categorical variables is imputed using maximum likelihood estimation (Allison, 2011). 
 Operationalization of concepts 
The study examines three separate but related concepts. The first concept of savings is 
operationalized by determining how much earnings an individual manages to exclude from 
income on an annual basis. This is described as the ratio of savings to income. The second 
concept deals with the investment of that savings and is described as the proportion of an 
individual’s proportion of assets in risky investments. The third concept is the distribution of 
those assets saved and invested, specifically whether a bequest is being left. 
 Dependent variables: Savings, risky asset share and bequest intentions 
Savings rate is a calculation of the individual’s annual savings divided by their total 
annual income. Both the savings rate for precautionary savings and long-term savings (i.e., 
retirement savings) are analyzed. Evidence suggests individuals treat these savings differently in 
the best of circumstances (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988), when there are not emergencies, cash flow is 
positive or have a positive economic outlook. 
 Precautionary savings (1a) 
Precautionary savings is defined as the dollar amount an individual places in checking 
accounts, money market accounts and savings accounts in a single year divided by that 
individual’s gross income. Gross income is defined as income from all sources. Gittleman and 
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Wolff (2009) provide a method for calculating savings rates. The current period combination of 
all checking, money market and savings accounts are subtracted by the previous period 
combination of checking, money market and savings accounts as well as subtracting windfalls 
such as inheritances. Growth on these assets is accounted for by subtracting the interest increase 
calculated as a geometric return between periods, using bank rates during the specified time 
period. The net subtracted number is the amount saved in that time period. Extrapolating the 
savings rate is then the amount saved in that time period divided by wage income. This is the 
method that was applied. 
 Retirement savings (1b) 
Retirement savings is defined as the dollar amount an individual places in retirement 
accounts such as IRAs, 401(k)s, and other defined contribution vehicles divided by their gross 
income. Defined benefit plans are not included in contributions. Gross income is defined as 
income from all sources. Growth on these assets is accounted for by subtracting the geometric 
return of a proportion of stock to total retirement assets, with the S&P 500 returns being used as 
the proxy for stock. 
 Dependent variable for analysis 2 - risky asset share 
Risky asset share is defined as the dollar amount of stock assets owned, divided by the 
dollar amount of total liquid assets owned. Total assets include stocks, bonds, cash, checking 
accounts, savings accounts and money market accounts. These amounts are calculated in 
aggregate regardless of account type (e.g., taxable, tax-deferred). Home equity is excluded in 
part because it is not marked to market (i.e., it is not easily valued), in part because it is a use 
asset and in part because the value is dependent upon a proportion of leverage and property 
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value. In order to account for stock market growth, the geometric mean return of the S&P 500 is 
calculated for each time period and subtracted from the the stock portion of the assets. 
 Dependent variable for analysis 3- Bequest intention 
Unfortunately, after examining the data from the PSID in detail there is only one year 
where bequest intention data is gathered. In 2007, respondents were asked three separate bequest 
intention questions. One question asked if they intended to leave money to children or other 
relatives, another asked if they intended to leave money to a religious organization and the last 
asked if they intended to leave money to a charitable organization unrelated to religion. Each 
item had four possible responses. These were “not important”, “somewhat important”, 
“important” and “very important”. These responses were collapsed into a binary variable, where 
“important” includes “important” and “very important” and “not important” includes “not 
important” and “somewhat important”. If the outcome was “important” it was coded as a “1” and 
if it was “not important” it was coded as “0”. 
 Independent variables 
Sex/Gender. Sex/gender is defined as “1” for female, “0” for male. No other identifiers 
are used for sex or gender. Observations including options other than male or female were 
excluded from the sample. 
Race. Race included variables for Black, Hispanic, and Asian/other. White was used as 
the reference group. 
Net worth. Net worth is the total of all assets, including real estate, minus all liabilities. 
Due to the possibility of negative values, an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation was used 
(Friedline, Masa, & Chowa, 2015) in order to account for negative values and zeroes in net 
worth. 
 
 
29 
Age. Age is treated as continuous and is represented by the numerical age of the 
individual respondent and only included individuals aged 25 to 55 in order to reduce the 
likelihood an individual was retired at some point during the period in question. 
Wage/employment income. Income is a continuous variable totaling the wage, contract or 
self-employment income of an individual. Within this subsample, the number ranges between 0 
and $428,000. This variable was log-transformed for ease of interpreting coefficients in 
regression models. 
Alimony. Alimony is a cash payment from one spouse to another for the receiving 
spouse’s benefit. For purposes of this study, this variable is categorical, and an individual is 
either “paying alimony”, “receiving alimony” or “neither paying nor receiving alimony”. 
Child support. Child support are cash payments from one spouse to another for the 
benefit of mutually supported children. For purposes of this study, this variable is categorical and 
an individual is either “paying child support”, “receiving child support” or “neither paying nor 
receiving child support”. 
Risk tolerance. Risk tolerance in the PSID is measured using income gamble questions. 
These questions are a way to approximate an individual tolerance for risk. While there are some 
problems with measurement of risk tolerance (Kimball, Sahm, & Shapiro, 2009; Lurtz, 
Archuleta, Kothakota, & Heckman, working paper), the income gamble questions have been 
used in many empirical studies. 
Respondents are asked the income gamble questions in the following way: 
 “Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job 
guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are given the 
opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance it will double your (family) 
income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your (family) income by X%. Would you take the new 
job?” 
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Depending upon the answer, the respondent is then given a similar question for a higher 
risk job or lower risk job.  This continues until an individual is sorted into one of six types of risk 
preference. These categories are rank ordered from one (low risk) to six (high risk). 
There are a few issues with using this measure in modeling. The first is that risk tolerance 
was only assessed in 1996. For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that risk tolerance will not 
vary over time and was carried forward in the modeling process. The second issue involves how 
the question is asked in the PSID. Each member of the household is asked the income gamble 
questions (Kimble, Sahm & Shapiro, 2009). When dividing the household to examine divorced 
individuals, the risk tolerance question is not accurately assigned to the new ID for the non-head. 
In order to ameliorate this problem, 158 of the non-heads of the sample were chained to create a 
new sample by taking the average pre-divorce risk tolerance of the couple, then adding .07 if the 
non-head of household was male, and subtracting .13 if the non-head was female to account for 
gender variation contained within the sample (Kimble, Sahm & Shapiro, 2009). These values 
were rounded to the nearest whole number. 
Education. Education is identified as a categorical variable and includes “did not 
complete high school”, “some college”, “bachelor’s degree”, “master’s degree”, “professional or 
doctorate degree”. “High school completion” was used as the reference group. 
Employment. Employment is a categorical variable and includes “Employed”, 
“Unemployed” and “Other”. Employed includes self-employed, and multiple occupations. 
Unemployed includes temporarily looking for work, employed as a homemaker, or maternity 
leave. Other includes prison, disabled or other. 
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 Sample descriptive statistics 
The following tables illustrate sample descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables. Categorical variables are displayed by percentage and year. Continuous 
variables report mean and standard deviation by year. A check was made for same sex divorces 
and none occurred during the analysis time period. Dependent variables are shown first, 
beginning with precautionary savings, then retirement savings, then risky asset share. 
 Those calculated to have had mean precautionary savings rates that fell between 0.12% 
(SD: 4.30%) of savings and 3.85% (6.70%) of savings. These are mean numbers and represent 
the whole of each year cohort, including those just divorced in that given year. The retirement 
savings rates were reported as mean percentages between 1.12% (SD: 6.78%) and 8.66% (SD: 
5.66%).  
Table 1: Precautionary savings rate descriptive statistics 
Year n Mean Median SD 
1997 323 -3.85% 0.00% 6.70% 
1999 445 0.12% 0.00% 4.30% 
2001 918 -0.79% 0.00% 7.32% 
2003 930 -1.28% 0.00% 16.83% 
2005 890 -0.72% 0.00% 9.17% 
2007 872 -1.00% 0.00% 22.81% 
 
Table 2: Retirement savings rate descriptive statistics 
Year n Mean Median SD 
1997 323 -1.12% 0.00% 6.78% 
1999 445 1.01% 0.00% 5.66% 
2001 918 -5.06% 0.00% 18.61% 
2003 930 -1.95% 0.00% 4.71% 
2005 890 4.70% 0.00% 8.15% 
2007 872 -2.40% 0.00% 6.45% 
 
Table 3: Risky asset share descriptive statistics 
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Year n Mean Median SD 
1997 289 17.00% 2.00% 31.00% 
1999 371 11.00% 1.00% 26.00% 
2001 456 10.00% 0.00% 24.00% 
2003 810 8.00% 0.00% 22.00% 
2005 793 8.00% 0.00% 22.00% 
2007 814 7.00% 1.00% 20.00% 
 
The sample skewed female with men representing as low as 39.30% and women as high 
as 60.70%. The majority of the sample were white (53.41% to 60.67%), while the next largest 
racial group were black (31.57% to 40.52%). Hispanics made up between 2.67% and 3.25% of 
the sample. Asian and other races ranged from 3.37% and 6.87% of the sample. 
Table 4: Gender descriptive statistics 
 
Year n Male Female 
1997 928 40.95% 59.05% 
1999 1056 39.30% 39.30% 
2001 1124 41.37% 58.63% 
2003 1239 42.86% 57.14% 
2005 1199 40.20% 59.80% 
2007 1187 39.85% 60.15% 
 
Table 5: Race descriptive statistics 
 
Year n White Black  Hispanic Asian/other 
1997 928 60.67% 31.57% 2.80% 4.96% 
1999 1056 60.13% 32.67% 2.84% 4.36% 
2001 1124 57.12% 33.99% 2.67% 6.22% 
2003 1239 54.72% 35.59% 2.82% 6.87% 
2005 1199 54.38% 38.37% 3.25% 4.00% 
2007 1187 53.41% 40.52% 2.70% 3.37% 
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 Most of the sample were working (68.64% and 82.92%), while between 1.12% and 
8.26% were self-employed. Between 15.66% and 23.71% were unemployed or not looking for 
work. Between 29.98% and 33.53% were high school graduates, while 17.30% to 23.77% did 
not complete high school. Between 8.39% and 14.77% possessed bachelor’s degrees with 
between 6.32% and 7.48% having some graduate schoolwork. 
Table 6: Employment descriptive statistics 
 
Year n Employed Not working or 
retired 
Self-employed Self employed and 
working 
1997 928 68.64% 23.71% 7.54% 0.11% 
1999 1056 70.93% 21.88% 7.01% 0.18% 
2001 1124 82.92% 15.66% 1.12% 0.30% 
2003 1239 73.38% 15.74% 7.91% 2.97% 
2005 1199 72.39% 18.85% 8.17% 0.59% 
2007 1187 71.02% 20.05% 8.26% 0.67% 
 
Table 7: Education descriptive statistics 
 
Year n No high school High school 
graduate 
Some 
college 
Bachelor's 
degree 
Graduate work 
1997 928 23.77% 32.00% 24.78% 12.01% 7.44% 
1999 1056 22.23% 30.49% 26.04% 13.76% 7.48% 
2001 1124 20.18% 29.98% 27.77% 14.77% 7.30% 
2003 1239 17.36% 33.33% 34.30% 8.39% 6.62% 
2005 1199 17.69% 32.94% 33.44% 9.09% 6.84% 
2007 1187 17.03% 33.53% 34.11% 9.01% 6.32% 
 
 As expected, there were few individuals either saving or paying alimony. Those paying 
alimony ranged from 0.65% to 1.21%, while those receiving alimony ranged from 1.69% to 
2.84%, with between 96.12% and 97.52% neither paying nor receiving alimony. Those paying 
child support ranged from between 8.76% and 12.11%. Those receiving child support ranged 
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between 16.22% and 18.28% with between 71.67% and 75.48% neither paying nor receiving 
child support. 
Table 8: Alimony descriptive statistics 
 
Year n Paying alimony Receiving alimony Neither paying nor 
receiving alimony 
1997 928 0.65% 1.83% 97.52% 
1999 1056 0.85% 2.08% 97.06% 
2001 1124 1.16% 1.69% 97.15% 
2003 1239 1.21% 2.26% 96.53% 
2005 1199 0.92% 2.84% 96.25% 
2007 1187 1.10% 2.78% 96.12% 
 
Table 9: Child support descriptive statistics 
 
Year n Paying child 
support 
Receiving child 
support 
Neither paying nor 
receiving child 
support 
1997 928 8.94% 17.67% 73.38% 
1999 1056 9.09% 18.28% 72.35% 
2001 1124 9.52% 17.17% 73.31% 
2003 1239 12.11% 16.22% 71.67% 
2005 1199 8.76% 16.26% 74.98% 
2007 1187 8.76% 15.75% 75.48% 
 
 The risk tolerance measure was taken only in 1996, but the measure was appended to 
each cohort. Values ranged from 1 to 6, with a mean of 1.86 (SD: 1.76). The median was 2, 
suggesting this group of divorced individuals was on the lower risk side. 
Table 10: Risk Tolerance descriptive statistics 
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Mean Median SD n 
1.86 2 1.76 1287 
Rated on scale from 1 - 6, 1 being extremely low risk tolerance and 6 being 
extremely high 
 
 The mean income ranged between $20,865 and $27,822. The standard deviations were 
between $21,500 and $32,166 per year. The mean net worth was between $56,400 and $98,720 
with standard deviations of $214,630 and $486,150.  
Table 11: Income descriptive statistics 
Year n Mean Median SD 
1997 928  $      20,865   $        16,000   $  21,817.00  
1999 1056  $      22,440   $        21,000   $  21,500.00  
2001 1124  $      26,265   $        26,000   $  24,602.00  
2003 1239  $      26,012   $        24,000   $  24,319.00  
2005 1199  $      27,473   $        20,000   $  32,166.00  
2007 1187  $      27,822   $        23,000   $  31,758.00  
 
Table 12: Net worth descriptive statistics (in $1000s) 
Year n Mean Median SD 
1997 928  $        58.21   $            6.00   $       287.64  
1999 1056  $        59.40   $          12.10   $       336.54  
2001 1124  $        56.44   $          14.54   $       214.63  
2003 1239  $        66.58   $          17.15   $       299.97  
2005 1199  $        98.72   $          14.25   $       486.15  
2007 1187  $        74.68   $          16.00   $       302.60  
 
 Ages of the sample had a mean between 41.95 and 48.75. The standard deviations were 
between 6.71 and 12.54. Ages ranged between 28 and 55 for the entire sample. 
Table 13: Age descriptive statistics 
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Year n Mean SD 
1997 928 41.95 6.71 
1999 1056 45.19 12.39 
2001 1124 46 12.02 
2003 1239 46.49 11.86 
2005 1199 47.47 12.25 
2007 1187 48.75 12.54 
 
 Houses that were dual income prior to divorce ranged from 47.62% and 55.01%.  This is 
compared to single income households where they ranged from 44.99% to 52.38%. As the years 
increased, the number of dual-income households increased, and the number of single income 
households decreased.  
Table 14: Dual income and single income households 
 
Year n Dual income households Single income households 
1997 928 47.62% 52.38% 
1999 1056 50.19% 49.81% 
2001 1124 51.61% 48.39% 
2003 1239 50.67% 49.33% 
2005 1199 53.48% 46.52% 
2007 1187 55.01% 44.99% 
 
 Most households in the sample had less than one child at home. The mean number of 
children was between .67 (SD: 1.02) and .94 (SD: 1.18) and decreased over time. Respondents in 
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the sample paying for college-related expenses were between 23.92% and 30.86% of the sample. 
Between 69.14% and 76.08% were not paying for college-related expenses. 
Table 15: Minor children in household 
 
Year n Mean SD 
1997 928 0.94 1.17 
1999 1056 0.76 1.11 
2001 1124 0.67 1.02 
2003 1239 0.67 1.03 
2005 1199 0.69 1.02 
2007 1187 0.69 1.06 
 
Table 16: Paying for college related expenses 
 
Year n Yes No 
1997 928 23.92% 76.08% 
1999 1056 25.66% 74.34% 
2001 1124 30.34% 69.66% 
2003 1239 28.89% 71.11% 
2005 1199 30.86% 69.14% 
2007 1187 27.21% 72.79% 
 
 A small number of the sample would indicate they were remarried. This number fell 
between 4.63% and 7.48%. This number included people previously divorced who indicated 
“married” as well as people who remarked they remarried between the last time and the current 
time. 
Table 17: Remarried versus not remarried 
 
Year n Remarried Not remarried 
1997 928 4.63% 95.37% 
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1999 1056 7.48% 92.52% 
2001 1124 5.25% 94.75% 
2003 1239 5.73% 94.27% 
2005 1199 6.17% 93.83% 
2007 1187 5.81% 94.19% 
 
 The analytic sample requires additional dimensionality, as there are new individuals 
divorced at any given time period. As an example, an individual may be divorced at t, and then 
be divorced for all five time periods. Or they may drop from the sample as they renewed their 
answer to the marital status question as “single”. Or they may get remarried and eventually drop 
from the sample. In addition, someone may only get divorced at t + 2 or later and not be in the 
sample for all subsequent years.  
Table 18: Sample size by time divorced 
Time n - Precautionary savings n - Retirement savings n -  Risky asset share 
t + 2 944 878 1121 
t + 4 788 734 803 
t + 6 656 602 647 
t + 8 551 498 544 
t + 10 389 321 408 
 
 Data analysis methodology 
 Exponential fractional response regression. 
 Analysis 1A 
The savings rate is defined as a ratio of savings to income and ratio variables follow a 
sigmoidal distribution (Gallani, Krishnan, & Wooldridge, 2015). Ordinary least squares 
regression can be used to model ratio outcome variables provided all values fall along the linear 
portion of the distribution. However, the savings rate is often negative or zero in the US 
(1) 
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(Desroches & Frances, 2010). For this study, the precautionary savings rate variables is 
constructed as follows: 
𝑆" = (𝜎& + 𝜎(( + 𝜎))𝜃  
where Sp is the precautionary savings rate, a ratio of sum of amounts of annual amount saved in a 
savings account, money market account and other short-term savings divided by annual wage 
income. Savings in a savings account, money market account and other short-term instruments 
are represented by ss, smm,  and so, respectively. Wage income is defined as q, which includes 
self-employment income, but excludes investment income and retirement income. 
Given this equation, savings cannot fall below zero nor exceed one. There are many zeros 
associated with panel survey data for savings (Wooldridge, 2013). Many households will not 
have any savings and there are clusters of observations at zero. This would suggest an analysis 
method using a truncated model such as a Tobit regression (Ramalho, Ramalho, & Henriques, 
2010). A tobit model is inappropriate because it is used with data that are censored and may have 
values above one and below zero. 
Fractional response models are more appropriate for these data as a variable such as a 
savings variable is a percentage. In other words, an individual may save no less than 0% of their 
income (based on the definition of savings in this study) and no more than 100% of their income. 
Pooled fractional response probit models have been used for ratio variables in accounting and 
finance, such as in the case of business metrics (Papke & Wooldridge, 2008). However, 
fractional response probit models require unobserved data to be normally distributed. The 
fractional response model can be defined as a conditional expectation in the following form: 𝐸(𝑦.|𝑥.) = 𝑁(𝑥.𝜕) (2.1) 
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where 𝜕 is a vector of variables describing the conditioned response and 𝑁 is a nonlinear 
function bounded by 0 and 1. 𝑁 is generally placed in a functional probit or logit model. 
Fractional response models may be extended in order to account for time with fixed 
effects in panel data as outlined below: 𝐸(𝑦.3|𝛼.𝑥.3) = 𝑁(𝑥.3𝜕	 +	𝛼.)	 
where 𝛼. is unobservable heterogeneity that does not vary by time. This method will not provide 
consistent estimators in panel data however due to the unobservable heterogeneity. While 𝛼. 
could be estimated to account for this, normal data is required which is not present in a sigmoidal 
distribution (Loudermilk, 2007; Elsas & Florysiak, 2015). Including an unobserved 
heterogeneity term in the model is a catch-all for this type of model. The presence of an 
endogenous covariate would solve any simultaneity bias, for the one individual covariate. This 
model with and without fixed effects does require strict exogeneity for all other covariates 
however. This assumption is seldom met and there is ample evidence that many other variables 
are tied to savings. 
The Exponential Fractional Response Model (EFRM) allows for analysis of ratio data 
bounded by 0 and 1, with clustering at one end of the distribution or both (Ramalho & Ramalho, 
2018; Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). The model also allows for lagged dependent variables and 
does not require normal distribution of unobserved variables. A fully realized EFRM will 
produce consistent estimators and is therefore the model used in this study. 
 Econometric issues 
Since the savings rate contains the income variable, there is a simultaneous bias problem 
(Firebaugh & Gibbs, 1985). This issue may be solved using an instrumental variable in a 2SLS 
model (Grossbard & Pereira, 2010). The instrument itself is a variable that is correlated with the 
(2.2) 
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outcome variable, but not the problem predictor variable. This model can reduce the endogeneity 
associated with the income and savings rate variables. However, finding an appropriate 
instrument for income can be challenging. Past research into proportions based on income 
suggest simultaneity is not that large of an issue. However, due to the two-stage nature of the 
EFRM, this problem of endogeneity is addressed. Multiple endogenous variables are allowed 
within the EFRM model because there are two sets of estimators. Three fixed effects estimators 
using mean differenced, quasi-differenced transformations make up the first set of estimators. 
The second set of estimators include correlated random effects, random effects and another fixed 
effects estimator. There is no need to specify a reduced model for endogenous explanatory 
variables as the quasi-differenced mean transformation uses the control function approach 
(Gallani, Krishnan & Wooldridge, 2015; Ramalho & Ramalho, 2015; Vinod & Rao, 2019). 
There is a chance that a change in savings may be due to variables outside of the model. 
Other shocks or major expenses may cause an increase or decrease in savings. In order to address 
this, a mean-zero error term is added to the final model to account for any unobserved effects on 
the savings rate. 
Life events. The outcome is conditioned upon several control variables noted in the 
variable section. Age and age-squared are designed to be indicators of life cycle changes. These 
along with dummy variables for gender, and employment variables are used to absorb any effects 
from any common life cycle events (e.g., children going to school, retiring, etc.). 
Measurement error. Panel microdata from surveys bring to mind measurement error as a 
concern because the measurement error at a specific time period is compounded over time. That 
is, any deviation from the value a respondent gives and the true value can create bias in a model 
(Groves, Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer & Terangeou, 2009). An OLS equation will be less 
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precise than a more robust model with an instrumental variable approach such as the Two-Stage 
Least Squares model (Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2008). However, a logit EFRM allowing for 
endogenous covariates should minimize this measurement error. 
Estimating parameters in an EFRM can be described in the following way: 𝑦.3 = 	𝑁[𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥.3𝜕	 +	𝛼. 	+ 𝑣.3)], 
where 𝑁 is a logit, loglog or cloglog equation. The variable 𝑦.3 is a fractional response variable, 
and 𝑥.3 is a series of control and other explanatory variables , 𝜕 represents the parameters of 
interest, in this case the time from divorce variables and 𝛼. is time-invariant heterogeneity. The 𝑣.3 describes the time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. For the savings rate equation, this 
model can be re-written as follows: 𝑆"3 = 	𝑁[𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒.3𝜕	 +	𝛼. 	+ 𝑣.3)], 
where 𝑆"3 is the savings rate variable over time and 𝑒.3 is the set of explanatory variables. These 
variables include sex, race, employment, education, age, income, net worth, number of children, 
remarriage, expenses for college, child support, alimony and risk tolerance. 
 An important aspect of the EFRM model is the  ability to handle zero observations for the 
response variables. EFRM uses a logit-link function and is a major advantage since many 
fractional responses have data clustered at 1 or 0. This link function has the added benefit of 
producing interpretable coefficients directly in model output. 
In summary, the EFRM model allows for analysis of fractional response dependent 
variables, where there are observations clustered at one end or both. Using time dummy variables 
and other econometric adjustments simultaneity bias can be accounted for. Using a fixed effects 
approach can allow for observation of  any changes to the savings rate after divorce and allow 
for determination of whether or not that change persists over time. 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
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 Analysis 1B 
Short-term and long-term savings can be assessed in similar ways. In order to examine 
longer term savings such as retirement savings, an EFRM model is used including the rate of 
long-term savings in vehicles normally reserved for retirement. The formula for the savings rate 
is identical to precautionary savings, with a substitution of 𝑆<3 to denote retirement savings rate 
over time. 
 Analysis 2 
Risky asset share is described as the proportion of risky assets as defined by the 
proportion of stocks to risk-free assets plus the risky assets. As with the savings rate variable, 
there will be clusters of observations at zero. Risky asset share takes the following form: 
𝑅" = 𝜆(𝜇 + 𝜆) 
where Rp is the risky asset share and l is the amount invested in stock investments and µ is the 
amount invested in non-risky assets, exclusive of real estate. Risky asset share can be analyzed 
with a logit EFRM as well. 
 Inertia, sudden wealth change, life cycle events and market effects.  
One issue with examining risky asset share has to do with the idea of inertia. Individuals 
may hold risky assets simply because they appreciate more (Campbell & Cochrane, 1999). Thus, 
it can be difficult to determine if someone is holding more risky assets due to gains in that asset 
class, or purposeful reallocation. Teasing this out of microdata and comparing individuals against 
themselves is problematic. 
Evidence from the PSID suggests individuals are more likely to succumb to inertia in 
asset allocation (Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2008). Thus, any large shifts in allocation are likely to 
(4.1) 
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be because of some other cause or event omitted in the model. For purposes of this analysis, 
inertia is controlled for using time dummy variables. 
An individual allocation may shift as a result of events other than divorce. As an 
example, an individual may inherit wealth in the form of either risky or non-risky assets. This 
could create a shift in balance of risky to non-risky assets or vice versa. 
As with savings, there are events in the life cycle that can cause issues with risky asset 
share. For example, as individuals age conventional wisdom is to shift from risky assets to less 
risky assets. Time dummies should absorb any life cycle effects. 
It is possible that systematic risk of global markets may cause an adjustment to risky 
asset share outside of the control of an individual household. That is, risky assets may lose or 
gain value as the result of a market event. It is estimated that the year variables should account 
for these effects and blunt any dramatic changes. In other studies (Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2008) 
local economic changes can affect a portfolio if locally sensitive assets are included in the ratio. 
Given housing and wealth is not included in the ratio, no estimation of geographic-specific 
parameters is necessary. 
The logit EFRM for risky asset share can be described as follows: 𝑅"3 = 	𝑁[𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒.3𝜕	 +	𝛼. 	+ 𝑣.3)], 
where 𝑅"3 is the savings rate variable over time and 𝑒.3 is the set of explanatory variables. 
While risky asset share has been examined using both OLS and 2SLS models 
(Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2008), in order to measure whether there is a reversion to previous 
allocation or the new adjustment appears to be permanent, using the EFRM model and 
examining those coefficients are more appropriate for this analysis. 
(5.1) 
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 Sub-analysis 1: Dual income versus single income 
 In order to examine differences in individuals who were part of either a dual income or 
single income households post-divorce, separate regressions were run to compare how 
individuals fare in these specific circumstances. Dual income households experience higher 
incomes and more financial resiliency than single income households (Thorne, 2010). A dual 
income household that divorces will conceivably end with both individuals having income post-
divorce. While they will lose the economies of scale of one household such as sharing housing 
expenses, they will have employment income of their own allowing them to build Social 
Security credit for income in retirement as well as the human capital associated with work 
experience. 
 Single income households on the other hand will lose economies of scale in both 
directions. The party with income loses home and caregiving services, and the party with no 
income has no income of their own to use in the new household, unless transfers of child support 
and spousal support occur. Given the low propensity of alimony to be awarded (Ellman & 
Braver, 2012) and inadequacy of child support payments (Morgan, 2011) this will not likely be 
able to ameliorate the loss of the other spouse’s income. Analysis was conducted on 
precautionary savings as well as retirement savings. Risky asset share on this sub-group was also 
assessed. 
 Sub-analysis 2: Male versus female 
 As outlined in the literature review, men and women have been shown to have differing 
behaviors when it comes to saving, investing and wealth distribution (Backcock, Recalde, 
Vesterlund & Weingart, 2017). Separate regressions allow for comparison among the sub-
groups. Comparisons between groups are made.  
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 Analysis 3 
Bequest intention is only asked in 2007. This makes it difficult to draw longitudinal 
comparisons. Instead, differences are examined between divorced and non-divorced individuals 
and a number of dimensions. While this makes it difficult to examine any change over time, it 
will allow a confirmatory or contradictory analysis of previous research and can provide 
information to professionals on differences between married and divorced people. 
Due to the imbalanced nature of the data a binary logistic regression is a preferable 
analysis technique compared to a multinomial model (Wooldridge, 2013). Therefore, “not 
important” and “somewhat important” are collapsed into a single category that is “not important” 
and “important” and “very important” are collapsed into a category of “important”. For purposes 
of coding, “not important” is “0,” while “important” is “1”. 
Binary logistic regression is used when the outcome variable takes one of two values. 
The model takes the following basic form: 
𝑃𝑟[𝑦 = 1|𝑥, 𝑧] = 𝑝 = 	 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜕 + 𝛽	 ∗ 	𝑙𝑛	𝑥	 + 𝛾𝑧)1	 + 	𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜕 + 𝛽	 ∗ 	𝑙𝑛	𝑥	 + 𝛾𝑧) 
Where 𝑃𝑟[𝑦 = 1|𝑥, 𝑧]  is the probability of an outcome “1” given a set of linear predictors x and 
z. These predictor variables for this model include divorced or not, sex, race, age, education, 
employment, wages and net worth. Binary logit model uses maximum likelihood estimation to 
determine the log-odds of an outcome. In this case, the model is determining the direction and 
magnitude an independent variable will increase or decrease the log-odds of someone responding 
to the bequest intention question as “important.”  
 Three separate regressions are completed for each question. Combining the questions 
makes little sense as it would be difficult to parse the influence of one on the other. In order to 
(6) 
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make the effect more interpretable, the “margins” package for R is used to estimate average 
marginal effects of each covariate, which makes the outcome more interpretable.  
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Chapter 4 - Results 
 Exponential fractional regression models were conducted for independent variables on 
precautionary savings, retirement savings and risky asset share. Employment was removed from 
all EFRM models due to convergence issues. In addition to the full sample analysis, a sub-
analysis was conducted which separated respondents with dual income households prior to 
divorce from those with single income households prior to divorce. A sub-analysis was also 
completed comparing with separate regressions for males and females. These analyses were done 
for precautionary savings, retirement savings and risky asset share. Binary logit models were 
completed for bequest intention for children or other relatives, bequest intention for religious 
organizations and bequest intention for non-religious charities. 
Due to self-reporting bias, estimates of precautionary and retirement savings rates 
changes for men and women should be interpreted with caution. Previous research indicates men 
indicate their income is higher than it actually is, and women indicate their income is lower than 
it actually is (Duncan & Hill, 1989; Goldin, 2014; Tharp, Lurtz, Mielitz, & Kitces, in press) . In 
the case of men, this will bias their savings estimates downward and for women it will bias the 
savings estimates upwards. 
 Precautionary savings – Overall 
Exponential fractional regression results for precautionary savings are outlined in Table 
18. Gender differences in precautionary savings were not significant in the full model (ß = 0.60;  
p = 0.62), nor was race. Age was not significant as a factor in precautionary savings (ß = 2.64; p 
= 0.86). Those paying alimony (ß = 1.28;  p = 0.59) and those receiving alimony (ß = -0.35; p = 
0.90) were not significantly different from those neither paying nor receiving. Those paying 
child support (ß = -0.44; p = 0.52) and those receiving child support (ß = -0.34;  p = 0.89) were 
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not significantly different from those neither paying nor receiving child support. Risk tolerance 
was not a significant factor in precautionary savings (ß = -0.30;  p = 0.84). Education was not 
significant as a factor in change in precautionary savings. Income was not significant (ß = 0.78;  
p = 0.16) and neither was net worth. The number of children had a positive association with 
precautionary savings (ß = 0.97; p = .09). Paying for college was significant at the p < .01 level 
(ß =-2.52) suggesting a negative association with precautionary savings. Getting remarried was 
positively associated (ß =3.94; p < .05) with precautionary saving. 
Table 19: Exponential fractional regression results – Precautionary savings 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Sex (Male)   - - - - 
  Female 0.60 1.21 0.49 0.62 
Race (White)  - - - - 
  Black -2.57 1.89 -1.36 0.17 
 Hispanic -1.07 0.96 -1.11 0.27 
  Asian/other 0.06 0.64 0.09 0.93 
Age  2.64 1.58 1.92 0.86 
Alimony (Neither pays 
nor receives)  - - - - 
  Pay 1.28 2.42 0.53 0.59 
  Receive -0.35 2.67 -0.13 0.90 
Child Support (Neither 
pays nor receives)      
  Pay -0.44 0.68 -0.64 0.52 
  Receive -0.34 2.67 -0.12 0.89 
Risk tolerance  -0.30 1.45 -0.20 0.84 
Education (High school 
graduate)  - - - - 
  
No high 
school -0.45 1.57 -0.29 0.77 
 Some college 0.78 0.56 1.39 0.16 
 4-year degree 1.02 1.65 0.62 0.54 
  
Some 
graduate  0.68 1.20 0.71 0.61 
Income  0.78 0.56 1.39 0.16 
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Net Worth  0.62 0.85 0.73 0.47 
Number of children  0.97 0.57 1.71 *0.09 
School expenses (No 
school expenses)  -2.52 0.95 -2.66 ***<.01 
Remarried (Not 
remarried)  3.94 2.04 1.78 **0.04 
Time   - - -   
  t + 2 -2.21 1.03 -1.84 **0.03 
 t + 4 1.02 1.78 0.71 0.48 
 t + 6 -0.86 1.21 -0.71 0.47 
 t + 8 -0.46 1.58 -0.29 0.77 
  t + 10 1.93 1.06 -1.83 *0.07 
n = 944; J-test for overidentification = 48.67 (p<.01); R-squared = .03;   
 
Time results 
 Time results indicate a decrease in the period immediately following divorce. There is an 
initial drop in precautionary savings after the divorce (ß =-2.21; p = .03). There are no significant 
results at t + 4, t + 6, or t + 8. Results at t + 10 show an increase (ß =1.93; p = 0.07) in 
precautionary savings rate.  
 Precautionary savings results– Dual income versus single income 
Results for the exponential fractional regression model are outlined for dual income 
versus single income households as it relates to precautionary savings. Dual income results are 
outlined in Table 19, and single income results are outlined in Table 20. Only significant non-
time results are shown. There were only two significant results for effects on precautionary 
savings for divorced households that were dual income prior to divorce. Individuals paying child 
support had their savings rate lowered (ß = -5.17; p < .05). In addition, as the number of children 
increased, the precautionary savings was reduced (ß = -2.28; p < .05). Time was not a factor in 
whether an individual changed their savings behavior. 
Table 20: Exponential fractional regression model results – Precuationary savings – Dual income 
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Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Sex (Male)   - - - - 
  Female 1.01 1.39 0.58 0.55 
Race (White)  - - - - 
  Black -2.81 1.21 -1.12 0.26 
 Hispanic -1.05 0.91 -1.13 0.28 
  Asian/other -0.87 0.99 -0.11 0.87 
Age  1.97 2.41 1.64 0.62 
Alimony (Niether pays nor 
receives)   - - - - 
  Pay 1.86 2.61 0.53 0.47 
  Receive -1.77 2.81 -0.99 0.74 
Child Support (Neither pays 
nor receives)      
  Pay -5.17 2.03 -2.55 **0.01 
  Receive 1.99 3.31 -1.21 0.56 
Risk tolerance  -0.31 1.43 -0.21 0.78 
Education (High school 
graduate)  - - - - 
  No high school -0.38 1.82 -0.35 0.71 
 Some college 0.42 2.70 0.16 0.88 
 4-year degree -0.99 1.22 -0.82 0.41 
  Some graduate  0.59 3.89 0.15 0.88 
Income  0.57 2.47 0.24 0.81 
Net Worth  0.72 3.87 0.03 0.94 
Number of children  -2.96 2.11 -1.40 0.16 
School expenses (No school 
expenses)  -2.52 0.95 -2.66 ***<.01 
Remarried (Not remarried)  2.36 1.28 0.87 0.31 
Time  - - - - 
  t + 2 -0.25 1.46 -0.17 0.83 
 t + 4 -0.32 1.46 -0.22 0.68 
 t + 6 -0.61 1.47 -0.42 0.89 
 t + 8 -0.33 2.30 -0.15 0.40 
  t + 10 -1.43 1.69 -0.85 0.90 
n = 727 ; J-test for overidentification = 56.54 (p<.01); R-squared = 0.06;   
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In situations where there was a single income household prior to divorce, the only finding 
having an effect on precautionary savings was whether the individual was employed or not. 
Since both individuals (employed and not employed) were included, this makes sense. Being 
employed was positively associated (ß = 1.28; p = < .01) with precautionary savings. At time t + 
2 there is a drop in the savings rate (ß = -1.12; p < .05). No subsequent years were significant. 
Table 21: Exponential fractional regression model results - Precautionary savings - Single 
income 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Sex (Male)   - - - - 
  Female 0.56 0.77 0.74 0.46 
Race (White)  - - - - 
  Black 0.16 0.10 0.50 0.62 
 Hispanic 0.11 0.14 0.77 0.44 
  Asian/other 0.55 0.41 1.36 0.17 
Age  0.10 0.18 0.53 0.60 
Alimony (Neither pays nor 
recieves)   - - - - 
  Pay 1.02 1.78 0.72 0.46 
  Receive -0.86 1.23 -0.77 0.44 
Child Support (Neither pays nor 
receives)      
  Pay 1.41 1.06 0.89 0.16 
  Receive -0.44 0.67 -0.66 0.51 
Risk tolerance  -1.31 1.98 -1.01 0.64 
Education (High school 
graduate)  - - - - 
  No high school 0.02 0.78 0.03 0.97 
 Some college 0.78 0.56 1.39 0.16 
 4-year degree 0.68 1.65 1.41 0.38 
  Some graduate  1.11 1.20 1.21 0.41 
Income  0.78 0.56 1.39 0.16 
Net Worth  -0.07 0.24 -0.27 0.79 
Number of children  0.24 0.34 0.70 0.49 
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School expenses (No school 
expenses)  0.91 0.71 1.26 0.18 
Remarried (Not remarried)  1.53 0.57 1.04 0.14 
Employed   1.28 1.12 0.89 ***p<.01 
Time   - - - - 
  t + 2 -1.12 1.04 -1.87 **.04 
 t + 4 0.78 0.56 1.39 0.16 
 t + 6 0.62 0.85 0.73 0.47 
 t + 8 -0.42 0.81 -0.63 0.54 
  t + 10 -0.88 2.42 -0.26 0.82 
n = 217; J-test for overidentification = 71.16 (p < .01); R-squared = 0.11;   
 
 Precautionary savings results – Male versus female 
Exponential fractional regression model results are outlined for males and females as it 
relates to precautionary savings. Male results are outlined in Table 21, and female results are 
outlined in Table 22. Remarriage for males has a positive association with precautionary savings 
(ß = 6.28; p < .01). Males with responsibility for school expenses experienced a negative a 
negative effect on their precautionary savings rate (ß = -2.27;  p < .05). At t + 4, there is an 
increase in savings (ß = 1.17; p < .10 level).  
Table 22: Exponential fractional regression model results - Precautionary savings - Male 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Race (White)  - - - - 
  Black -2.12 2.14 -0.89 0.72 
 Hispanic -0.22 2.62 -0.11 0.92 
  Asian/other 0.18 2.17 0.06 0.91 
Age  1.98 1.27 1.21 0.22 
Alimony (Neither pays nor 
recieves)  - - - - 
  Pay 3.87 4.12 1.21 0.31 
  Receive -2.11 2.12 -0.81 0.56 
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Child Support (Neither pays 
nor receives)      
  Pay -0.43 0.59 -0.77 0.42 
  Receive -0.24 1.87 -0.35 0.68 
Risk tolerance  -0.59 3.89 0.15 0.88 
Education (High school 
graduate)  - - - - 
  No high school -0.25 7.88 -0.18 0.98 
 Some college 0.58 2.46 0.24 0.81 
 4-year degree 0.72 3.82 0.44 0.91 
  Some graduate  1.70 3.86 0.41 0.82 
Income  -1.08 1.24 -0.83 0.38 
Net Worth  -2.95 2.11 -1.40 0.15 
Number of children  0.23 0.33 0.68 0.46 
School expenses (No school 
expenses)  -2.27 0.98 -2.15 **0.02 
Remarried (Not 
remarried)  6.28 2.18 2.64 ***<.01 
Employed (Not employed)  1.04 2.02 1.01 0.32 
Time  - - - - 
  t + 2 -0.32 1.70 -0.15 0.78 
 t + 4 1.17 1.01 -0.67 *0.08 
 t + 6 0.34 0.85 0.41 0.68 
 t + 8 0.02 0.78 0.03 0.97 
  t + 10 0.52 0.34 1.53 0.13 
n = 434; J-test for overidentification = 38.21 (p<.01); R-squared = 
0.14   
 
 Females who remarry also have a positive association with precautionary savings rates (ß 
= 3.18; p < .01). There is evidence of positive association of income with precautionary savings 
rates for females (ß = 1.02; p < .10). There were no significant time estimates for females and 
precautionary savings. 
Table 23: Exponential fractional regression model results – Precautionary savings – Female 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
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Race (White)  - - - - 
  Black 0.34 0.53 0.61 0.52 
 Hispanic 0.28 0.98 0.42 0.34 
  Asian/other 0.04 0.61 0.31 0.74 
Age  1.24 2.91 1.09 0.38 
Alimony (Niether pay nor 
receive)  - - - - 
  Pay 0.03 0.58 0.06 0.95 
  Receive 0.84 1.21 0.98 0.76 
Child Support (Neither pay 
nor receive)      
  Pay -0.61 1.24 -0.79 0.39 
  Receive 0.44 1.01 1.01 0.31 
Risk tolerance  -0.33 2.16 -0.15 0.88 
Education (High school 
graduate)  - - - - 
  No high school 0.71 12.16 0.01 0.98 
 Some college 2.35 8.44 0.02 0.97 
 4-year degree 2.16 11.21 0.04 0.91 
  Some graduate  1.69 10.88 0.08 0.93 
Income  1.02 1.04 1.07 *.07 
Net Worth  0.87 1.87 0.73 0.63 
Number of children  1.54 3.88 1.41 0.18 
School expenses (No school 
expenses)  -1.88 3.12 -1.21 0.14 
Remarried (Not 
remarried)  3.18 1.87 2.34 ***p<.01 
Employed (Not employed)  1.21 4.44 0.64 0.68 
Time  - - - - 
  t + 2 -0.45 1.57 -0.29 0.77 
 t + 4 -1.07 0.96 -1.11 0.27 
 t + 6 0.06 0.64 0.09 0.93 
 t + 8 -0.44 0.67 -0.66 0.51 
  t + 10 -1.32 1.44 -0.93 0.89 
n = 510; J-test for overidentification = 64.587 (p <. 01); R-squared = 0.09   
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 Retirement savings – Overall 
Results for exponential fractional regression model for retirement savings are outlined in 
Table 23. Gender differences were not significant (ß = 0.24; p = 0.82). With respect to white, 
black respondents did not have a significant difference in retirement savings rates (ß = -0.53; p = 
0.36), nor were Hispanics who had an estimate of ß  = -0.28 (p = 0.15) when compared to whites 
and Asian/other had an estimate of ß = -.03 (p = 0.95) when compared to whites. Neither those 
paying alimony nor those receiving alimony had a significant impact on retirement savings 
compared to those neither paying nor receiving alimony. Their estimates were ß = 0.02 (p = .95) 
and ß = 0.34 (p = 0.76) respectively. Child support was also not significant either for the 
individual paying, or the individual receiving the support when compared to those neither paying 
nor receiving child support. Their estimates were ß = -0.07 (p = 0.89) and ß = 0.14 (p = 0.64) 
respectively. Risk tolerance was also not significantly associated with retirement savings and 
reported an estimate of  ß = -1.36 (p = 0.32). None of the education variables were significant. 
Income did not appear to be a factor as either, with an estimate of ß = 0.15 (p = 0.86), nor did net 
worth with an estimate of ß = 0.60 (p = 0.51). Number of children in the family was not 
significant with an estimate of  ß = -0.88 (p = 0.49). School expenses were not significant with 
respect to retirement savings with an estimate of ß = -1.75 (p = 0.28). Individuals who remarried 
had a positive association with retirement savings (ß = 5.01; p < .10).  
Table 24: Exponential fractional regression results – Retirement savings 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Sex (Male)           
  Female 0.24 1.06 0.23 0.82 
Race (White)      
  Black -0.53 0.58 -0.92 0.36 
 Hispanic -0.28 0.41 -0.69 0.15 
  Asian/other -0.03 0.39 -0.07 0.95 
Age  0.16 1.02 0.16 0.87 
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Alimony (Neither pays nor receives)    
  Pay 0.02 0.37 0.07 0.95 
  Receive 0.34 1.11 0.3 0.76 
Child Support (Neither pays nor receives)    
  Pay -0.07 0.51 -0.13 0.89 
  Receive 0.14 0.36 0.24 0.64 
Risk tolerance  -1.36 1.36 -1.00 0.32 
Education (High school graduate)     
  No high school -0.94 1.17 -0.81 0.42 
 Some college 0.21 1.51 0.79 0.38 
 4-year degree -0.05 1.03 0.05 0.96 
  Some graduate  0.19 1.15 0.167 0.87 
Income  0.15 0.82 0.18 0.86 
Net Worth  0.60 1.31 0.62 0.51 
Children in family  -0.88 1.31 -0.68 0.49 
School expenses (No school 
expenses) -1.75 1.41 -1.12 0.28 
Remarried (Not remarried) 5.01 2.87 1.67 *0.08 
Time           
  t + 2 -0.89 0.76 -1.12 **.02 
 t + 4 -1.96 1.39 -1.408 0.17 
 t + 6 -2.32 1.18 -1.955 *.05 
 t + 8 0.74 1.58 0.47 0.64 
  t + 10 0.18 2.37 0.09 0.93 
n = 878 ; J-test for overidentification = 48.70 (p<.01); R-squared =.09 ;   
 
Time results 
 Time results indicate changes at  t + 2 and t + 6. There is an initial decrease at t + 2 in 
retirement savings rate of  (ß = -0.07;  p < .05). At the next time stage (t + 4) the estimate is not 
significant with respect to changes in retirement savings (ß = -1.96; p = 0.17). However, at t + 6, 
there is an increase in retirement savings (ß = 2.32; p = 0.02). Both t + 8 (ß  = 0.74; p = 0.64) and 
t + 10 (ß = 0.18; p = 0.93) show no significant changes in retirement savings. 
Retirement savings – Dual income and single income 
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Results for exponential fractional regression model for retirement savings for dual 
income and single income households as it relates to retirement savings are outlined in tables 24 
and 25. Dual income results are outlined in Table 24, and single income results are outlined in 
Table 25. For dual income households, income was significant and positively associated with 
retirement savings rates (ß = 4.17; p < .01), while being remarried was positively associated with 
retirement savings rates (ß = 3.43; p < .10). No other covariates significantly affected retirement 
savings rates for dual income households. The time estimates were all insignificant. 
Table 25: Exponential fractional regression results – Retirement Savings – Dual income 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Sex (Male)           
  Female 0.28 2.12 0.06 0.87 
Race (White)      
  Black -0.52 0.68 -0.87 0.56 
 Hispanic -0.26 0.98 -0.06 0.87 
  Asian/other -0.06 0.44 -0.03 0.96 
Age  0.28 1.04 0.21 0.86 
Alimony (Neither pays nor 
receives)      
  Pay 0.03 0.41 0.06 0.94 
  Receive 0.31 1.88 0.24 0.72 
Child Support (Neither 
pays nor receives)      
  Pay -0.48 1.21 -0.21 0.72 
  Receive 0.66 2.14 0.19 0.33 
Risk tolerance  -1.02 1.48 -0.58 0.31 
Education (High school 
graduate)      
  No high school -0.93 1.17 -0.62 0.39 
 Some college 0.24 1.64 0.82 0.41 
 4-year degree -0.04 2.64 0.06 0.97 
  Some graduate  0.64 1.88 0.22 0.81 
Income  4.17 0.87 1.44 ***<.01 
Net Worth  0.68 2.66 0.42 0.43 
Children in family  -1.21 3.45 -0.12 0.77 
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School expenses (No 
school expenses)  -2.88 4.66 -0.98 0.81 
Remarried (Not 
remarried)  3.43 1.21 1.71 *.05 
Time  - - - - 
  t + 2 -0.12 1.57 -0.21 0.81 
 t + 4 -0.42 1.43 -0.38 0.71 
 t + 6 -0.58 1.43 -0.39 0.88 
 t + 8 -0.32 1.87 -0.18 0.52 
  t + 10 -0.77 2.11 -0.44 0.68 
n = 673 ; J-test for overidentification = 64.61 (p < .01); R-squared = 0.05  
 
 For single income households being remarried had a positive effect on the retirement 
savings rate (ß = 2.86; p < .05). No other covariates had a significant effect on retirement savings 
for single income households prior to divorce. None of the time estimates were significant with 
respect to single incomes and retirement savings. 
Table 26: Exponential fractional regression results – Retirement Savings – Single income 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Sex (Male)           
  Female 0.18 1.44 0.18 0.89 
Race (White)      
  Black -0.44 1.24 -0.67 0.41 
 Hispanic -0.31 1.22 -0.87 0.18 
  Asian/other -0.12 2.45 -0.03 0.98 
Age  0.44 2.02 0.33 0.84 
Alimony (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay 0.88 1.64 0.68 0.64 
  Receive 1.21 2.44 0.59 0.68 
Child Support (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay -0.55 1.21 -0.28 0.88 
  Receive 0.18 0.98 0.17 0.63 
Risk tolerance  -1.58 2.28 -1.21 0.14 
Education (High school graduate)     
  No high school 0.24 1.06 0.23 0.82 
 Some college -0.53 0.58 -0.92 0.36 
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 4-year degree -0.03 0.41 -0.07 0.95 
  Some graduate  0.16 1.02 0.16 0.87 
Income  0.13 0.71 0.18 0.86 
Net Worth  0.34 1.10 0.30 0.76 
Children in family  -1.21 1.44 -0.89 0.30 
School expenses (No school expenses) -1.22 2.45 -0.45 0.54 
Remarried (Not 
remarried)  2.86 0.98 1.22 **.02 
Time   - - - - 
  t + 2 -2.64 2.86 -1.68 0.21 
 t + 4 -1.87 1.99 -1.32 0.24 
 t + 6 0.08 0.68 0.03 0.94 
 t + 8 -2.21 2.44 -1.33 0.17 
  t + 10 0.98 1.56 -0.44 0.69 
n = 205 ; J-test for overidentification = 48.67 (p<.01); R-squared = 0.12;   
 
 Retirement savings – Male and female 
Results for exponential fractional regression model for male and female households as it 
relates to retirement savings are outlined in tables 26 and 27 respectively. Results are displayed 
regardless of significance. Results for sub-group male show there is a positive association of 
income with retirement savings (ß = 0.83; p<.10). There is a negative association (ß = -1.08; 
p<.05) of child support paid with retirement savings. There is a negative association of (ß = -
2.44; p<.10) of school expenses with retirement savings. Time results at t + 2 show a decrease in 
retirement savings rate (ß = -1.68; p<.10) and an increase at t + 10 (ß = 2.14; p<.05). 
Table 27: Exponential fractional regression results – Retirement savings – Male 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Race (White)      
  Black -0.19 22.61 -0.01 0.95 
 Hispanic 0.25 23.01 0.01 0.99 
  Asian/other 0.08 24.99 0.02 0.97 
Age  0.21 0.5 0.42 0.68 
Alimony (Neither pays nor receives)     
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  Pay -2.91 2.22 -1.46 0.15 
  Receive 0.14 1.89 0.44 0.54 
Child Support (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay -1.08 0.79 -1.02 **.01 
  Receive 0.29 1.05 0.78 0.31 
Risk tolerance  0.58 2.47 0.24 0.80 
Education (High school graduate)     
  No high school 0.42 2.70 0.18 0.82 
 Some college 0.60 3.90 0.19 0.84 
 4-year degree 0.58 2.47 0.28 0.79 
  Some graduate  0.96 3.05 0.32 0.76 
Income  0.83 0.28 0.67 *.05 
Net Worth  0.60 1.31 0.62 0.51 
Children in family  -0.88 1.31 -0.68 0.49 
School expenses (No school expenses) -2.44 1.11 -1.65 *.06 
Remarried (Not remarried)  3.24 4.68 1.02 0.17 
Time  - - - - 
  t + 2 -1.68 1.54 -1.20 *.07 
 t + 4 1.02 2.18 0.77 0.29 
 t + 6 0.37 0.98 0.55 0.48 
 t + 8 -0.18 0.57 -0.17 0.86 
  t + 10 2.14 1.33 1.12 **.01 
n =404 ; J-test for overidentification = 62.22 (p  <  .01); R-squared = .13   
 
 Results for the female sub-group show a positive association of retirement savings with 
income (ß = 4.12; p<.01). No other covariates were significant with respect to females and 
retirement savings. No time results were significant with respect to females and retirement 
savings. 
Table 28: Exponential fractional regression results – Retirement savings – Female 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Race (White)      
  Black 0.81 0.96 0.85 0.38 
 Hispanic 0.35 2.21 0.16 0.87 
  Asian/other 0.09 2.14 0.05 0.97 
Age  0.47 0.41 1.135 0.26 
 
 
62 
Alimony (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay -0.11 0.25 -0.44 0.66 
  Receive 4.46 2.36 1.22 0.11 
Child Support (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay -0.73 1.07 -0.92 0.42 
  Receive 0.84 1.33 0.72 0.48 
Risk tolerance  0.62 2.17 0.29 0.78 
Education (High school graduate)     
  No high school -2.09 3.44 -0.61 0.54 
 Some college -1.67 3.29 -0.51 0.61 
 4-year degree -0.85 3.25 -0.26 0.73 
  Some graduate  -0.61 3.29 -0.22 0.81 
Income  4.12 1.98 -2.87 ***<.01 
Net Worth  1.04 1.88 0.44 0.52 
Children in family  -1.21 2.45 -0.27 0.61 
School expenses (No school expenses) -1.88 3.01 -0.085 0.22 
Remarried (Not remarried)  1.04 2.18 0.64 0.44 
Time   - - - - 
  t + 2 -0.45 1.57 -0.29 0.77 
 t + 4 -1.07 0.96 -1.11 0.27 
 t + 6 0.72 0.54 1.28 0.16 
 t + 8 1.08 1.45 0.44 0.66 
  t + 10 -1.41 1.88 -0.86 0.72 
Data source: Panel Study on Income Dynamics; n = 474 ; J-test for overidentification = 42.81 
(p < .01); R-squared = .04;  
 
 Risky asset share – Overall 
Exponential fractional regression model results for risky asset share are outlined in Table 
28. Sex differences are insignificant with an estimate of (ß =-0.45; p = 0.56). Racial 
characteristics are also insignificant with respect to risky asset share with blacks having an 
estimate of 0.33 (p = 0.53) in comparison to whites, Hispanics an estimate of 0.35 (p = 0.68) 
when compared to whites and Asian/other with an estimate of 0.04 (p = 0.74) in comparison to 
whites. Age was not significant with an estimate of 0.28 (p = 0.34). Compared to individuals 
neither paying nor receiving alimongy paying alimony was not associated with risky asset share 
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(ß = -0.45; p = 0.76) nor was receiving (ß = -0.37; p = 0.61) respectively. Compared to those 
neither paying nor receiving child support, paying child support was negatively associated with 
risky asset share (ß = -3.94;  p < .10), while receiving child support was not significant with an 
estimate of (ß = 1.00; p = 0.36). Risk tolerance was not significant with an estimate of (ß =1.58; 
p = 0.34) with respect to risky asset share. Compared to high school graduates, none of the other 
education variables were significant with respect to risky asset share. Wage income was 
positively associated with risky asset share (ß = 1.24; p < .05), while net worth was not 
significant (ß = 0.23; p = 0.73). Number of children in the family were not significant with an 
estimate of (ß = 0.19; p = 0.79). Individuals paying college expenses showed a negative 
association with risky asset share (ß = -2.07; p < .10). Being remarried was negatively associated 
with risky asset share (ß = -4.38;  p < .05). 
Table 29: Exponential fractional regression results – Risky asset share 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Sex (Male)           
  Female -0.45 0.77 -0.58 0.56 
Race (White)      
  Black 0.33 0.54 0.62 0.53 
 Hispanic 0.35 0.85 0.41 0.68 
  Asian/other 0.04 0.61 0.31 0.74 
Age  0.28 0.98 0.42 0.34 
Alimony (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay -0.45 1.49 -0.301 0.76 
  Receive -0.37 0.74 -0.51 0.61 
Child Support (Neither pays nor receives)    
  Pay -3.94 2.21 -1.78 *0.07 
  Receive -1.00 1.10 -0.91 0.36 
Risk tolerance  1.58 2.16 1.98 0.41 
Education (High school graduate)     
  
No high 
school -0.61 1.24 -0.79 0.39 
 Some college 0.44 1.01 1.01 0.31 
 4-year degree -0.09 1.37 0.54 0.71 
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  Some graduate  1.1 2.12 0.98 0.88 
Income  1.24 0.58 2.13 **0.03 
Net Worth  0.23 0.66 0.35 0.73 
Children in family  0.19 0.73 0.26 0.79 
School expenses (No school 
expenses) -2.07 1.22 -1.69 *0.09 
Remarried (Not remarried) -4.38 1.71 -2.56 **0.01 
Time           
  t + 2 0.18 2.15 0.09 0.93 
 t + 4 -1.93 1.38 -1.43 0.16 
 t + 6 -2.26 0.96 -2.37 **0.01 
 t + 8 -0.75 1.59 -0.47 0.63 
  t + 10 -1.98 0.84 -2.35 *0.02 
n = 1121 ; J-test for overidentification = 34.86 (p<.01); R-squared = 0.07;   
 
Time results 
 Time results indicate changes at t + 6 and t + 10. Both t + 2 and t + 4 showed no 
significant changes in risky asset share. At t + 6 there is a decrease in risky asset share (ß  = -
2.26; p < .05). At t + 8 there is no significant reduction, but at t + 10 there is a reduction in risky 
asset share (ß = -1.98; p < .05). 
 Risky asset share – Dual income and single income 
Results for exponential fractional regression model for retirement savings for dual 
income and single income households as it relates to retirement savings. Dual income results are 
outlined in Table 29, and single income results are outlined in Table 30. When looking at couples 
that were dual income prior to divorce, the only non-time covariate that is significant is net worth 
with a positive association with risky asset share (ß = 2.98; p <. 01). At t + 8 there is a decrease 
in risky asset share (ß = -0.88; p < .05). At t + 10 there was a continued negative association with 
risky share (ß = -2.68; p < .01). 
Table 30: Exponential fractional regression results – Risky asset share – Dual income 
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Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Sex (Male)           
  Female -0.44 0.68 -0.66 0.51 
Race (White)      
  Black 0.84 3.76 0.24 0.81 
 Hispanic 1.6 3.67 0.44 0.66 
  Asian/other 1.99 2.88 0.68 0.48 
Age  0.03 0.37 0.08 0.94 
Alimony (Neither pays nor 
receives)      
  Pay 1.58 0.99 1.59 0.11 
  Receive 0.82 0.86 1.12 0.21 
Child Support (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay -3.24 1.97 -1.02 0.15 
  Receive 1.94 1.31 1.49 0.14 
Risk tolerance  1.57 1.25 1.26 0.21 
Education (High school 
graduate)      
  
No high 
school 1.04 4.00 0.262 0.79 
 Some college 1.17 4.08 0.29 0.76 
 4-year degree 0.91 3.94 0.29 0.74 
  
Some 
graduate  0.32 3.96 0.08 0.93 
Income  0.4 0.61 0.66 0.51 
Net Worth  2.98 1.68 2.04 ***<.01 
Children in family  -0.14 0.23 -0.78 0.51 
School expenses (No school 
expenses)  -0.75 1.87 -0.98 0.31 
Remarried (Not remarried)  -0.28 0.71 -0.41 0.58 
Time   - - - - 
  t + 2 -0.41 1.01 -0.22 0.81 
 t + 4 -1.68 2.77 -1.02 0.44 
 t + 6 0.28 1.15 0.08 0.91 
 t + 8 -0.88 0.78 -0.58 **<.04 
  t + 10 -2.68 1.55 -1.01 ***<.01 
Data source: Panel Study on Income Dynamics; n = 807 ; J-test for overidentification = 78.34 
(p <. 01); R-squared = .05;  
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 When looking at couples where there was a single income prior to divorce, school 
expenses were negatively associated with risky asset share (ß  = -3.21; p < .05). Income was also 
positively associated with risky asset share at (ß = 2.48; p < .05). In the period immediately 
following divorce at t + 2 there is an increase in risky asset share of (ß = 1.14; p < .05). There is 
a decrease in risky asset share at t + 10 of (ß = -2.01; p < .05). 
Table 31: Exponential fractional regression results – Risky asset share – Single income 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Sex (Male)           
  Female -0.28 1.48 -0.71 0.48 
Race (White)      
  Black -0.45 0.77 -0.58 0.56 
 Hispanic 0.62 0.85 0.73 0.47 
  Asian/other 0.37 0.98 0.55 0.48 
Age  0.18 2.14 0.21 0.87 
Alimony (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay -0.61 1.24 -0.79 0.39 
  Receive 0.44 1.01 1.01 0.31 
Child Support (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay -2.91 2.22 -1.46 0.15 
  Receive 0.14 1.89 0.44 0.54 
Risk tolerance  0.27 1.19 0.23 0.82 
Education (High school 
graduate)      
  No high school 0.14 0.71 0.17 0.85 
 Some college 0.34 1.10 0.30 0.76 
 4-year degree 0.72 3.82 0.44 0.91 
  Some graduate  1.86 2.91 0.84 0.78 
Income  2.48 1.67 1.61 **.02 
Net Worth  0.97 1.37 0.70 0.48 
Children in family  0.21 0.98 0.44 0.71 
School expenses (No school expenses) -3.21 1.31 -2.04 **.01 
Remarried (Not remarried)  2.61 1.41 1.28 0.13 
Time   - - - - 
  t + 2 1.14 1.02 1.71 **.03 
 
 
67 
 t + 4 0.44 0.78 0.98 0.54 
 t + 6 0.61 0.78 0.44 0.68 
 t + 8 -1.09 0.78 -1.04 0.21 
  t + 10 -2.01 1.44 1.01 **.03 
Data source: Panel Study on Income Dynamics; n = 314 ; J-test for overidentification = 26.21 
(p = . 04); R-squared = .08 
 
 Risky asset share – Male versus female 
Results for exponential fractional regression model for for male and female households as 
it relates to risky asset share are outlined in tables 31 and 32. Male results are outlined in Table 
31, and female results are outlined in Table 32. For males, being remarried had a negative 
association with risky asset share of (ß = -1.58; p <.10). Net worth had a positive association 
with risky asset share (ß = 5.28; p <.01). At t + 2 there is an increase in risky asset share for 
males (ß = 2.18; p <.05) of risky asset share. There is an additional increase in risky asset share 
at t + 4 (ß = 1.28, p < .10). 
Table 32: Exponential fractional regression results – Risky asset share – Male 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Race (White)           
  Black -0.54 0.51 -0.87 0.38 
 Hispanic -0.28 0.41 -0.69 0.15 
  Asian/other -0.04 0.41 -0.06 0.98 
Age  0.44 1.28 1.02 0.18 
Alimony (Neither pays nor receives)         
  Pay 1.39 1.05 0.91 0.15 
  Receive -0.48 1.87 -0.61 0.48 
Child Support (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay 0.88 1.64 0.68 0.64 
  Receive 1.21 2.44 0.59 0.68 
Risk tolerance  0.78 3.41 1.21 0.78 
Education (High school 
graduate)      
  No high school 0.68 3.48 0.04 0.97 
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 Some college 2.31 4.21 0.03 0.96 
 4-year degree 2.98 4.22 0.02 0.99 
  Some graduate  1.48 3.87 0.12 0.91 
Income  0.98 2.12 1.04 0.18 
Net Worth  5.28 2.38 2.44 **.01 
Children in family  0.77 1.66 0.58 0.48 
School expenses (No school expenses) -1.22 2.24 -1.08 0.25 
Remarried (Not remarried)  -1.58 1.38 -1.28 *.05 
Time  - - - - 
  t + 2 2.18 1.44 1.54 **<.04 
 t + 4 1.28 1.18 1.21 *0.08 
 t + 6 -0.16 0.84 -0.18 0.81 
 t + 8 1.28 0.65 0.87 0.19 
  t + 10 0.48 0.85 0.34 0.22 
Data source: Panel Study on Income Dynamics; n = 527 ; J-test for overidentification = 49.67 
(p < .01); R-squared = .14 
 
 For females, there is a positive association of remarriage with risky asset share (ß = 1.32; 
p < .05). Income had a positive association with risky asset share as well (ß = 1.02; p<.10). No 
time effects were significant. 
Table 33: Exponential fractional regression results – Risky asset share – Female 
Variable  ß S.E. t value p-value 
Race (White)           
  Black 0.33 0.58 0.72 0.49 
 Hispanic 0.28 1.04 0.98 0.34 
  Asian/other 0.22 0.92 0.48 0.61 
Age  0.08 2.45 0.07 0.95 
Alimony (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay 2.87 5.11 0.78 0.56 
  Receive -2.18 1.05 -1.02 0.16 
Child Support (Neither pays nor receives)     
  Pay -0.43 0.59 -0.77 0.42 
  Receive -0.24 1.87 -0.35 0.68 
Risk tolerance  1.58 2.16 1.98 0.41 
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Education (High school 
graduate)      
  No high school -0.27 3.87 -0.08 0.97 
 Some college 0.42 2.64 0.25 0.82 
 4-year degree 0.75 3.83 0.47 0.90 
  Some graduate  1.24 2.68 0.70 0.84 
Income  1.02 1.04 1.07 *.07 
Net Worth  0.29 1.27 0.38 0.67 
Children in family  0.22 0.98 0.18 0.66 
School expenses (No school expenses) -1.08 2.87 -0.44 0.32 
Remarried (Not remarried)  1.32 1.01 1.12 **.02 
Time  - - - - 
  t + 2 0.58 1.04 0.32 0.67 
 t + 4 -0.45 0.77 -0.58 0.56 
 t + 6 0.62 0.85 0.73 0.47 
 t + 8 0.37 0.98 0.55 0.48 
  t + 10 -1.21 1.89 -0.87 0.64 
Data source: Panel Study on Income Dynamics; n = 594 ; J-test for overidentification = 44.51 
(p < .01); R-squared = .04 
 
 Bequest intention analysis 
 Binary logit model results are reported for bequest intention. Table 33 shows results for 
bequest intention for children or other relatives, Table 34 shows results for bequest intention for 
religious organizations and Table 35 shows results for bequest intention for non-religious 
charities. 
For the response of bequest intention to children and other relatives, being divorced was 
not significant (p = .48), suggesting there was no difference between married and divorced 
individuals when it comes to leaving money to children. When compared to whites, blacks had a 
5% increase in the probability they intend to leave a bequest to children (p = .02), while 
Asian/other had a 7% increase in the probability they intend to leave a bequest to children. As an 
individual aged, they had a 5% decrease in the likelihood they would leave money to children (p 
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< .01). Those with a bachelor’s degree or greater had a 4% decrease (p = .03) in the probability 
they would leave money to children or other relatives when compared to high school dropouts. 
Those with some college and those who were high school graduates only did not have significant 
differences from high school dropouts. Whether employed, unemployed by choice or 
unemployed not by choice there were no significant differences in employment levels. Income 
was not a significant factor in whether someone would leave a bequest. Net worth was 
significant at p < .01 level and as net worth increased there is a 3% increase in the probability an 
individual would leave a bequest to children or other relatives. 
Table 34: Binary logit – Bequest intention for children and other relatives 
Variable 
 ß AME OR OR Lower 
OR  
Upper p-value 
Intercept   1.73   5.62 4.03 7.93 ***p<.01 
Divorced (Married) -0.06 -0.01 0.94 0.79 1.12 0.48 
Sex (Female)             
  Male -0.07 -0.01 0.93 0.81 1.07 0.33 
Race 
(White) 
       
  Black 0.37 0.05 1.44 1.05 1.96 **0.02 
 Hispanic 0.21 0.02 1.33 1.09 2.01 ***p<.01 
 Asian/Other -0.43 -0.07 0.65 0.48 0.87 ***p<.01 
Age  -0.35 -0.05 0.71 0.66 0.76 ***p<.01 
Education (High School 
dropout) 
      
  
High school 
graduate 0.03 0.01 1.03 0.86 1.25 0.73 
 Some college -0.15 -0.02 0.87 0.71 1.05 0.15 
 
Bachelors or 
greater -0.23 -0.04 0.79 0.65 0.97 **0.03 
Employment (Employed)       
  
Unemployed by 
choice 0.17 0.02 1.18 0.97 1.44 0.11 
 
Not unemployed by 
choice -0.16 -0.03 0.85 0.70 1.05 0.12 
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Wages  0.00 0.06 1.00 0.94 1.09 0.92 
Net Worth   0.20 0.03 1.22 1.09 1.40 ***p<.01 
n = 7595 ; Degrees of freedom = 7601; c = 0.73; R-squared = 0.08; -2 log likelihood = 7218; 
AIC = 7360 
 
For the response of bequest intention to religious organizations, being divorced was 
significant (p < .01), and divorced individuals, when compared to married individuals had a 5% 
lower probability they would leave a bequest to a religious organization. When compared to 
whites, blacks had a 7% greater probability they intend to leave a bequest to a religious 
organization (p = .02), while Asian/other had a 13% greater probability they would leave a 
bequest to a religious organization, when compared to whites (p<.01). As an individual aged, 
they had a 3% lower probability they would leave money to religious organizations (p<.01). 
Those with a bachelor’s degree or greater had a 8% lower probability (p = .03) they would leave 
money to a religious organization when compared to high school dropouts. Those with some 
college and those who were high school graduates only had a 7% and 3% decrease respectively 
in the probability they would leave a bequest to a religious organization respectively, when 
compared to high school dropouts. Whether employed, unemployed by choice or unemployed 
not by choice, there was no significant differences by employment levels in bequest intention for 
religious organizations. Income was not a significant factor in whether someone would leave a 
bequest to religious organizations. Net worth was not significant in affecting the chances an 
individual would leave a bequest to a religious organization. 
Table 35: Binary logit – Bequest intention for religious organizations 
Variable 
 ß AME OR OR Lower 
OR  
Upper p-value 
Intercept   -0.23   0.79 0.60 1.04 0.09 
Divorced (Married) -0.27 -0.05 0.76 0.65 0.89 ***p<.01 
Sex (Female)       
  Male -0.11 -0.02 0.89 0.80 1.01 0.06 
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Race 
(White) 
       
 Black 0.28 0.07 1.32 1.04 1.69 **.02 
 Hispanic 0.74 0.12 2.11 1.64 5.62 ***p<.01 
 Asian/Other -0.62 -0.13 0.54 0.43 0.68 ***p<.01 
Age  -0.14 -0.03 0.87 0.82 0.92 ***p<.01 
Education (High School 
dropout) 
      
  
High school 
graduate -0.18 -0.03 0.83 0.72 0.97 **.02 
 Some college -0.34 -0.07 0.71 0.60 0.84 ***p<.01 
 
Bachelors or 
greater -0.40 -0.08 0.67 0.56 0.80 ***p<.01 
Employment (Employed)       
  
Unemployed by 
choice 0.15 0.03 1.17 0.97 1.40 0.10 
 
Not unemployed by 
choice 0.03 0.01 1.03 0.88 1.22 0.70 
Wages  -0.09 -0.02 0.92 0.83 0.99 0.06 
Net Worth   0.05 0.01 1.05 1.00 1.11 0.06 
n = 7595 ; Degrees of freedom = 7585; c = 0.76; R-squared = 0.17; -2 log likelihood =8855; 
AIC = 8947 
 
For the response of bequest intention to non-religious charities, being divorced was 
significant (p <. 01), and divorced individuals had a 4% lower probability they would leave a 
bequest to a non-religious organization when compared to married individuals. When compared 
to whites, blacks did not have a significant difference when compared to whites, while 
Asian/other had a 16% (p < .01) higher probability they intend to leave a bequest to a non-
religious charity. As an individual aged, they had a 7% lower probability they would leave a 
bequest to a non-religious charity (p < .01). Those with a bachelor’s degree or greater had a 4% 
lower probability (p = .05) they would leave money to non-religious charity when compared to 
high school dropouts. Those with some college and those who were high school graduates only 
each had a 5% lower probability they would leave a bequest to a non-religious charity 
 
 
73 
respectively, when compared to high school dropouts.When compared to employed individuals, 
those unemployed by choice and unemployed not by choice were significant and had a 4% lower  
probability they would leave money to a non-religious charity. Income was not a significant 
factor. As net worth increases there is a 2% increase in the probability an individual will leave a 
bequest to a non-religious charity. 
Table 36: Binary logit – Bequest intention for non-religious charities 
Variable 
 ß AME OR OR Lower 
OR  
Upper p-value 
Intercept   0.07   1.07 0.82 1.40 0.60 
Divorced (Married) -0.20 -0.04 0.82 0.71 0.95 ***p<.01 
Sex (Female)             
 Male -0.20 -0.04 0.82 0.73 0.92 ***p<.01 
Race 
(White) 
       
  Black -0.12 -0.03 0.89 0.70 1.13 0.34 
 Hispanic -0.14 -0.04 0.92 0.78 1.11 0.21 
 Asian/Other -0.69 -0.16 0.50 0.40 0.63 ***p<.01 
Age  -0.32 -0.07 0.73 0.69 0.77 ***p<.01 
Education (High School 
dropout) 
      
  
High school 
graduate -0.23 -0.05 0.80 0.69 0.93 ***p<.01 
 Some college -0.25 -0.05 0.78 0.66 0.92 ***p<.01 
 
Bachelors or 
greater -0.17 -0.04 0.84 0.71 1.00 **.05 
Employment (Employed)       
  
Unemployed by 
choice 0.20 0.04 1.22 1.02 1.45 **.03 
 
Not unemployed by 
choice 0.20 0.04 1.22 1.04 1.43 **.02 
Wages  0.02 0.01 1.02 0.96 1.08 0.56 
Net Worth   0.08 0.02 1.08 1.02 1.15 **.02 
n = 7595 ; Degrees of freedom = 7594; c = 0.81; R-squared = 0.19; -2 log likelihood =9098; 
AIC = 9384 
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 Research questions and hypotheses 
The research question is: What effect does divorce have on wealth management? In 
certain circumstances and sub-groups there does appear to be an effect of divorce on the aspects 
of accumulation and management of wealth. Analysis of overall groups of divorced people 
indicate certain consistent covariates associated with increases or decreases in the rates of 
precautionary savings, retirement savings and risky asset share. Bequest intentions confirmed 
some previous research and did not confirm others. 
There is an overall decrease in precautionary savings for divorced individuals after 
divorce consistent with H1. This decrease appeared to persist until t + 10, where there was an 
increase in precautionary savings. This suggests reaching an equilibrium of some sort after the 
initial drop and then a reversal of that decrease. Comparing single-income households to dual 
income households, single-income households experience a drop in precautionary savings rates, 
while dual income households do not, consistent with H2. While wage income was not 
significant as it relates to precautionary savings and as a result does not uphold H3. 
Table 37: Summary table of results 
Hypothesis 
Predicted 
direction Result Consistent 
H1: Individuals will have lower precautionary 
savings rates post-divorce. Negative Negative Yes 
H2: Single-income households prior to divorce 
will have lower precautionary savings rates post-
divorce than double-income households. Negative Negative Yes 
H3: As wage income increases post-divorce 
precautionary savings rates will increase. Positive 
Not 
significant No 
H4: Individuals will have lower retirement 
savings rates post-divorce. Negative Negative Yes 
H5: As wage income increases post-divorce 
retirement savings rates will increase. Positive 
Not 
significant No 
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H6: Individuals will have a higher proportion of 
their assets in risky assets post-divorce than prior 
to divorce. Positive Negative No 
H7: The proportion of risky assets will not 
change over time post-divorce. Neutral Negative No 
H8: Single-income households will have a higher 
proportion of their assets in risky assets than 
double-income households. Positive Positive Yes 
H9: Divorced individuals will be less likely to 
leave money to children or other relatives. Negative Positive No 
H10: Divorced individuals will be less likely to 
leave money to religious organizations. Negative Negative Yes 
H11: Divorced individuals will be less likely to 
leave money to non-religious charities. Positive Negative No 
 
Overall results suggest after divorce, individuals decrease their retirement savings rates 
and continue to decrease retirement savings, consistent with H4. Wage income does not have a 
positive association with retirement savings and is not consistent with H5. There does not appear 
to be a difference when comparing dual income to single income households as far as the time 
from divorce changes. However, both single and dual income households show an increase in 
retirement savings rates if remarried. Dual income households have a positive association with 
income. For males, there is a decrease in retirement savings at divorce, that is recovered at t + 10. 
Females on the other hand show no significant changes with retirement savings post-divorce. 
However, females do experience increased retirement savings rates with an increase in income. 
Overall results for risky asset share suggest there is a decrease in risky assets over time 
for individual post-divorce. This is not consistent with H6 and there appears to more of a 
decrease of risky assets later after divorce so does change over time which is not consistent with 
H7, nor previous research. Single income households do experience an increase in risky asset 
share post-divorce consistent with H8, but risky asset share does decrease in later years.  
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Results for the binary logistic regression comparing married and divorced individuals as 
it relates to leaving money to children and other organizations do not uphold H9. Results were 
not significant, suggesting there are no differences in the groups.  However, when it comes to 
leaving money to religious organizations, being divorced is in line with H10 as they are less 
likely to leave money to religious organizations as a bequest. The opposite was found for H11 
where divorced were less likely to leave a bequest to non-religious charities, while the 
hypothesis was they would be more likely to leave a bequest. 
 Summary of findings 
There is an effect after divorce on precautionary savings, retirement savings and risky 
asset share. Some effects are only noticeable when examining sub-groups. Precautionary savings 
is affected just after divorce overall and does reverse later. Other than men increasing their 
precautionary savings, this is consistent with theory. Retirement savings has an overall negative 
effect as it relates to divorce and in particular men tend to reduce their retirement savings. There 
is no difference between dual and single income households as it relates to retirement savings for 
divorced individuals. Risky asset share showed an overall decrease, but certain differences in 
dual and single income households were surprising as single income households increased their 
risky asset share. Men increased their risky asset share and kept increasing it, while there did not 
appear to be a change for women. Bequest intention gave both confirmatory and contradictory 
results. 
Some of the most surprising effects came from covariates. Being remarried appeared to 
have a positive effect in almost every situation. School expenses had a negative effect on 
situations where it was significant. By themselves, most demographic characteristics did not 
have any effect. Race, age and education had no significant impact on any of the outcome 
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variables. Alimony as expected had no effect on any of the outcome variables. In some cases, 
paying child support had an effect on precautionary and retirement savings. Income and net 
worth had an occasional positive effect, while number of children in the family typically reduced 
the savings rates, both precautionary and retirement. 
 
Chapter 5 - Discussion 
 Discussion of research findings 
This study sought to discover the effect of divorce on wealth management and to 
determine the extent to which these effects continued over time. By examining precautionary 
savings and retirement savings from the point of divorce, in two-year intervals using 
exponentional fractional regression models there were situations where there were both short- 
and long-term effects. The same exponential fractional regression models were applied to the 
proportional of risky assets held by divorced individuals and results were mixed. Finally, cross-
sectional analysis of bequest intentions confirmed some previous research and contradicted 
others. 
 Precautionary savings 
The results from precautionary savings highlight how some of the idiosyncrasies of 
divorce can affect savings behavior. Divorced persons who pay for college expenses save less 
than those without college expenses. Remarriage has a positive effect on precautionary savings. 
This makes logical sense, as there are economies of scale being married (Cherchye, 2016). The 
divorce process removes economies of scale that are achieved while living together (e.g., shared 
housing payments or shared household production roles). Interestingly, the number of children 
an individual had overall indicated a positive effect on precautionary savings. It is expensive to 
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raise children, thus on the surface these results seem counterintuitive. However, it may be that 
unexpected medical bills, or the need for purchasing vehicles or insurance for children may 
prompt savings. In divorce situations, there may be a court order or separation agreement 
mandating planned expenses for children get paid by a given spouse or shared in a non-equal 
proportion with their former spouse (Garrison, 2011). With college having a negative effect on 
the savings rate, perhaps those with children ameliorate this drop by saving for their children. 
The time effects of divorce show that immediately after the divorce, there is a decrease in 
savings rate. This makes sense, as there may be fewer resources to pay for increased expenses 
(Kothakota & Heckman, 2018). However, there is a reversal of this rate change after 10 years. 
This may mean an equilibrium has been reached. There is also the possibility that there has been 
a decrease in expenses as children age out, or an increase in income as individuals spend more 
time in the workforce, as some of the sub-analyses seem to suggest increased income helps with 
savings rates. 
It is also telling that many covariates such as race and education do not appear to have an 
effect on the precautionary savings rate. This may mean that divorce is an equalizer of sorts and 
has little to no effect on these financial behaviors in that people of all education and races behave 
similarly post-divorce. Risk tolerance also did not appear to have an effect on the savings rate. 
While Light and Ahn (2010) found a positive association with divorce and risky behavior, they 
were comparing between married and divorced, while this study compared within group. This 
could be because risk tolerance is not thought about as much under divorce constraints, or that 
the differences in risk tolerances within the divorce group is so small as to show no effect. 
Alimony may have an effect, but the sample is too small to tell, and child support while effective 
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in sub-group analyses, was not significant in the overall analysis. This suggests transfer 
payments have little to no effect on savings.  
 Dual income and single income sub-analysis 
 In situations where the divorced individual came from a dual-income household and was 
paying child support, there was a negative effect on the savings rate. This suggests that in this 
case there is an effect of transfer payments: either the individual is paying more than they can 
afford and reducing their disposable income, or in situations where there are minor children there 
is not enough money to go around. Since the number of children also has a negative effect, the 
effect of paying child support and number of children may have a multiplicative effect on 
savings. While there are no significant time effects, this may simply mean that those with dual 
incomes have the ability to continue saving as before absent children and transfer payments. 
 Single income households, on the other hand, showed an increase in savings rates if they 
were employed. This makes sense whether they were employed previously or not. There is an 
initial time effect after the divorce that has a negative influence on savings rates. This could be 
the result of simply increased expenses. It also could be the result of taking time to find 
employment if they were one of the individuals not employed at the time of divorce. 
 Male and female sub-analysis 
 Examining precautionary savings results among males shows that they increase their 
precautionary savings after divorce. This could be the result of being remarried as they show a 
marked increase in precautionary saving if they have remarried. They do experience a negative 
influence on savings rates if they are responsible for expenses related to college. While most 
states do not require the payment of college by divorced parents (Turley & Desmond, 2011)), it 
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is possible many males opt to cover college expenses and may agree to do so as part of marital 
dissolution in exchange for some other concession (Smyth, Vnuk, Rodgers & Son, 2014).  
 There were no time effects illustrating either crisis mode or chronic strain in the female 
regression as it relates to precautionary savings. Being remarried does have a positive effect on 
the precautionary savings rate, however. This is consistent with other results from remarriage 
and is likely a result of having more resources or economies of scale. In addition, having income 
is positively associated with increased precautionary savings.  
 Retirement savings 
Overall retirement savings indicate a decrease in the retirement savings rate after divorce. 
There does not appear to be a reversal of this trend within the PSID data. This could be from 
required shifting of expenses prior to divorce. Previous retirement contributions may not be 
sustainable given the new divorced circumstances. These contribution reductions may be the 
result of orders from the court or necessary changes as a result of divorce negotiation (Fields, 
2016). The only other significant factor was whether an individual was remarried, and this may 
include new spouse retirement savings. The time effects do not indicate that this change in 
retirement savings rate adjusts, even as distance with respect to the divorce increases. 
It is surprising that most of the other covariates are not significant. Retirement savings is 
in the United States is a behavior that must be elected. And at least income and education would 
be thought to play a role in whether an individual is saving for retirement. It is also possible with 
so few saving for retirement, the group that does actually share a common omitted variable. 
Transfer payments would likely reduce the ability to save for retirement, but neither alimony nor 
child support are significant. Again, risk tolerance is not significant, suggesting that the risk 
tolerance questions may not be useful in identifying propensity to save with these data. 
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 Dual income and single income sub-analysis 
There were no time effects with individuals divorced from a previous two-income 
household. This suggests individuals maintained the status quo and did not make any changes 
post-divorce. This is logical, given that both individuals had income and may be able to adjust to 
their individual income and expense paradigms post-divorce.  
Income had a positive association with dual income divorced individuals. This is 
consistent with expectations as income can be helpful in maintaining or increasing retirement 
savings. Again, being remarried has a positive influence on retirement savings. In the context of 
retirement savings, this likely means economies of scale as a married couple typically can share 
expenses and share non-income generating work (e.g., household chores). 
 Male and female sub-analysis 
Retirement savings by males experience a negative association after divorce, and then 
does increase later. This suggests the initial reason for the decline is related to the divorce. 
Income was positively associated with retirement savings. Child support paid by males resulted 
in a negative association with retirement savings. As in other conditions, this makes sense. More 
paid out to an ex-spouse means less to put into retirement savings. School expenses have a 
negative influence on retirement saving – again, this is likely due to those expenses taking away 
income that could otherwise be deferred into retirement. 
Retirement savings among females shows no time effects. This is consistent with the 
overall effects and suggest if someone was contributing before, they did not change their rate of 
contribution and if they were not contributing before they did not contribute after. Income did 
have a positive effect on retirement savings for females however. The income effect for females 
is consistent with males as well.  
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 Risky asset share 
Risky asset share overall analysis indicates that paying child support reduced the 
proportion of risky assets. This could be attributed to the need to meet expenses via liquidating 
investable assets. Income is positively associated with risky asset share, suggesting income may 
help someone take on more risk in investing as they have income as a buffer (Arianti, 2018). 
School expenses had a negative effect. Again, perhaps this had something to do with liquidating 
investable assets during college years. However, this could also be due to changing allocations so 
that investments designated for college are less subject to volatility (Woodside-Oriakhi, Lucas & 
Beasley, 2013). Unlike the savings variables, being remarried is negatively associated with risky 
asset share. This may be due to using a joint utility function of couples to invest the money, or 
what happens with the assets of each party combine, such as one person having nearly riskless 
assets or one of the excluded assets from the analysis (e.g., house). 
The time effects show a risky asset share reduction well after the divorce event (at t + 6 
and t + 10). This suggests the divorced individual is not beholden to inertia in their assets and 
does make changes as mentioned in other research (Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2008). However, 
there does not appear to be an effect initially after the divorce, suggesting these changes are due 
more to life cycle issues. 
 Dual income and single income sub-analysis 
 Divorced individuals who previously had dual incomes prior to marital dissolution 
showed a positive association with net worth and risky asset share. This may be due to being 
used to absorb market shocks (Seccombe, 2002) because of having two incomes in addition to a 
higher net worth. Time effects show a decrease in risky asset share in later years, but not 
immediately subsequent to divorce, suggesting those from a dual income previous marriage do 
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not change their risky asset share because of the divorce event, but possibly due to life cycle 
changes (Games & Michaelides, 2005; Campbell, Cocco & Gomes, 2001). 
 Single income divorced individuals decrease their risky asset share when they have 
school expenses. As with the overall analysis, this may be due to the need to have fewer assets in 
volatile instruments. Income was positively associated with risky asset share. This may be 
because they are putting more money in 401(k)-type investments (Kwun, Mohebbi & Braunstein, 
2010) or have confidence that their income will provide a buffer for volatile investment 
instruments (Seccombe, 2002). Time effects show an increase in risky asset share subsequent to 
divorce. This may be because of the divorce and a desire to make back what was lost due to the 
divorce (Charles & Stephens, 2004). Later, the time effect is reversed and there is a decrease in 
risky asset share, possibly meaning an adjustment to the new normal, or life cycle changes 
(Games & Michaelides, 2005; Campbell, Cocco & Gomes, 2001). 
 Male and female sub-analysis 
 Male divorced individuals decrease their risky asset share when remarried, consistent 
with previous literature (Grable, 2000). Having higher net worth is associated with higher risky 
asset shares. As in other situations, this may be entirely unrelated to being divorced and may 
actually involve reverse causality. That is, having a higher risky asset share may result in a 
higher net worth. Time effects for males show an increase in risky asset share after divorce. This 
may be because of purposeful rebalancing (Games & Michaelides, 2005; Campbell, Cocco & 
Gomes, 2001), the result of division of the marital estate (Garrison, 2008) or a desire to “get back 
what they lost” in the divorce. While excluding other assets such as a house and business from 
the calculation should help with reducing the effect of a an unbalanced division of the marital 
estate, it does not eliminate it entirely.  
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 Female divorced individuals have a positive association with remarriage and risky asset 
share. This is also consistent with previous literature (Grable, 2000) that suggests women 
increase their risky asset share when getting married. In addition, income is positively associated 
with risky asset share for women. As with previous overall and sub-group analyses, this makes 
sense as the ability to earn income may help an individual feel more comfortable taking portfolio 
risk and think about the long-term. There were no time effects: this suggests female divorced 
individuals, absent intervention, are subject to inertia as it relates to portfolio allocation. 
 Bequest intention 
 This study found no differences between divorced and married individual’s intent to 
leave a bequest to children or other relatives. In addition, there was a decrease in the likelihood 
they intended to leave a bequest to non-religious charities.  These results are contradictory to 
previous research as it relates to children and non-religious charities (Kell, Jane & Rohrbacher, 
2014). Bern and colleagues (2009) found divorced individuals were less likely to leave money to 
children than married individuals, while this study did not find a relationship. Further, this study 
also found being divorced decreased the probability they would leave a bequest to a non-
religious charity, which is the opposite of Bern and colleagues’ research. This could be that Bern 
and colleagues also included single individuals in their sample, while this study’s sample 
compared only divorced and married individuals. There is also the possibility that remarriage in 
the current study created an issue.  
The results from the current study did confirm the decrease in the likelihood that a 
divorced individual would leave money to a religious organization when compared to married 
individuals. Importantly, the ability to leave money to any group is impacted by actually having 
money to leave. Net worth is tied inextricably to this and as can be noted in both the leaving 
 
 
85 
money to children and money to non-religious charity questions, net worth increases the 
probability of a bequest being made. 
 EFRM 
Use of the Exponential Fractional Regerssion models provided an opportunity to both 
look at causality in the short-term and long-term, and provided nuance not examined before. 
Other models have difficulty incorporating endogenous variables, while EFRM allows full 
inclusion of both endogenous and exogenous variables. Importantly, EFRM extends the use of 
other fractional response models to longitudinal data, while traditional FRM can only be applied 
to cross-sectional models.  
In terms of replication of previous research, the results are confirmatory of economic 
hardship associated with divorce. Specifically, there are decreases in precautionary savings rates. 
This decrease indicates a reduced financial ability to handle hardships that may come from 
emergencies. Thus, future financial shocks would be difficult to manage and may lead to debt or 
possibly bankruptcy. Past research has not examined the role of dual income households and 
single income households as being different with respect to absorbing the divorce shock. This 
particular study builds on previous research by expanding the detail in precautionary savings 
research with respect to divorce and buttresses research comparing single and dual income 
married households. In addition, the boost to savings from remarriage provides additional 
evidence for married couples that precautionary savings is increased when economies of scale 
are present. Use of the EFRM provided an opportunity to both look at causality in the short-term 
and long-term, and provided nuance not examined before. 
The decreases in retirement savings also confirm previous research associated with 
retirement savings. Specifically, as current household expenses increase then retirement savings 
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has been found to decrease. As with precautionary savings, examining the dual income and 
single income divorced households separately creates more nuance in the results. Dual income 
households appear to be more robust to negative changes in retirement savings behavior.  
The contradictory nature of divorce and risky asset share compared to previous research 
suggests that the divorced sub-group acts differently. Surprisingly, these individuals act in 
accordance with best practices by reducing their risky asset share over time. This may be because 
protective factors such as divorce professionals provide perspective on how they should be 
allocating assets. Conversely, it may simply be that higher risk assets are being withdrawn to pay 
for current consumption, leaving non-risky assets as the only remaining amount. This makes if 
there are few cash assets to begin with. Withdrawing retirement assets to pay for current 
consumption, as an example will naturally result in a reduction in risky asset share. 
Despite previous research suggesting divorced individuals are less likely to leave a 
bequest to children or other relatives, compared to married individuals there does not appear to 
be a difference. This contradiction points to divorced parents still feeling financially responsible 
for their children. Previous research did indicate less of a desire to leave money to religious 
organizations, although the results of this study with the reference group being white may simply 
point to white individuals leaving less. Black and Hispanic individuals are more likely than 
whites to leave more money to religious organizations. This is also consistent with previous 
research. There is a contradiction with individuals who divorce not having a bequest intention 
towards non-religious charities. This contradiction points to possible variation between data 
sources. 
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 Divorce stress adjustment theory 
In some ways, the results are generally in line with the divorce stress adjustment theory. 
Overall results with both precautionary and retirement savings provide some evidence that in 
certain circumstances, individuals who are divorced experience crisis mode and chronic stress. 
Sub-group analyses provide further insight into which groups’ financial behaviors may be more 
subject to the stress of divorce than others.  
 Precautionary savings, crisis moments and chronic strain 
The overall results of the precautionary savings analysis suggest there is a decrease in 
precautionary savings post-divorce and that this rate of savings does not change for some time. 
There is evidence that there is a reversal years later, suggesting this is a chronic strain stressor. 
At the same time, this could be seen as a temporary effect since it does eventually reverse. 
Adding school expenses into a divorce situation appears to have a negative effect on this by 
exacerbating the downward direction of the savings rate. Conversely, remarriage has a positive 
effect on precautionary savings. 
Examining divorced individuals coming from dual income household is interesting 
because it suggests that dual income households are robust to the divorce event and do not have 
any changes simply because those households divorce. There does appear to be a negative effect 
when paying child support, as well as the number of children in the household, which would both 
be negative stressors.  
However, coming from a situation where the household is dual income creates an effect 
prior to the divorce event as there is no noticeable effect at the time of divorce. This lack of a 
time effect may be simply because the couple was not saving prior to the divorce, and so there 
would be no change. Precautionary savings though is to provide a buffer in the case of an 
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emergency or a long-term event such as a job loss. Since dual income households have lower 
proportional expenses, they should be able to save more prior to divorce. That there is no 
decrease in a savings rate post-divorce may mean structural financial issues within the 
household, such as not having an actual savings plan. This may create stress on a marriage and 
actually be a catalyst for the couple to divorce. 
Single income divorced individuals however show signs of chronic strain as there is a 
negative effect subsequent to divorce that does not change. There is a positive effect of being 
employed. This makes sense as the employment can likely boost income, allowing the individual 
to save more for emergencies. 
When looking at males, there is an increase in savings rates sometime after divorce. This 
suggests that there is neither a crisis moment nor chronic strain when males get divorced as it 
relates to precautionary savings. This may be because of remarriage working as a positive 
influence on savings and males getting married quickly after divorce (Spanier & Glick, 1980). 
School expenses do act as a negative stressor and can reduce precautionary savings. 
In the case of females, there is also no crisis moment or chronic strain associated with the 
divorce. As with males, remarriage does appear to have a positive effect on precautionary 
savings. Income is also a positive for females and has a positive influence on whether they can 
save or not. 
 Retirement savings, crisis moments and chronic strain 
Overall results for retirement savings suggest retirement savings rates are subject to 
chronic strain. Not only do they decrease after divorce, they decrease more sometime after 
divorce. The only effect in the case of retirement savings rates is whether the individual was 
remarried, which had a positive effect on retirement savings. 
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Dual income households had neither a crisis moment nor chronic strain. However, single 
income households likewise experienced neither a crisis moment nor chronic strain in retirement 
savings rates suggesting the income share prior to divorce has little to do with retirement savings.  
Income had a positive effect on those with higher incomes who had higher retirement savings 
rates. Remarriage also had a positive effect on retirement savings. 
When looking only at males they experienced a crisis moment as they had a decrease in 
retirement savings rate initially after divorce, and later reversed this decrease. There was a 
positive effect on income. School expenses and child support paid, however, were stressors that 
can decrease retirement savings rates. Females had neither an increase nor a decrease in 
retirement savings rates. Income was a protective factor as it had a positive association with 
retirement savings rates. 
 Risky asset share, crisis moments and chronic strain 
Risky asset share as it relates to divorce-stress adjustment theory is difficult to say 
whether a change is positive or negative, as increasing risky asset share can be good in many 
cases. It may depend on perspective, as one individual may feel that taking more risk is 
necessary to “get back what they lost from the divorce and may be more aggressive, while 
another individual may fear “losing” more by taking on more risk. Measurement of substantial 
changes is the key factor in this analysis. 
Overall results indicate that contrary to previous research there is no evidence of inertia 
and there does not appear to be an effect of the divorce on risky asset share. However, when 
looking at the sub-group analysis for single income household divorced individuals there is an 
increase in risky asset share just after divorce followed by a decrease later, suggesting 
individuals coming from single income households increase their risky asset share as a result of 
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divorce-stress. In the case of these individuals, income causes an increase in risky asset share, 
while school expenses also may have a positive or negative effect, depending upon whether the 
decrease in risky assets is considered a good thing for that specific situation.  
Interestingly, dual income households appeared to follow a pattern of decreasing their 
risky asset share over time. This is often recommended by financial planners (Finke & Huston, 
2003). There does not appear to be either a crisis moment or chronic strain associated with 
reallocating risky assets post-divorce, and net worth is the only variable with an effect for 
increased risky asset share. Single income households experience a crisis moment initially after 
divorce and increase their risky asset share, while following generally recommended advice and 
decreasing it in later years. In addition, single households with higher incomes have a higher 
proportion of risky assets, and a lower proportion of risky assets with school expenses, 
suggesting these are positive and negative effects respectively. 
In the case of males, there does appear to be chronic strain of risky asset share 
immediately subsequent to divorce. However, this could be simply the nature of males as 
previous research indicates they tend to have a higher risky asset share (Grable, 2000). 
Remarriage tends to increase this effect, while net worth tends to increase the willingness to have 
a higher proportion of assets in risky investments. Females on the other hand do not experience 
either a crisis moment or chronic strain as it relates to risky asset share. For females, getting 
remarried increases their propensity to put more assets in risky investments. Since previous 
research indicates getting married increases risky asset share for females (Grable, 2000), this 
could simply an effect of marriage found previously on female risky asset share. Having more 
income also increases the amount females put in risky assets. This increased income may have a 
negative effect in the sense that income in general may make individuals feel as if they can take 
 
 
91 
more risk, or a positive influence in the sense that having more income provides a feeling of 
safety and riskier may be taken with investments. 
 Bequest intention, crisis moments and chronic strain 
Unfortunately, there is not enough information in the PSID to draw any conclusions 
about crisis moments and chronic strain. There are differences between divorced and married 
individuals when it comes to bequest intentions, but it is difficult to tell if these differences are 
the result of a divorce, an whether they would persist or not. It is important to take note of the 
differences however, and how they differ from previous research. Stronger research design is 
needed to determine the idiosyncrasies and subtle differences in bequest intention and the effect 
divorce and time has on it. 
 Implications 
Given the lack of significance of many demographic variables, these results present an 
opportunity for financial planners and wealth managers to assist clients of varying demographics 
without treating them differently because of race or education when it comes to those divorced. 
While this study does discuss how divorce effects precautionary savings, retirement savings and 
risky asset share, caution should be used in applying the generalizations to specific situations. 
Several themes did emerge from the analysis however that should help guide how professionals 
interact with clients going through divorce. 
 Precautionary savings 
 Getting divorced does have an effect on the ability to save for emergencies. This should 
be considered when negotiating a divorce and or creating a financial affidavit for court 
proceedings. In particular, situations where there is one earner spouse prior to divorce should be 
considered. The focus should be on employment and empowering the individual not working. 
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This may reduce the financial strain associated with the divorce and allow both individuals to 
save. Another remedy may be to have established savings distributed differently to account for 
any differences. In the case of males, they do appear to be able to increase their savings some-
time after divorce, perhaps suggesting a different asset division.  
 Retirement savings 
 In the case of retirement savings, the negative influence after the divorce and continually 
should have individuals and advisors to divorced individuals concerned. Articles on divorce and 
retirement security suggest getting divorced impacts the ability of a divorced individual to retire 
severely (Munnell, Hou & Sanzenbacher, 2018). Financial planners and wealth managers armed 
with this information should keep a careful eye on how these savings rates might change. More 
check-ins in the years after divorce may be necessary to keep them on the right track. The 
reduction in retirement savings is more obvious for males and thus for male clients the 
professional should be especially aware. 
 Risky asset share 
 The variation in risky asset share results may simply mean divorced individuals are more 
engaged in their financial future. While overall results point to a decrease in risky asset share, 
there is an increase among males. Professionals should check-in and make sure this is a choice 
that is being rationally considered in the context of the individuals total wealth plan.  
 Bequest intentions 
 While not specifically examined over time or in the immediate context of divorce, there 
is information in the study that can be useful to professionals. Knowing that there are differences 
can help starting a conversation around bequests. Often charitable trusts are suggested by 
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financial planners (Brown, 2004), which may be a mistake given the likelihood that a divorced 
individual may not be charitably inclined, at least at some point.  
 School expenses 
 School expenses or paying for the post-secondary education of children has a negative 
effect on both savings rates and risky asset share. For precautionary savings, this may simply 
mean once the money is spent it no longer needs to be saved and so a reduced savings may make 
sense. However, for retirement savings planners need to be aware and perhaps counsel clients 
that reducing retirement savings to pay for college will reduce their ability to spend in retirement.  
The decrease in risky asset share may simply be a result of liquidating risky assets to pay for 
school, but it may also be the result of fear so that money used to pay those expenses is not 
volatile. Planners should take into account the time horizon and purpose of the money and 
caution that reducing risky asset share may have long-term negative consequences. 
 Income 
 It may seem obvious, but income needs to be considered part of a post-divorce wealth 
plan. Financial planners can assist in helping divorced individuals find new careers. Partnering 
with occupational specialists would be useful in identifying opportunities for divorced clients. A 
financial planner should have knowledge of the marketplace for careers and also be able to help 
the client move in the right direction. Keeping in mind those in the divorced situation may need 
more prompting than those not, given the traumatic nature of divorce. The positive influence of 
income on savings is non-trivial, as is the ability to feel as if one may invest in riskier assets. 
Income is often tied to employment, which is tied with self-efficacy and is considered a factor in 
the success of individuals post-divorce (Warrener, Koivunen & Anderson, 2014). 
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 Remarriage 
 One of the most persistent themes in the analysis is that remarriage has a positive effect 
on both precautionary and retirement savings rates. This makes sense for a variety of reasons, as 
there may be economies of scales associated with a new marriage. This information is less 
helpful for financial planners as they may not necessarily work as a matchmaker. However, this 
may simply mean that the divorced individual needs more support and time with the planner. 
Perhaps getting the individual to focus on finances and being a partner in the decision-making 
process can assist clients in making choices that mirror the effects of getting remarried.  
Remarriage has a mixed effect on risky asset share consistent with previous literature 
around males and females. Since males tend to be more risk tolerant prior to marriage and less 
risky during marriage and females are vice versa, this effect makes sense. However, just like 
with savings, understanding where the client is and providing more time and education to the 
client may help them make adjustments to fit their plan. The inertia issue with some sub-groups 
can be helped with check-ins and counseling on why adjustments may need to be made to risky 
assets. 
 Limitations 
The results should be interpreted with caution in light of the limitations of the study. This 
study was conducted using a secondary dataset not designed for this analysis. The PSID does not 
ask every question in every year. Further, since the dataset is designed to mirror the population 
of the United States, and most households do not have any savings (Butrica & Smith, 2012), the 
savings estimates have less power, as does the risky asset share. If someone does not have any 
precautionary savings or in fact is going into debt to finance their lifestyle, then measurement of 
this variable is difficult. If someone does not have any retirement savings, there is no rate of 
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savings and there is no variation being captured, and it is difficult to see if that individual 
changes their savings preferences over time. Risky asset share is also difficult to measure since 
an individual must have risky assets to have a proportion of assets in them. This is compounded 
by the issue of divorced individuals skewing lower income and not having assets and sometimes 
a negative net worth (Butrica & Smith, 2012). 
The risk tolerance question is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it is only asked 
in 1996. If risk tolerance is assumed to be constant, this is less of a problem. However, risk 
tolerance may affect risky asset share and savings, and divorce may affect risky asset share 
mechanically on how assets are divided. It is difficult to tease out what is mechanical and what is 
an individual risk preference with one year of information. In addition, the risk tolerance 
questionnaire asks all family members this question. Unfortunately, not all family members 
complete the questionnaire, and when splitting the divorced couple, the questions are not 
assigned directly to the non-head divorced spouse. This required creative variable coding to 
account for the discrepancy. 
Variable measurement for the key response variables of precautionary savings, retirement 
savings and risky asset share required specific handling as those measures could not be made in 
every year in the analysis. A dataset with those measures at every stage would be more helpful in 
identifying variation within group and within individual across years. On savings the calculations 
involve accounting for investment experience and assuming that there are no withdrawals. For 
retirement savings, this means not accounting for taxes in any withdrawals. Since tax return data 
is not included in the sample, it would be non-trivial to attempt to calculate an estimate of taxes 
on any retirement account withdrawal. 
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Calculating risky asset share is less precise than desired. Typically, retirement funds at 
employers are located within mutual funds or other multi-investment option accounts. These 
types of funds reduce idiosyncratic risk but are still affected by the volatility of capital markets 
(Spiegel & Zhang, 2013). Self-reported references to “stock” in an account is an issue since most 
individual Americans are not financially literate (Kothakota & Kiss, 2019) and have trouble 
differentiating between different types of investments (Grinblatt & Kelharju, 2000). Further, 
individuals may own a single stock or a series of individual stocks that are highly volatile. This 
increases the relative risk of their portfolio when compared to a portfolio with less idiosyncratic 
risk, such as mutual funds. 
This study excluded businesses from assets. Individuals with businesses tend to invest 
more into their businesses (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011) and depending upon the stage of business 
may carry debt as part of their capital structure (Ammerman, 2017). Divorce can harm a family 
business, but usually one person keeps operation of the business (Stafford, Duncan, Dane & 
Winter, 1999). This may cause that person to have no risky assets at all in this study, even 
though they carry the full idiosyncratic risk of their business. Business owners are also less likely 
to invest in retirement accounts in early business stages (Bowen & Charles, 2003). Increases in 
retirement contributions could coincide with more disposable income in later business stages and 
have less to do with stress adjustment. Not including business owners as a covariate and 
interacting with other variables does not allow examination of this effect. 
While child support and alimony are included as explanatory variables, the number of 
individuals receiving child support and alimony is small. Lower income individuals are more 
likely to divorce, they are less likely to receive alimony and child support (Kothakota & 
Heckman, 2018). A sample including more wealthy households would help determine whether 
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the short- and long-term effects on precautionary savings, retirement savings and risky asset 
share are affected by these types of transfer payments. 
 Disposition of marital estate 
Since the analysis excludes assets such as vehicles and real estate, the effect of the 
disposition of the marital estate is not included in the analysis. As an example, a couple with a 
retirement account and house as their only assets might get divorced. One spouse receives all of 
the retirement funds and the other receives the house. In this situation, the spouse receiving the 
house has a zero risky asset share according to this analysis, while simultaneously carrying all of 
the risk associated with the real estate market. In addition, if there is an unequal distribution of 
assets the spouse receiving fewer assets may have a greater desire to save than the spouse 
receiving more assets. 
 Methodology 
The Exponential Fractional Regression Model is helpful in identifying measuring 
significant changes to savings rates and risky asset share. It is less helpful in determining if 
equilibrium to previous behavior is achieved. A duration or survival analysis model may be 
helpful in identifying whether this occurs. Austin (2014) has suggested using a multivariable 
fractional polynomial model to assess survival curves, while Tang, Jeong & Song (2017) suggest 
the use of a fractional logistic regression model. While less equipped to handle zeroes and ratio 
variables in general, a more robust data set with fewer extreme values may allow for this type of 
analysis.  
 Future studies 
Given the promising nature of these results, there is an opportunity to build on this 
research in the area of divorce and wealth management. Future studies can be conducted on other 
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longitudinal datasets such as the Health and Retirement Savings Survey. Since each survey has 
varying degrees of detail within the financial questions that are asked, more detailed investment 
and savings data may be obtained. This may allow for more precise measurement of risky asset 
share as well as illustrate actual savings rates. A project of this scope further would provide 
validation or contradiction for the current study, advancing the scientific knowledge of this area 
of inquiry.  
Given the dearth of surveys focused on divorcing, primary research by collecting data on 
divorcing couples and divorced individuals may help in obtaining more accurate information. 
Specifically, a study tailored to assess the varying financial, emotional and structural dimensions 
of divorce may provide better estimates on behavior of savings and investing. Primary research 
may also allow for collecting of very specific savings and investing information by designing 
questions to obtain that information. 
This study only examined divorces from heterosexual couples. Future research should 
include results for same sex divorces. Same sex divorces may have different outcomes than 
heterosexual divorces. For example, it would be interesting to examine results from same sex 
dual income households and same sex single income households and compare them to 
heterosexual households. Examining male-male and female-female differences would also be 
interesting to see how the gender differences compare from heterosexual couples and same sex 
couples. 
The definition of wealth management used in the introduction includes protection of 
assets. Protecting assets is usually done with various insurance and estate planning tools. This is 
an important part of the wealth management process that should be explored in the future. 
Analysis of how divorced individuals use or do not use insurance products can open 
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conversations for wealth managers to provide adequate protection following a divorce. As an 
example, someone who is reliant on child support and alimony may be advantaged to purchase 
life insurance on their former spouse in case that spouse dies, and transfer payments stop. 
Given the often negative savings rates of individuals and negative net worth associated 
with individuals in this sample, research on debt and how it changes over time and interventions 
to assist with that debt can be helpful in finding the causes of spiraling debt for divorced 
individuals. Examining the differentiating factors between divorced individuals in debt and those 
not in debt can be helpful in developing interventions to assist with debt management. Studies 
can use both cross-sectional and longitudinal data to examine the effects of such interventions. 
Almost one-third of the sample were paying for educational expenses associated with 
children. College tuition can affect wealth and the ability to save (Souleles, 2000). Further 
research on the effect of divorce on college planning, the choice of college by a financial 
dependent and the debt loads of children of divorce can be helpful to professionals in advising 
clients before, during and after divorce.  
Pieces of estate planning can also be researched. How individuals decide to distribute 
their wealth upon their death is an important part of the wealth management process. The bequest 
intention results of this study provide a start to estate planning research but must be further 
examined before more robust recommendations can be made surrounding the research. In 
addition, the techniques individuals, both divorced and not use and how they wish to distribute 
those assets can be helpful in understanding a divorced population. Looking to see how these 
events change pre- and post-divorce and over their lifetime can assist wealth managers in 
advising their clients. 
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Since this study explicitly excludes business owners, a study including business owners 
would be useful. A business may be sold, it may convey to one spouse or it may continue to be 
owned by both parties. If sold, this would result in a large cash infusion and would necessitate 
management of that cash for current and future consumption. Understanding how each spouse 
operates post-divorce would be helpful in assisting wealth managers and financial planners to 
steer their clients in the direction that works best for that individual. If one spouse continues to 
own the business, and the owner-spouse must take on debt to but their spouse out of their portion 
of the business, it would be helpful to understand these effects immediately and long-term. And 
understanding how divorced couples who continue to do business together can help their advisor 
team assist them in operating smoothly and efficiently.  
Finally, does having a wealth manager or financial planner help reduce negative effects 
of divorce? By studying the involvement of wealth managers and financial planners pre- and 
post-divorce, researchers can determine how helpful it is to have professionals assisting 
individuals who are divorced. Research of the effect of having a specific type of advisor, such as 
the differences between financial planners, attorneys and accountants may also be helpful in 
understanding which type of advisor is best for those going through divorce. For example, 
someone trained in understanding the consequences of divorce may be more helpful during a 
divorce but may be less helpful in later years following the divorce. 
 Conclusion 
This study provided insight into changes that may occur over time with respect to savings 
and risky asset share. It also provided additional research in the area of bequest intention that 
confirmed some previous results and contradicted others. This simply means that more research 
is needed to create a robust body of work that can be useful to professionals working in wealth 
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management. The study further provided detail in certain sub-groups and found a robust result 
with respect to remarriage and how it affects financial behaviors.  
Finally, the use of Exponential Fractional Regression Modeling has been useful in 
explaining short- and long-term financial behavior consequences of divorce. The use of such 
methods in accounting and corporate finance has been translated to personal finance. Future 
studies using fractional response variables may be used to draw more insight in the areas of 
consumer economics, household finance, financial planning and wealth management. 
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 Appendix 
R Code 
# install packages from cran 
cran_pkgs = c("tidyverse", 'devtools', "convey", "srvyr", 'e1071', 'frmpd') 
for (pkg in cran_pkgs) { 
        cat("Install the most recent version of", pkg, "\n") 
        install.packages(pkg, dependencies = T, repos = "http://cran.rstudio.com/") 
} 
 
# install packages from github 
github_pkgs = c("gmlang/ezplot", 'ajdamico/lodown')  
for (pkg in github_pkgs) { 
        cat("Install the most recent version of", pkg, "\n") 
        devtools::install_github(pkg, dependencies = T, upgrade = 'always') 
} 
 
cat("### All required packages installed ###") 
# data: https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu 
# look up variables: https://simba.isr.umich.edu/VS/s.aspx 
 
rm(list = ls()) 
 
source("R/00-set-up.R") 
#source("R/01-download-data.R") # comment out to run, and only need to run once 
 
cohort_year = 1987 # 1987, 1994, 1999 
source('R/02-read-crossyear-individual-file.R') 
source('R/03-prep-data-fixed-vars.R') 
source('R/03-prep-data-yearly-vars.R') 
source('R/04-choose-cohort.R') 
source('R/05-chain-yearly-data.R') 
source('R/06-join-fixed-n-yearly-vars.R') 
source('R/07-fill-NAs.R') 
source('R/08-calc-savings-rates-n-save.R') 
 
rmarkdown::render("R/09-summary-stats.R", 
                  output_file = paste0("summ-stats-", cohort_year,  
                                       "-divorced.pdf"), 
                  output_dir = pdf_path) 
# library(readxl) 
library(readr) 
library(dplyr) 
library(tidyr) 
library(lodown) 
# library(ezplot) 
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# library(ggplot2) 
 
# set options 
options(scipen = 999) 
 
# set paths 
data_path = "data" 
out_path = "output" 
pdf_path  = file.path(out_path, "pdf") 
png_path  = file.path(out_path, "png") 
csv_path  = file.path(out_path, "csv") 
rds_path  = file.path(out_path, "rds") 
dir.create(data_path, showWarnings = F, recursive = T) 
dir.create(pdf_path, showWarnings = F, recursive = T) 
dir.create(rds_path, showWarnings = F, recursive = T) 
# dir.create(png_path, showWarnings = F, recursive = T) 
dir.create(csv_path, showWarnings = F, recursive = T) 
 
# load helper functions 
helper_path = "R/helper" 
for (fname in list.files(helper_path)) source(file.path(helper_path, fname)) 
# ref: http://asdfree.com/panel-study-of-income-dynamics-psid.html 
 
all_cat = get_catalog("psid",  
                      # dir to save downloaded files in the next step 
                      output_dir = data_path,  
                      your_email = "mkothakota@ksu.edu", 
                      your_password = "useyourownpassword") 
 
# choose data files to download 
catalog_for_download = rbind( 
        all_cat %>% filter(type %in% c('Family Files', 'Wealth Files'),  
                           year >= 1987),         
        all_cat %>% filter( 
                table_name %in% c('Cross-year Individual: 1968-2017', 
                                  'Active Savings: 1989, 1994', 
                                  'Marriage History: 1985-2017')) 
        ) 
 
 
lodown("psid",  
       catalog = catalog_for_download, 
       your_email = "mkothakota@ksu.edu", 
       your_password = " useyourownpassword ") 
df_ind = read_rds( 
        file.path(data_path,  
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                  'consumption expenditure data 1999-2013/cross-year individual 1968-2017.rds') 
        ) 
---  
# This script extracts time-invariant vars from the individual and family  
# files and put them in a data frame with keys (family_id, person_id). 
# ---  
 
 
# get fixed vars from the individual file 
df_ind_fixed = df_ind %>% select(ind_vars_fixed) 
stopifnot( 
        # df_ind_fixed should contain unique individuals (family_id+person_id) 
        df_ind_fixed %>% select(keys) %>% distinct_all() %>% nrow() ==  
                  nrow(df_ind_fixed) 
        ) 
 
 
# --- get risk tolerance vars --- # 
 
# select unique (family_id, person_id, interview_id) from 1996 individual file 
ind_vars_1996 = ind_vars_year_specific %>% filter(year == 1996) %>%  
        select(interview_id, sequence_number, relation_to_head) %>% unlist() 
df_ind_1996 = df_ind %>% select(ind_vars_fixed[keys], ind_vars_1996) %>%  
        filter_responding_heads() 
stopifnot( 
        # df_ind_1996 should contain unique interview_id's 
        length(df_ind_1996$interview_id) ==  
                length(df_ind_1996$interview_id %>% unique()), 
        # df_ind_1996 should contain unique individuals 
        df_ind_1996 %>% count(family_id, person_id) %>% filter(n > 1) %>%  
                  nrow() == 0 
        ) 
 
# assume risk tolerance is time invariant, extract it from the 1996 family file 
#       since it only exists there. 
source(paste0('R/get-risk-tolerance-1996.R')) 
 
# df_ind_1996 has unique identifier (family_id + person_id) of the individual  
#       and his or her 1996 interview id.  
# df_risk_tolerance has unique 1996 interview ids and the corresponding 
#       responses to the gambling questions. 
# we want to associate those responses to the unique individual identifiers 
tmp = left_join(df_ind_1996, df_risk_tolerance, by = 'interview_id') 
stopifnot(nrow(tmp) == nrow(df_ind_1996), 
          tmp %>% select(family_id, person_id) %>%  
                  distinct_all() %>% nrow() == nrow(tmp)) 
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# move risk tolerance to df_ind_fixed 
df_ind_fixed = left_join(df_ind_fixed, tmp %>% select(-interview_id), by = keys) 
# nrow(df_ind_fixed) 
 
 
# --- get bequest importance vars --- # 
 
# select unique (family_id, person_id, interview_id) from 2007 individual file 
ind_vars_2007 = ind_vars_year_specific %>% filter(year == 2007) %>%  
        select(interview_id, sequence_number, relation_to_head) %>% unlist() 
df_ind_2007 = df_ind %>% select(ind_vars_fixed[keys], ind_vars_2007) %>%  
        filter_responding_heads 
stopifnot( 
        # df_ind_2007 should contain unique interview_id's 
        length(df_ind_2007$interview_id) ==  
                length(df_ind_2007$interview_id %>% unique()), 
        # df_ind_2007 should contain unique individuals 
        df_ind_2007 %>% count(family_id, person_id) %>% filter(n > 1) %>%  
                  nrow() == 0) 
 
# assume bequest importance is time invariant, extract it from 2007 family file 
#       since it only exists there. 
source(paste0('R/get-bequest-importance-2007.R')) 
 
 
# df_ind_2007 has unique identifier (family_id + person_id) of the individual  
#       and his or her 2007 interview id.  
# df_bequest has unique 2007 interview ids and the corresponding 
#       responses to the bequest importance questions. 
# we want to associate those responses to the unique individual identifiers 
tmp = left_join(df_ind_2007, df_bequest, by = 'interview_id') 
stopifnot(nrow(tmp) == nrow(df_ind_2007), 
          tmp %>% select(family_id, person_id) %>%  
                  distinct_all() %>% nrow() == nrow(tmp)) 
 
# move bequest importance to df_ind_fixed 
df_ind_fixed = left_join(df_ind_fixed, tmp %>% select(-interview_id), by = keys) 
 
nrow(df_ind_fixed) 
head(df_ind_fixed)         
# ---  
# This script extracts time-varying (yearly) vars from the individual and family  
# files and put them in a data frame with keys (family_id, person_id, year). 
# ---  
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lst_of_yearly_dfs = vector('list', length(years_wea)) 
names(lst_of_yearly_dfs) = years_wea 
for (yr in years_wea) { 
        # yr = 1989 
        cat(yr, "..\n") 
         
        # get year-specific vars from individual file  
        ind_vars_yr = ind_vars_year_specific %>%  
                filter(year == yr) %>% select(-year) %>% unlist() 
        df_ind_year = df_ind %>%  
                select(ind_vars_fixed[keys], ind_vars_yr) %>% 
                filter_responding_heads() 
          
        # get vars from family file 
        df_fam = read_rds(file.path(data_path, 'family files',  
                                    paste0(yr, '.rds')))  
        source('R/prep-family-files.R') # changes df_fam 
         
        # get vars from wealth file 
        df_wea = read_rds(file.path(data_path, 'wealth files',  
                                    paste(yr, 'wealth.rds')))         
        source('R/prep-wealth-files.R') # changes df_wea 
         
        # join family and wealth sets by interview_id,  
        #       both should have unique interview_id, but may not have 
        #       the same number of records (some people might've only answered 
        #       questions on family file, but weren't intereviewed or didn't 
        #       respond to wealth related questions). 
        df_fam_wea = left_join(df_fam, df_wea, by = 'interview_id') 
         
        # join df_fam_wea and df_ind_year, where the former has unique interview_id 
        stopifnot(length(df_fam_wea %>% pull(interview_id) %>% unique()) == 
                          length(df_fam_wea %>% pull(interview_id))) 
         
        dat = left_join(df_fam_wea, df_ind_year, by = 'interview_id') 
         
        stopifnot(nrow(dat) == nrow(df_fam_wea), 
                  dat %>% select(family_id, person_id) %>%  
                          distinct_all() %>% nrow() == nrow(dat)) 
         
        # add year to dat and rearrange columns 
        dat = dat %>% mutate(year = yr) %>%  
                # rearrange columns 
                select(family_id, person_id, race, year, interview_id, age,  
                       highest_education, employment, everything()) 
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        # head(dat) 
         
        lst_of_yearly_dfs[[as.character(yr)]] = dat 
} 
 
# cat('Number of families with more than 1 head:\n') 
# lst_of_yearly_dfs[['1989']] %>% count(family_id) %>% filter(n > 1) %>% nrow() 
# lst_of_yearly_dfs[['1994']] %>% count(family_id) %>% filter(n > 1) %>% nrow() 
# lst_of_yearly_dfs[['1999']] %>% count(family_id) %>% filter(n > 1) %>% nrow() 
# lst_of_yearly_dfs[['2001']] %>% count(family_id) %>% filter(n > 1) %>% nrow() 
# lst_of_yearly_dfs[['2003']] %>% count(family_id) %>% filter(n > 1) %>% nrow() 
# lst_of_yearly_dfs[['2005']] %>% count(family_id) %>% filter(n > 1) %>% nrow() 
# lst_of_yearly_dfs[['2007']] %>% count(family_id) %>% filter(n > 1) %>% nrow() 
 
        filter(year == cohort_year) %>%  
        select(interview_id, sequence_number, relation_to_head) %>%  
        unlist() 
 
df_cohort_ids = df_ind %>%  
        select(ind_vars_fixed[keys], ind_vars_cohort_year) %>%  
        filter_responding_heads() 
 
 
# --- only keep those divorced in the cohort year --- # 
 
# marital status exists in the family file 
df_fam = read_rds(file.path(data_path, 'family files',  
                            paste0(cohort_year, '.rds')))  
 
# look up the varname for marital status and interview id on family file 
lookup_fam = fam_vars_year_specific %>% filter(year == cohort_year)  
marital_status_varname = lookup_fam %>% pull(marital_status_var) 
interview_id_varname = lookup_fam %>% pull(interview_id_var) 
 
# marital status levels: 
#       1 Married 
#       2 Never married 
#       3 Widowed 
#       4 Divorced, annulled  
#       5 Separated 
is_divorced = df_fam[[marital_status_varname]] == 4 
interview_ids_divorced = df_fam[is_divorced,][[interview_id_varname]] 
 
df_cohort_ids = df_cohort_ids %>%  
        filter(interview_id %in% interview_ids_divorced) 
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# nrow(df_cohort_ids) 
# head(df_cohort_ids) 
 
# --- find those (family_id, person_id) that appear in all wealth years,  
#     stack them into one data frame 
# ---  
 
# print(keys) 
df_common_keyvals = df_cohort_ids[keys]  
for (yr in years_wea)  
        df_common_keyvals = df_common_keyvals %>%  
                inner_join(lst_of_yearly_dfs[[as.character(yr)]][keys],  
                           by = keys)  
nrow(df_common_keyvals) 
 
 
df_chained = bind_rows( 
        lapply(lst_of_yearly_dfs, function(year_data)  
                inner_join(year_data, df_common_keyvals, by = keys))         
        ) 
 
df_chained %>% count(year) %>% print() 
 
df_chained = df_chained %>%  
        # join the fixed (time-invariant) vars         
        left_join(df_ind_fixed, by = keys) %>%  
        recode_ind_vars() %>% # defined in R/helper 
        # join sp500 returns 
        left_join(lookup_sp500_rets %>% select(end_year, CAGR_sp500),  
                  by = c('year' = 'end_year')) 
 
 
# --- rearrange the columns --- # 
 
df_chained = df_chained %>%  
        select(family_id, person_id,  
               # fixed vars: 
               num_of_live_births, gender, race, 
               risk_tolerance, importance_bequest_to_rels, 
               importance_bequest_to_relorg, importance_bequest_to_charity,  
               # yearly vars: 
               year, interview_id, is_remarried, age,  
               education_status, education_status_agg,  
               employment_status, employment_status_agg, 
               everything()) 
df_chained = df_chained %>% group_by(family_id, person_id) %>%  
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        fill(race, had_school_expenses,  
             chld_supprt_paid, chld_supprt_net, 
             alimony_paid, alimony_net, 
             chld_supprt_alimony_tot_net,  
             chld_supprt_status, alimony_status, 
             .direction = 'up') %>% 
        fill(education_status, education_status_agg,  
             chld_supprt_paid, chld_supprt_net, 
             alimony_paid, alimony_net, 
             chld_supprt_alimony_tot_net,  
             chld_supprt_status, alimony_status, 
             had_school_expenses) 
 
# --- missing filling strategies --- # 
# 
# race: fill by next non-NA val 
# risk_tolerance: NA for all years, cannot fix 
# importance_bequest_to_rels: NA for all years, cannot fix 
# importance_bequest_to_relorg: NA for all years, cannot fix 
# importance_bequest_to_charity: NA for all years, cannot fix 
# education_status, education_status_agg, chld_supprt_paid, chld_supprt_net, 
# chld_supprt_status: 
#       Some have non-NA for early years and NA for later years,  
#       fill those NA by previous non-NA val. 
#       Others have NA for all years, cannot fix. 
# had_school_expenses: fill by next non-NA val, then by previous non-NA val. 
# num_of_live_births: NA for all years, cannot fix 
 
# # --- manually check each var's missingness --- # 
#  
# # calc percent of NAs in each var 
# na_pct = sapply(df_chained, function(col) sum(is.na(col))) / nrow(df_chained) 
# na_pct[na_pct > 0] 
#  
#  
# varname = 'num_of_live_births' 
# varquo = as.name(varname) 
#  
# df_chained %>% filter(is.na(!!varquo)) %>% 
#         count(family_id, person_id) %>% filter(n < length(years_wea)) 
#  
# df_chained %>% filter(family_id == 414, person_id == 3) %>% 
#         select(family_id, person_id, year, !!varquo) %>% 
#         View() 
#  
# df_chained %>% filter(is.na(!!varquo)) %>% 
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#         select(family_id, person_id, year, !!varquo) %>% 
#         View() 
df_chained = df_chained %>%  
        group_by(family_id, person_id) %>%  
        mutate(savings_cash = pmax(cash - lag(cash), 0), 
               savings_retirement = pmax( 
                       retirement_accts_value - lag(retirement_accts_value), 0), 
               savings_rate_cash = case_when( 
                       is.na(savings_cash) ~ NA_real_, 
                       tot_labor_income_lastyr == 0 & savings_cash > 0 ~ 0.999, 
                       tot_labor_income_lastyr == 0 & savings_cash == 0 ~ 0, 
                       TRUE ~ savings_cash / tot_labor_income_lastyr), 
               savings_rate_retirement = case_when( 
                       is.na(savings_retirement) ~ NA_real_, 
                       tot_labor_income_lastyr == 0 & savings_retirement > 0 ~ 0.999, 
                       tot_labor_income_lastyr == 0 & savings_retirement == 0 ~ 0, 
                       TRUE ~ savings_retirement / tot_labor_income_lastyr) 
               ) %>% ungroup() %>%  
        arrange(family_id, person_id, year)  
 
 
# save 
write_rds(df_chained,  
          file.path(rds_path, paste0('divorced-', cohort_year, '.rds'))) 
write_csv(df_chained,  
          file.path(csv_path, paste0('divorced-', cohort_year, '.csv'))) 
 
#' --- 
#' title: Summary Stats 
#' author: "" 
#' date: "`r Sys.Date()`" 
#' output: pdf_document 
#' --- 
 
#+ include = FALSE 
knitr::opts_chunk$set(comment = "", tidy = F, echo = F, warning = F,  
                      message = F, fig.width = 8, fig.height = 6) 
options(scipen = 999) 
 
#' # `r cohort_year` Divorced 
#'  
#' This dataset contains info of the heads of families who were divorced in  
#' `r cohort_year` over the years 1989, 94, 99, 2001, 03, 05 and 07.  
#'  
 
knitr::kable(freqtab(df_chained)('year') %>% arrange(year) %>% select(-pct),  
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             caption = 'Number of heads by year') 
 
df_chained %>% group_by(year) %>%  
        summarise(family_cnt = length(unique(family_id))) %>%  
        knitr::kable(caption = 'Number of unique families by year')  
 
#' ## Fixed (time-invariant) Variables 
 
df_fixed = df_chained %>% filter(year == 1989) %>% # 1st year of data 
        select(gender, num_of_live_births,  
               risk_tolerance, importance_bequest_to_rels, 
               importance_bequest_to_relorg, importance_bequest_to_charity) 
f = freqtab(df_fixed) 
 
#+ results = 'asis' 
 
f("gender") %>% knitr::kable(caption = 'Gender') %>% print() 
f("num_of_live_births") %>% knitr::kable(caption = 'Number of live births') %>%  
        print() 
 
cap = 'Risk tolerance (1 - lowest, 6 - highest)' 
f("risk_tolerance") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>% print() 
 
cap = 'Importance of leaving estate/inheritance to children/relatives' 
f("importance_bequest_to_rels") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>% print() 
 
cap = 'Importance of leaving estate/inheritance to religious organizations' 
f("importance_bequest_to_relorg") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>% print() 
 
cap = 'Importance of leaving estate/inheritance to charity' 
f("importance_bequest_to_charity") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>% print() 
 
 
#' ## Yearly (time-varying) Variables 
 
#+ results = 'asis' 
 
for (yr in years_wea) { 
        # yr = years_wea[1] 
        dat = df_chained %>% filter(year == yr) 
        # glimpse(dat) 
        get_freq_tbl = freqtab(dat) 
         
        get_freq_tbl("race") %>% knitr::kable(caption = 'Race') %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Is remarried?', sep = ' - ') 
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        get_freq_tbl("is_remarried") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>% 
                print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Education Status', sep = ' - ') 
        get_freq_tbl("education_status") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>%  
                print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Education Status Aggregated', sep = ' - ') 
        get_freq_tbl("education_status_agg") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>%  
                print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Employment Status', sep = ' - ') 
        get_freq_tbl("employment_status") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>%  
                print() 
 
        cap = paste(yr, 'Employment Status Aggregated', sep = ' - ') 
        get_freq_tbl("employment_status_agg") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>%  
                print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Child Support Status', sep = ' - ') 
        get_freq_tbl("chld_supprt_status") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>%  
                print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Alimony Status', sep = ' - ') 
        get_freq_tbl("alimony_status") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>%  
                print() 
 
        cap = paste(yr, 'Had school related expenses?', sep = ' - ') 
        get_freq_tbl("had_school_expenses") %>% knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>%  
                print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Age', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$age) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'age') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Number of children in family', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$num_of_chld_in_family) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'num_of_chld_in_family') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Wage Income Last Year', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$tot_wages_lastyr) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'tot_wages_lastyr') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
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        cap = paste(yr, 'Total Labor Income Last Year', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$tot_labor_income_lastyr) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'tot_labor_income_lastyr') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Child Support Paid', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$chld_supprt_paid) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'chld_supprt_paid') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
 
        cap = paste(yr, 'Child Support Received', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$chld_supprt_recd) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'chld_supprt_recd') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
 
        cap = paste(yr, 'Child Support Net (Received - Paid)', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$chld_supprt_net) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'chld_supprt_net') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Alimony Paid', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$alimony_paid) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'alimony_paid') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Alimony Received', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$alimony_recd) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'alimony_recd') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Alimony Net (Received - Paid)', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$alimony_net) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'alimony_net') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Child Support + Alimony Total Net', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$chld_supprt_alimony_tot_net) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'chld_supprt_alimony_tot_net') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Total Cash', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$cash) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'cash') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Total Stocks Not in Retirement Accounts', sep = ' - ') 
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        summary_stats(dat$stocks) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'stocks') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Total Retirement Accounts Value', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$retirement_accts_value) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'retirement_accts_value') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Networth', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$net_worth) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'net_worth') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Risky Share', sep = ' - ') 
        summary_stats(dat$risky_share) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                setNames(nm = 'risky_share') %>%  
                knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Active Savings - Cash', sep = ' - ') 
        if (all(is.na(dat$savings_cash))) { 
                data.frame(savings_cash = 'All NA') %>% 
                        knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>% print() 
        } else { 
                summary_stats(dat$savings_cash) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                        setNames(nm = 'savings_cash') %>%  
                        knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
        } 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Active Savings - Retirement Account', sep = ' - ') 
        if (all(is.na(dat$savings_retirement))) { 
                data.frame(savings_retirement = 'All NA') %>% 
                        knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>% print() 
        } else { 
                summary_stats(dat$savings_retirement) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                        setNames(nm = 'savings_retirement') %>%  
                        knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
        } 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Active Savings Rate - Cash', sep = ' - ') 
        if (all(is.na(dat$savings_rate_cash))) { 
                data.frame(savings_rate_cash = 'All NA') %>% 
                        knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>% print() 
        } else { 
                summary_stats(dat$savings_rate_cash) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                        setNames(nm = 'savings_rate_cash') %>%  
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                        knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
        } 
         
        cap = paste(yr, 'Active Savings Rate - Retirement Account', sep = ' - ') 
        if (all(is.na(dat$savings_rate_retirement))) { 
                data.frame(savings_rate_retirement = 'All NA') %>% 
                        knitr::kable(caption = cap) %>% print() 
        } else { 
                summary_stats(dat$savings_rate_retirement) %>% data.frame() %>%  
                        setNames(nm = 'savings_rate_retirement') %>%  
                        knitr::kable(digits=2, caption = cap) %>% print() 
        } 
} 
 
# --- bequest importance vars only exist in 2007 family file, extract them --- # 
 
df_bequest = read_rds(file.path(data_path, 'family files', '2007.rds')) %>%  
        select(er36002, er37720, er37721, er37722) %>%  
        transmute(interview_id = er36002, 
                  # how important of leaving estate/inheritance to children/relatives?         
                  importance_bequest_to_rels =  
                          case_when(er37720 == 1 ~ 'Very important', 
                                    er37720 == 2 ~ 'Quite important', 
                                    er37720 == 3 ~ 'Not important', 
                                    er37720 == 4 ~ 'Not at all important', 
                                    TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                   
                  # how important of leaving estate/inheritance to religious organizations? 
                  importance_bequest_to_relorg =  
                          case_when(er37721 == 1 ~ 'Very important', 
                                    er37721 == 2 ~ 'Quite important',  
                                    er37721 == 3 ~ 'Not important', 
                                    er37721 == 4 ~ 'Not at all important', 
                                    TRUE ~ NA_character_),         
                   
                  # how important of leaving estate/inheritance to charity? 
                  importance_bequest_to_charity =  
                          case_when(er37722 == 1 ~ 'Very important', 
                                    er37722 == 2 ~ 'Quite important',  
                                    er37722 == 3 ~ 'Not important', 
                                    er37722 == 4 ~ 'Not at all important', 
                                    TRUE ~ NA_character_) 
                  ) 
# --- gambling questions only exist in 1996 family file, extract them  --- # 
 
df_risk_tolerance =  
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        read_rds(file.path(data_path, 'family files', '1996.rds')) %>%  
        select(er7002, er9103, er9104, er9105, er9106, er9107) %>%  
        transmute(interview_id = er7002, 
                  risk_tolerance = case_when( # 1 - lowest risk; 6 - highest risk 
                        er9107 == 1 ~ 6,  # 'Yes' on 75% INCOME CUT 
                        er9107 == 5 & er9104 == 1 ~ 5,  # 'No' on 75% cut but 'Yes' on 50% cut 
                        er9104 == 5 & er9103 == 1 ~ 4,  # 'No' on 50% cut but 'Yes' on 1/3 cut 
                        er9103 == 5 & er9105 == 1 ~ 3,  # 'No' on 1/3 cut but 'Yes' on 20% cut 
                        er9105 == 5 & er9106 == 1 ~ 2,  # 'No' on 20% cut but 'Yes' on 10% cut 
                        er9106 == 5 ~ 1,  # 'No' on 10% cut 
                        TRUE ~ NA_real_) 
                  ) 
# yr = 1989 
 
lookup_fam = fam_vars_year_specific %>% filter(year == yr) 
 
# --- some vars don't exist for all years, deal with them here --- # 
 
if (is.na(lookup_fam$wages_xtra_job_lastyr_var)) { 
        wages_xtra = rep(0, nrow(df_fam)) 
} else { 
        wages_xtra = df_fam[[lookup_fam$wages_xtra_job_lastyr_var]] 
} 
 
if (is.na(lookup_fam$had_school_expenses_var)) { 
        flag_school_expense = rep(NA_integer_, nrow(df_fam)) 
} else { 
        flag_school_expense = df_fam[[lookup_fam$had_school_expenses_var]] 
} 
 
if (is.na(lookup_fam$tot_labor_income_lastyr_var)) { 
        subtot_labor_income = df_fam[[lookup_fam$subtot_labor_income_lastyr_var]] 
        subtot_labor_income = ifelse(subtot_labor_income == 9999999,  
                                     NA_real_, subtot_labor_income) 
        biz_labor_income = df_fam[[lookup_fam$biz_labor_income_lastyr_var]]    
        biz_labor_income = ifelse(biz_labor_income == 999999, 
                                  NA_real_, biz_labor_income) 
        tot_labor_income = subtot_labor_income + biz_labor_income 
 
} else { 
        tot_labor_income = df_fam[[lookup_fam$tot_labor_income_lastyr_var]] 
        tot_labor_income = ifelse(tot_labor_income == 999999, NA_real_,  
                                  tot_labor_income) 
} 
 
# --- some ad hoc codes look up --- # 
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na_codes_csal_paid = case_when(yr < 1993 ~ c(99998, 99999),  
                               TRUE ~ c(9999998, 9999999)) 
na_codes_csal_recd = case_when(yr < 2003 ~ c(99998, 99999),  
                               TRUE ~ c(999998, 999999)) 
 
race_code_white = 1 
race_code_black = 2 
race_code_aindian = 3 
race_code_asian_pislander = ifelse(yr < 2005, 4, c(4, 5)) 
race_code_latino = ifelse(yr < 2005, 5, 9999) # 9999 means doesn't exist 
race_code_more_colors = ifelse(yr < 2005, 6, 9998) # 9998 means doesn't exist 
race_code_other = 7         
 
# get the vars and prep 
 
df_fam = df_fam %>%  
        transmute(interview_id = !!as.name(lookup_fam$interview_id_var), 
                  race = !!as.name(lookup_fam$race1_var), 
                  marital_status_cng =  
                          !!as.name(lookup_fam$marital_status_cng_var), 
                  num_of_chld_in_family =  
                          !!as.name(lookup_fam$num_of_chld_in_family_var), 
                  flag_school_expenses = flag_school_expense, 
                   
                  wages_lastyr = !!as.name(lookup_fam$wages_lastyr_var),  
                  wages_xtra_lastyr = wages_xtra, 
                  tot_labor_income_lastyr = tot_labor_income, 
                   
                  chld_supprt_paid = !!as.name(lookup_fam$chld_supprt_paid_var),  
                  alimony_paid = !!as.name(lookup_fam$alimony_paid_var), 
                  chld_supprt_recd = !!as.name(lookup_fam$chld_supprt_recd_var),  
                  alimony_recd = !!as.name(lookup_fam$alimony_recd_var) 
                  ) %>%  
        mutate(is_remarried = ifelse(marital_status_cng == 5, 'Yes', 'No'),  
                
               race = case_when(race == race_code_white ~ 'White', 
                                race == race_code_black ~ 'Black', 
                                race == race_code_aindian ~ 'American Indian or Alaska Native', 
                                race == race_code_asian_pislander ~ 'Asian, Pacific Islander', 
                                race == race_code_latino ~ 'Latino origin or descent', 
                                race == race_code_more_colors ~ 'Color besides black or white', 
                                race == race_code_other ~ 'Other', 
                                TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                
               had_school_expenses = case_when( 
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                       flag_school_expenses == 1 ~ 'Yes', 
                       flag_school_expenses == 5 ~ 'No', 
                       TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
         
               tot_wages_lastyr = wages_lastyr + wages_xtra_lastyr, 
                
               chld_supprt_paid = ifelse( 
                       chld_supprt_paid %in% na_codes_csal_paid,  
                       NA_real_, chld_supprt_paid), 
               alimony_paid = ifelse( 
                       alimony_paid %in% na_codes_csal_paid,  
                       NA_real_, alimony_paid), 
                
               chld_supprt_recd = ifelse( 
                       chld_supprt_recd %in% na_codes_csal_recd,  
                       NA_real_, chld_supprt_recd), 
               alimony_recd = ifelse( 
                       alimony_recd %in% na_codes_csal_recd,  
                       NA_real_, alimony_recd), 
               
               chld_supprt_net = chld_supprt_recd - chld_supprt_paid, 
               alimony_net = alimony_recd - alimony_paid, 
               chld_supprt_alimony_tot_net = chld_supprt_net + alimony_net, 
                
               chld_supprt_status = case_when( 
                       chld_supprt_paid > 0 & chld_supprt_recd > 0 ~ 'both', 
                       chld_supprt_paid > 0 & chld_supprt_recd == 0 ~ 'paid', 
                       chld_supprt_paid == 0 & chld_supprt_recd > 0 ~ 'received', 
                       chld_supprt_paid == 0 & chld_supprt_recd == 0 ~ 'neither', 
                       TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
 
               alimony_status = case_when( 
                       alimony_paid > 0 & alimony_recd > 0 ~ 'both', 
                       alimony_paid > 0 & alimony_recd == 0 ~ 'paid', 
                       alimony_paid == 0 & alimony_recd > 0 ~ 'received', 
                       alimony_paid == 0 & alimony_recd == 0 ~ 'neither', 
                       TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                
               marital_status_cng = NULL, 
               wages_lastyr = NULL, 
               wages_xtra_lastyr = NULL, 
               flag_school_expenses = NULL 
                
               ) 
# yr = 1989 
lookup_wea = wea_vars_year_specific %>% filter(year == yr) 
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if (is.na(lookup_wea$ira_asset_var)) { 
        ira_vec = rep(0, nrow(df_wea)) 
} else { 
        ira_vec = df_wea[[lookup_wea$ira_asset_var]] 
} 
df_wea = df_wea %>%  
        transmute(interview_id = !!as.name(lookup_wea$interview_id_var), 
                  cash = !!as.name(lookup_wea$cash_asset_var),  
                  stocks = !!as.name(lookup_wea$stocks_asset_var),  
                  other_paper_asset = !!as.name(lookup_wea$other_paper_asset_var),  
                  ira = ira_vec, 
                  net_worth = !!as.name(lookup_wea$net_worth_var)) %>%  
        mutate(stocks = pmax(stocks, 0), # negative values are caused by market decline, not 
indicative of sold stocks 
               retirement_accts_value = other_paper_asset + ira,  
               other_paper_asset = NULL, 
               ira = NULL, 
               risky_share = ifelse(stocks == 0, 0, 
                                    stocks / (cash + stocks + retirement_accts_value)) 
               ) 
         
# --- year-specific vars to be selected from family files --- # 
 
years_fam = setdiff(c(1987:2017), seq(1998, 2016, 2)) 
 
fam_vars_year_specific = data.frame( 
        year = years_fam, 
        race1_var = c('v14612', 'v16086', 'v17483', 'v18814', 'v20114', 'v21420',  
                      'v23276', 'er3944', 'er6814', 'er9060', 'er11848',  
                      'er15928', 'er19989', 'er23426', 'er27393', 'er40565',  
                      'er46543', 'er51904', 'er57659', 'er64810', 'er70882'), 
        interview_id_var = c('v13702', 'v14802', 'v16302', 'v17702', 'v19002',  
                             'v20302', 'v21602', 'er2002', 'er5002', 'er7002',  
                             'er10002', 'er13002', 'er17002', 'er21002',  
                             'er25002', 'er36002', 'er42002', 'er47302',  
                             'er53002', 'er60002', 'er66002'), 
        marital_status_var = c('v14120', 'v15136', 'v16637', 'v18055', 'v19355', 
                               'v20657', 'v22412', 'er2014', 'er5013', 'er7013', 
                               'er10016', 'er13021', 'er17024', 'er21023',  
                               'er25023', 'er36023', 'er42023', 'er47323', 
                               'er53023', 'er60024', 'er66024'), 
        marital_status_cng_var = c('v14713', 'v16188', 'v17566', 'v18917',  
                                   'v20217', 'v21523', 'v23337', 'er4159b',  
                                   'er6999b', 'er9250b', 'er12223b', 'er16424',  
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                                   'er20370', 'er24151', 'er28050', 'er41040',  
                                   'er46984', 'er52408', 'er58226', 'er65462',  
                                   'er71541'), 
         
        wages_lastyr_var = c('v13898', 'v14913', 'v16413', 'v17829', 'v19129',  
                             'v20429', 'v21739', 'er4122', 'er6962', 'er9213',  
                             'er12196', 'er16493', 'er20425', 'er24117',  
                             'er27913', 'er40903', 'er46811', 'er52219',  
                             'er58020', 'er65200', 'er71277'), 
        wages_xtra_job_lastyr_var = c(rep(NA_character_, 1993-1987), 'v21801', 
                                      'er4138', 'er6978', 'er9229', 'er12212', 
                                      'er16509', 'er20441', 
                                      rep(NA_character_, length(seq(2003, 2017, 2))) 
                                      ), 
         
        tot_labor_income_lastyr_var = c('v14671', 'v16145', 'v17534', 'v18878',  
                                        'v20178', 'v21484', 'v23323',  
                                        rep(NA_character_, 14) # don't exist for years 1994 and beyond 
                                        ), 
        subtot_labor_income_lastyr_var =  
                c(rep(NA_character_, 1994 - 1987), # don't exist for years before 1994 
                  'er4140', 'er6980', 'er9231', 'er12080', 'er16463', 'er20422',  
                  'er24116', 'er27931', 'er40921', 'er46829', 'er52237',  
                  'er58038', 'er65216', 'er71293'), 
        biz_labor_income_lastyr_var = 
                c(rep(NA_character_, 1994 - 1987), # available but we're not getting them since we 
already got the total above 
                  'er4119', 'er6959', 'er9210', 'er12193', 'er16490', 'er20422', 
                  'er24109', 'er27910', 'er40900', 'er46808', 'er52216',  
                  'er58017', 'er65197', 'er71274'), 
         
         
        num_of_chld_in_family_var = c('v14117', 'v15133', 'v16634', 'v18052', 
                                      'v19352', 'v20654', 'v22409', 'er2010', 
                                      'er5009', 'er7009', 'er10012', 'er13013', 
                                      'er17016', 'er21020', 'er25020', 'er36020', 
                                      'er42020', 'er47320', 'er53020', 'er60021', 
                                      'er66021'), 
        had_school_expenses_var = c(rep(NA_character_, 1998-1987), 'er13201', 
                                    'er17212', 'er21848', 'er25804', 'er36822',  
                                    'er42813', 'er48135', 'er53829', 'er60888',  
                                    'er66936'), 
         
        chld_supprt_paid_var = c('v13922', 'v14937', 'v16437', 'v17853', 'v19153', 
                                 'v20453', 'v21961', 'er3715', 'er6717', 'er8835', 
                                 'er11717', 'er14985', 'er19181', 'er22546', 
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                                 'er26527', 'er37545', 'er43536', 'er48861', 
                                 'er54604', 'er61715', 'er67768'), 
        alimony_paid_var = c('v13923', 'v14938', 'v16438', 'v17854', 'v19154',  
                             'v20454', 'v21962', 'er3717', 'er6719', 'er8837',  
                             'er11719', 'er14987', 'er19183', 'er22548',  
                             'er26529', 'er37547', 'er43538', 'er48863',  
                             'er54606', 'er61717', 'er67770'), 
        chld_supprt_recd_var = c('v13944', 'v14959', 'v16459', 'v17875',  
                                 'v19175', 'v20475', 'v22126', 'er3401', 
                                 'er6402', 'er8519', 'er11413', 'er14679',  
                                 'er18847', 'er22217', 'er26198', 'er37216', 
                                 'er43207', 'er48532', 'er54226', 'er61268',  
                                 'er67320'), 
        alimony_recd_var = c('v13917', 'v14932', 'v16432', 'v17848', 'v19148',  
                             'v20448', 'v21879', 'er3416', 'er6417', 'er8534',  
                             'er11428', 'er14694', 'er18863', 'er22233',  
                             'er26214', 'er37232', 'er43223', 'er48548',  
                             'er54242', 'er61284', 'er67336'), 
        stringsAsFactors = F 
) 
# names of the variables that serve as keys for merging different sets 
keys = c('family_id', 'person_id') 
 
 
 
# --- Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGRs) of SP500 --- # 
# 
# obtained from this calculator: http://moneychimp.com/features/market_cagr.htm 
# including dividends, not adjust for inflation 
 
lookup_sp500_rets = data.frame( 
        start_year = c(1987, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005), # assume start at the last day of 
start_year (i.e., first day of year+1) 
        end_year = c(1989, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007),   # assume end at the last day of 
end_year 
        CAGR_sp500 = c(24.08, 8.69, 28.76, -10.56, 0.03, 7.76, 10.48) / 100) %>%  
        mutate(num_of_years = end_year - start_year, 
               tot_ret_sp500 = (1+CAGR_sp500) ^ (num_of_years) - 1) 
 
# --- time invariant vars to be selected from individual files --- # 
 
ind_vars_fixed = c( 
        # family_id + person_id is unique 
        # they are extracted from 1968 individual file and serve as common keys 
        #       for all following years 
        family_id = 'er30001', person_id = 'er30002', 
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        # sampling_unit = 'er31997' ,     # primary sampling unit variable 
        # strata = 'er31996' ,            # stratification variable 
        gender = 'er32000', 
        num_of_live_births = 'er32022') 
 
 
# --- year-specific vars to be selected from individual files --- # 
 
ind_vars_year_specific = data.frame( 
        year = years_fam, 
        interview_id = c('er30535', 'er30570', 'er30606', 'er30642', 'er30689', 
                         'er30733', 'er30806', 'er33101', 'er33201', 'er33301', 
                         'er33401', 'er33501', 'er33601', 'er33701', 'er33801', 
                         'er33901', 'er34001', 'er34101', 'er34201', 'er34301', 
                         'er34501'), 
         
        # to select current heads, filter 
        #       sequence_number == 1 & relation_to_head == 10  
        sequence_number = c('er30536', 'er30571', 'er30607', 'er30643', 'er30690', 
                            'er30734', 'er30807', 'er33102', 'er33202', 'er33302', 
                            'er33402', 'er33502', 'er33602', 'er33702', 'er33802', 
                            'er33902', 'er34002', 'er34102', 'er34202', 'er34302', 
                            'er34502'), 
        relation_to_head = c('er30537', 'er30572', 'er30608', 'er30644', 'er30691', 
                             'er30735', 'er30808', 'er33103', 'er33203', 'er33303',  
                             'er33403', 'er33503', 'er33603', 'er33703', 'er33803',  
                             'er33903', 'er34003', 'er34103', 'er34203', 'er34303',  
                             'er34503'), 
         
        # AGE OF INDIVIDUAL 
        age = c('er30538', 'er30573', 'er30609', 'er30645', 'er30692', 'er30736',  
                'er30809', 'er33104', 'er33204', 'er33304', 'er33404', 'er33504',  
                'er33604', 'er33704', 'er33804', 'er33904', 'er34004', 'er34104',  
                'er34204', 'er34305', 'er34504'), 
         
        employment = c('er30545', 'er30580', 'er30616', 'er30653', 'er30699',  
                       'er30744', 'er30816', 'er33111', 'er33211', 'er33311',  
                       'er33411', 'er33512', 'er33612', 'er33712', 'er33813',  
                       'er33913', 'er34016', 'er34116', 'er34216', 'er34317',  
                       'er34516'), 
         
        highest_education = c('er30549', 'er30584', 'er30620', 'er30657',  
                              'er30703', 'er30748', 'er30820', 'er33115',  
                              'er33215', 'er33315', 'er33415', 'er33516',  
                              'er33616', 'er33716', 'er33817', 'er33917', 
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                              'er34020', 'er34119', 'er34230', 'er34318', 
                              'er34517'), 
 
        stringsAsFactors = F) 
 
# --- year-specific vars to be selected from wealth files --- # 
 
years_wea = c(1989, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007) 
 
wea_vars_year_specific = data.frame( 
        year = years_wea,  
        interview_id_var =  
                c('s201', 's301', 's401', 's501', 's601', 's701', 's801'), 
        cash_asset_var = # assets at checking and savings accts 
                c('s205', 's305', 's405', 's505', 's605', 's705', 's805'), 
        stocks_asset_var = # assets at non-retirement accts 
                c('s211', 's311', 's411', 's511', 's611', 's711', 's811'),  
        other_paper_asset_var = # bond funds, life insurance, valuable collections, rights in a trust 
and etc 
                c('s215', 's315', 's415', 's515', 's615', 's715', 's815'), 
        ira_asset_var = # private annuities or Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) 
                c(NA, NA, 's419', 's519', 's619', 's719', 's819'), 
        net_worth_var = # total asset - total debt - home equity 
                c('s216', 's316', 's416', 's516', 's616', 's716', 's816'), 
        stringsAsFactors = F 
) 
crosstab = function(df) { 
        function(xvar, yvar, type = "grand_pcts", show_total = TRUE, 
                 decimals = 2) { 
 
                # calc cross table 
                if (type == "raw_cnts") { 
                        tbl = table(df[[xvar]], df[[yvar]]) 
                } else if (type == "grand_pcts") { 
                        tbl = prop.table(table(df[[xvar]], df[[yvar]])) 
                } else if (type == "row_pcts") { 
                        tbl = prop.table(table(df[[xvar]], df[[yvar]]), 1) 
                } else { 
                        tbl = prop.table(table(df[[xvar]], df[[yvar]]), 2) 
                } 
 
                # change tbl to a data frame 
                vec_rowname = row.names(tbl) 
                vec_colname = colnames(tbl) 
                m = dim(tbl)[1]; n = dim(tbl)[2] 
                tbl = data.frame(matrix(tbl, nrow = m, ncol = n)) 
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                # show row or column sums 
                if (show_total) { 
                        tbl$Sum = rowSums(tbl) 
                        tbl = rbind(tbl, colSums(tbl)) 
                        vec_colname = c(vec_colname, "Total") 
                        vec_rowname = c(vec_rowname, "Total") 
                } 
 
                # give row and column names and return 
                names(tbl) = vec_colname 
                row.names(tbl) = vec_rowname 
 
                # format cell values as % if type is any kind of "pcts" 
                if (grepl("pcts", type)) { 
                        tbl[] = lapply(tbl, function(x) 
                                formattable::percent(x, decimals)) 
                        if (type == "row_pcts") tbl = tbl[-nrow(tbl),] 
                        if (type == "col_pcts") tbl = tbl[, -ncol(tbl)] 
                } 
 
                tbl 
        } 
} 
filter_responding_heads = function(df) { 
        # df: data frame with vars: interview_id, relation_to_head, sequence_number 
         
         
        df %>% # discard people who didn't respond to interviews 
                filter(interview_id != 0) %>%  
                # only keep heads of the family 
                filter(relation_to_head == 10 & sequence_number == 1) %>%  
                select(-relation_to_head, -sequence_number)  
} 
freqtab = function(df) { 
        function(catvar, order = "descend", as_pct = T, decimals = 2) { 
                if (!order %in% c("descend", "ascend")) 
                        stop("Order must be either 'ascend' or 'descend'") 
                 
                tbl = dplyr::mutate(dplyr::count(df, !!as.name(catvar)), 
                                    cnt = n, pct = cnt/sum(cnt), n = NULL) 
                 
                if (order == "descend") 
                        tbl = dplyr::arrange(tbl, dplyr::desc(cnt)) 
                else tbl = dplyr::arrange(tbl, cnt) 
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                if (as_pct) 
                        tbl = dplyr::mutate( 
                                tbl, pct = formattable::percent(pct, decimals)) 
                 
                tbl 
        } 
} 
 
recode_ind_vars = function(dat) { 
        # dat: data frame of vars from the individual file  
        dat %>% mutate( 
                age = ifelse(age %in% c(0, 98, 99, 999), NA_real_, age),         
                gender = case_when(gender == 1 ~ 'Male', 
                                   gender == 2 ~ 'Female', 
                                   TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                 
                employment_status = case_when( 
                        employment == 1 ~ "Working now", 
                        employment == 2 ~ 'Only temporarily laid off, sick leave or maternity leave', 
                        employment == 3 ~ 'Looking for work, unemployed', 
                        employment == 4 ~ 'Retired', 
                        employment == 5 ~ 'Permanently disabled; temporarily disabled', 
                        employment == 6 ~ 'Keeping house', 
                        employment == 7 ~ 'Student', 
                        employment == 8 ~ 'Other; "workfare"; in prison or jail', 
                        TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                employment_status_agg = case_when( 
                        employment == 1 ~ "Working", 
                        employment %in% c(3, 2, 5, 8) ~ 'Not working (not by choice)', 
                        employment %in% c(4, 6, 7) ~ 'Not working (by choice)', 
                        TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                employment = NULL, 
                 
                education_status = case_when( 
                        highest_education == 0 ~ 'Completed no grades of school', 
                        highest_education == 1 ~ 'Completed grade 1', 
                        highest_education == 2 ~ 'Completed grade 2', 
                        highest_education == 3 ~ 'Completed grade 3', 
                        highest_education == 4 ~ 'Completed grade 4', 
                        highest_education == 5 ~ 'Completed grade 5', 
                        highest_education == 6 ~ 'Completed grade 6', 
                        highest_education == 7 ~ 'Completed grade 7', 
                        highest_education == 8 ~ 'Completed grade 8', 
                        highest_education == 9 ~ 'Completed grade 9', 
                        highest_education == 10 ~ 'Completed grade 10', 
                        highest_education == 11 ~ 'Completed grade 11', 
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                        highest_education == 12 ~ 'Completed grade 12', 
                        highest_education == 13 ~ 'Completed 1st year college', 
                        highest_education == 14 ~ 'Completed 2nd year college', 
                        highest_education == 15 ~ 'Completed 3rd year college', 
                        highest_education == 16 ~ 'Completed 4th year college', 
                        highest_education == 17 ~ 'At least some post-graduate work', 
                        TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                education_status_agg = case_when( 
                        highest_education < 12 ~ 'Did not complete high school', 
                        highest_education == 12 ~ 'High school graduate', 
                        highest_education > 12 & highest_education < 16 ~ 'Some college', 
                        highest_education == 16 ~ "Bachelor's degree", 
                        highest_education == 17 ~ 'Graduate work', 
                        TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                highest_education = NULL, 
                 
                 
                # race = case_when(race == 1 ~ 'White', 
                #                  race == 2 ~ 'Black', 
                #                  race == 3 ~ 'American Indian, Aleut, Eskimo', 
                #                  race == 4 ~ 'Asian, Pacific Islander', 
                #                  race == 5 ~ 'Mentions Latino origin or descent', 
                #                  race == 6 ~ 'Mentions color other than black or white', 
                #                  race == 7 ~ 'Other', 
                #                  TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                 
                 
                num_of_live_births = ifelse(num_of_live_births %in% 98:99,  
                                            NA_real_, num_of_live_births) 
                 
        )         
} 
summary_stats = function(x) { 
        is_valid = is.finite(x) 
        if (sum(is_valid) == 0) 
                stop("The input vector contains only NA, NAN, Inf or -Inf. 
                     Please check.") 
         
        x = x[is_valid] 
        funs = c(length, summary, sd, e1071::skewness, e1071::kurtosis) 
        setNames(unlist(lapply(funs, function(f) f(x))), 
                 c("n", "min", "q1", "median", "mean", "q3", "max", 
                   "sd", "skewness", "kurtosis")) 
} 
scale_this = function(x) (x - mean(x, na.rm=TRUE)) / sd(x, na.rm=TRUE) 
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modes = function(xs, na.rm = T) { 
        if (na.rm) xs = xs[!is.na(xs)] 
        ux = unique(xs) 
        tab = tabulate(match(xs, ux)) 
        # note: instead of using which.max(), we are using == max()  
        #       because it returns all the modes if multiple ones exist 
        ux[tab == max(tab)]  
} 
 
sigmoid = function(x) {  
        x[x > 10] = 10 
        exp(x) / (exp(x) + 1)  
} 
# yr = 1989 
 
lookup_fam = fam_vars_year_specific %>% filter(year == yr) 
 
# --- some vars don't exist for all years, deal with them here --- # 
 
if (is.na(lookup_fam$wages_xtra_job_lastyr_var)) { 
        wages_xtra = rep(0, nrow(df_fam)) 
} else { 
        wages_xtra = df_fam[[lookup_fam$wages_xtra_job_lastyr_var]] 
} 
 
if (is.na(lookup_fam$had_school_expenses_var)) { 
        flag_school_expense = rep(NA_integer_, nrow(df_fam)) 
} else { 
        flag_school_expense = df_fam[[lookup_fam$had_school_expenses_var]] 
} 
 
if (is.na(lookup_fam$tot_labor_income_lastyr_var)) { 
        subtot_labor_income = df_fam[[lookup_fam$subtot_labor_income_lastyr_var]] 
        subtot_labor_income = ifelse(subtot_labor_income == 9999999,  
                                     NA_real_, subtot_labor_income) 
        biz_labor_income = df_fam[[lookup_fam$biz_labor_income_lastyr_var]]    
        biz_labor_income = ifelse(biz_labor_income == 999999, 
                                  NA_real_, biz_labor_income) 
        tot_labor_income = subtot_labor_income + biz_labor_income 
 
} else { 
        tot_labor_income = df_fam[[lookup_fam$tot_labor_income_lastyr_var]] 
        tot_labor_income = ifelse(tot_labor_income == 999999, NA_real_,  
                                  tot_labor_income) 
} 
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# --- some ad hoc codes look up --- # 
 
na_codes_csal_paid = case_when(yr < 1993 ~ c(99998, 99999),  
                               TRUE ~ c(9999998, 9999999)) 
na_codes_csal_recd = case_when(yr < 2003 ~ c(99998, 99999),  
                               TRUE ~ c(999998, 999999)) 
 
race_code_white = 1 
race_code_black = 2 
race_code_aindian = 3 
race_code_asian_pislander = ifelse(yr < 2005, 4, c(4, 5)) 
race_code_latino = ifelse(yr < 2005, 5, 9999) # 9999 means doesn't exist 
race_code_more_colors = ifelse(yr < 2005, 6, 9998) # 9998 means doesn't exist 
race_code_other = 7         
 
# get the vars and prep 
 
df_fam = df_fam %>%  
        transmute(interview_id = !!as.name(lookup_fam$interview_id_var), 
                  race = !!as.name(lookup_fam$race1_var), 
                  marital_status_cng =  
                          !!as.name(lookup_fam$marital_status_cng_var), 
                  num_of_chld_in_family =  
                          !!as.name(lookup_fam$num_of_chld_in_family_var), 
                  flag_school_expenses = flag_school_expense, 
                   
                  wages_lastyr = !!as.name(lookup_fam$wages_lastyr_var),  
                  wages_xtra_lastyr = wages_xtra, 
                  tot_labor_income_lastyr = tot_labor_income, 
                   
                  chld_supprt_paid = !!as.name(lookup_fam$chld_supprt_paid_var),  
                  alimony_paid = !!as.name(lookup_fam$alimony_paid_var), 
                  chld_supprt_recd = !!as.name(lookup_fam$chld_supprt_recd_var),  
                  alimony_recd = !!as.name(lookup_fam$alimony_recd_var) 
                  ) %>%  
        mutate(is_remarried = ifelse(marital_status_cng == 5, 'Yes', 'No'),  
                
               race = case_when(race == race_code_white ~ 'White', 
                                race == race_code_black ~ 'Black', 
                                race == race_code_aindian ~ 'American Indian or Alaska Native', 
                                race == race_code_asian_pislander ~ 'Asian, Pacific Islander', 
                                race == race_code_latino ~ 'Latino origin or descent', 
                                race == race_code_more_colors ~ 'Color besides black or white', 
                                race == race_code_other ~ 'Other', 
                                TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
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               had_school_expenses = case_when( 
                       flag_school_expenses == 1 ~ 'Yes', 
                       flag_school_expenses == 5 ~ 'No', 
                       TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
         
               tot_wages_lastyr = wages_lastyr + wages_xtra_lastyr, 
                
               chld_supprt_paid = ifelse( 
                       chld_supprt_paid %in% na_codes_csal_paid,  
                       NA_real_, chld_supprt_paid), 
               alimony_paid = ifelse( 
                       alimony_paid %in% na_codes_csal_paid,  
                       NA_real_, alimony_paid), 
                
               chld_supprt_recd = ifelse( 
                       chld_supprt_recd %in% na_codes_csal_recd,  
                       NA_real_, chld_supprt_recd), 
               alimony_recd = ifelse( 
                       alimony_recd %in% na_codes_csal_recd,  
                       NA_real_, alimony_recd), 
               
               chld_supprt_net = chld_supprt_recd - chld_supprt_paid, 
               alimony_net = alimony_recd - alimony_paid, 
               chld_supprt_alimony_tot_net = chld_supprt_net + alimony_net, 
                
               chld_supprt_status = case_when( 
                       chld_supprt_paid > 0 & chld_supprt_recd > 0 ~ 'both', 
                       chld_supprt_paid > 0 & chld_supprt_recd == 0 ~ 'paid', 
                       chld_supprt_paid == 0 & chld_supprt_recd > 0 ~ 'received', 
                       chld_supprt_paid == 0 & chld_supprt_recd == 0 ~ 'neither', 
                       TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
 
               alimony_status = case_when( 
                       alimony_paid > 0 & alimony_recd > 0 ~ 'both', 
                       alimony_paid > 0 & alimony_recd == 0 ~ 'paid', 
                       alimony_paid == 0 & alimony_recd > 0 ~ 'received', 
                       alimony_paid == 0 & alimony_recd == 0 ~ 'neither', 
                       TRUE ~ NA_character_), 
                
               marital_status_cng = NULL, 
               wages_lastyr = NULL, 
               wages_xtra_lastyr = NULL, 
               flag_school_expenses = NULL 
                
               ) 
# yr = 1989 
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lookup_wea = wea_vars_year_specific %>% filter(year == yr) 
 
 
if (is.na(lookup_wea$ira_asset_var)) { 
        ira_vec = rep(0, nrow(df_wea)) 
} else { 
        ira_vec = df_wea[[lookup_wea$ira_asset_var]] 
} 
df_wea = df_wea %>%  
        transmute(interview_id = !!as.name(lookup_wea$interview_id_var), 
                  cash = !!as.name(lookup_wea$cash_asset_var),  
                  stocks = !!as.name(lookup_wea$stocks_asset_var),  
                  other_paper_asset = !!as.name(lookup_wea$other_paper_asset_var),  
                  ira = ira_vec, 
                  net_worth = !!as.name(lookup_wea$net_worth_var)) %>%  
        mutate(stocks = pmax(stocks, 0), # negative values are caused by market decline, not 
indicative of sold stocks 
               retirement_accts_value = other_paper_asset + ira,  
               other_paper_asset = NULL, 
               ira = NULL, 
               risky_share = ifelse(stocks == 0, 0, 
                                    stocks / (cash + stocks + retirement_accts_value)) 
               ) 
        df = read_rds(file.path(rds_path, paste0('divorced-', cohort_year, '.rds'))) 
 
 
# --- one-hot encoding since frmpd::frmpd cannot work with char or factor vars --- # 
 
df = df %>% mutate( 
        male = case_when(gender == 'Male' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), # do NOT use ifelse() since it'll leave 
NA as NA instead of 0 
         
        gave_0live_birth = case_when(num_of_live_births == 0 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        gave_1live_birth = case_when(num_of_live_births == 1 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        gave_2live_births = case_when(num_of_live_births == 2 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        gave_3live_births = case_when(num_of_live_births == 3 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        gave_4live_births = case_when(num_of_live_births == 4 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        gave_5plus_live_births = case_when(num_of_live_births >= 5 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
         
        risk_tolerance_lvl1 = case_when(risk_tolerance == 1 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0),  
        risk_tolerance_lvl2 = case_when(risk_tolerance == 2 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        risk_tolerance_lvl3 = case_when(risk_tolerance == 3 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        risk_tolerance_lvl4 = case_when(risk_tolerance == 4 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        risk_tolerance_lvl5 = case_when(risk_tolerance == 5 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        risk_tolerance_lvl6 = case_when(risk_tolerance == 6 ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
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        bequest_to_rels_important = case_when( 
                importance_bequest_to_rels %in% 
                        c("Quite important", "Very important") ~ 1,  
                TRUE ~ 0), 
        bequest_to_relorg_unimportant = case_when( 
                importance_bequest_to_relorg %in%  
                        c("Not at all important", "Not important") ~ 1,  
                TRUE ~ 0), 
        bequest_to_charity_unimportant = case_when( 
                importance_bequest_to_charity %in%  
                        c("Not at all important", "Not important") ~ 1, 
                TRUE ~ 0), 
         
        white = case_when(race == 'White' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        black = case_when(race == 'Black' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        remarried = case_when(is_remarried == 'Yes' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
         
        hs_dropout = case_when( 
                education_status_agg == 'Did not complete high school' ~ 1,  
                TRUE ~ 0), 
        hs_graduate = case_when( 
                education_status_agg == 'High school graduate' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        co_dropout = case_when( 
                education_status_agg == 'Some college' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        co_graduate_or_beyond = case_when( 
                education_status_agg %in% c("Bachelor's degree", 'Graduate work') ~ 1,  
                TRUE ~ 0), 
         
        working = case_when(employment_status_agg == 'Working' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
 
        paid_chl_supprt = case_when(chld_supprt_status == 'paid' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        recd_chl_supprt = case_when(chld_supprt_status == 'received' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        paid_alimony = case_when(alimony_status == 'paid' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
        recd_alimony = case_when(alimony_status == 'received' ~ 1, TRUE ~ 0), 
         
        had_school_expenses = case_when(had_school_expenses == 'Yes' ~ 1,  
                                        TRUE ~ 0) 
) 
 
# group vars 
index_vars = c(keys, 'year') 
yvars = c('risky_share', 'savings_rate_cash', 'savings_rate_retirement') 
xvars_onehot = c('male', 'white', 'black', 'remarried',  
                 'working', 'had_school_expenses', 
                  
                 'gave_0live_birth', 'gave_1live_birth',  
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                 'gave_2live_births', 'gave_3live_births',  
                 'gave_4live_births', 'gave_5plus_live_births', 
                  
                 'risk_tolerance_lvl1', 'risk_tolerance_lvl2',  
                 'risk_tolerance_lvl3', 'risk_tolerance_lvl4',  
                 'risk_tolerance_lvl5', 'risk_tolerance_lvl6', 
                  
                 'bequest_to_rels_important', 'bequest_to_relorg_unimportant',  
                 'bequest_to_charity_unimportant',  
                  
                 'hs_dropout', 'hs_graduate',  
                 'co_dropout', 'co_graduate_or_beyond',  
                  
                 'paid_chl_supprt', 'recd_chl_supprt' 
                 # 'paid_alimony', 'recd_alimony' # ignore because nearly all have value 0 
                 ) 
 
xvars_num = c('age', 'num_of_chld_in_family',  
              'tot_wages_lastyr', 'tot_labor_income_lastyr',  
               
              'chld_supprt_net', # alternatively, we can use chld_supprt_alimony_tot_net 
              # 'chld_supprt_alimony_tot_net'  
               
              # 'chld_supprt_paid', 'chld_supprt_recd', # ignore because we use their sum, the net 
value 
              # 'alimony_paid', 'alimony_recd' # ignore because nearly all have value 0 
               
              'net_worth', 'CAGR_sp500') 
 
 
 
cat('\nYears when risky share is available:\n') 
df %>% filter(!is.na(risky_share)) %>% pull(year) %>% table() %>% print() 
 
cat('\nYears when cash savings rate is available:\n') 
df %>% filter(!is.na(savings_rate_cash)) %>% pull(year) %>% table() %>% print() 
 
cat('\nYears when retirement savings rate is available:\n') 
df %>% filter(!is.na(savings_rate_retirement)) %>% pull(year) %>% table() %>%  
        print() 
yvar = 'savings_rate_cash' 
yvar_quo = as.name(yvar) 
 
dat = df %>% filter(!is.na(!!yvar_quo)) %>%  
        select(yvar, index_vars, xvars_num, xvars_onehot) %>% 
        mutate(# some people have cash savings rate as big as 230, meaning 
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               # cash saved > total labor income. This can happen because 
               # 1. they sold stocks and increased their cash position  
               # 2. they funded their cash position using non-labor income such 
               #    as inheritance or non-reported income 
                # 
                # frmpd does not allow yvar value to be 1 
                savings_rate_cash = ifelse(savings_rate_cash >= 1, 0.999, 
                                           savings_rate_cash) 
                ) 
# hist(dat[[yvar]]) 
# glimpse(dat) 
 
# check missings: should have no missings 
na_pct = sapply(dat, function(col) sum(is.na(col))) / nrow(dat) 
stopifnot(length(na_pct[na_pct > 0]) == 0) 
 
# scale numeric data 
xvars_scaled = setdiff(xvars_num, "CAGR_sp500") # CAGR_sp500 doesn't vary within the 
same year, so cannot scale. Plus, it's already between 0 and 1.  
dat_norm = dat %>% group_by(year) %>% 
        mutate_at(xvars_scaled, scale_this) %>%  
        ungroup()  
 
# exclude vars from entering the model due to high correlations 
drop_xvars = c("tot_labor_income_lastyr", # used to define y 
               "tot_wages_lastyr", # part of tot labor income, and hence indirectly defines y 
               "chld_supprt_net", # correlated with chld_supprt_net 
               "gave_0live_birth", "gave_1live_birth", 
               "gave_2live_births", "gave_3live_births",              
               "gave_4live_births", "gave_5plus_live_births"   
               )  
 
# specify endo- and exdo-genous vars 
xvars_endo = c("remarried", "working", "num_of_chld_in_family",  
               "had_school_expenses",  "net_worth",  
               "risk_tolerance_lvl1", "risk_tolerance_lvl2",  
               "risk_tolerance_lvl3", "risk_tolerance_lvl4",  
               "risk_tolerance_lvl5", "risk_tolerance_lvl6" 
               )  
xvars_exdo = setdiff(c(xvars_num, xvars_onehot), c(xvars_endo, drop_xvars)) 
 
# make unique individual id 
id = as.integer(paste0(dat$family_id, dat$person_id)) 
 
 
# recommended approach: using both endo- and exdo-genous vars 
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set.seed(42) 
frmpd::frmpd(id, dat$year, y = dat[[yvar]], x = dat_norm[xvars_endo],  
             z = dat_norm[xvars_exdo], x.exogenous=FALSE, 
             type="GMMww", bootstrap = TRUE, B=100, tdummies= F) 
 
 
# # --- experiment --- # 
#  
# # what if we ignore the endogenous vars? 
# frmpd::frmpd(id, dat$year, y = dat[[yvar]], 
#              x = dat_norm[xvars_exdo], x.exogenous=T, 
#              type="GMMww", bootstrap = TRUE, B=100, tdummies= F) 
#  
# # what if we treat both endo- and exdo-genous vars as exdogenous? 
# frmpd::frmpd(id, dat$year, y = dat[[yvar]], 
#              x = dat_norm[c(xvars_exdo, xvars_endo)], x.exogenous=T, 
#              type="GMMww", bootstrap = TRUE, B=100, tdummies= F) 
yvar = 'savings_rate_retirement' 
yvar_quo = as.name(yvar) 
 
dat = df %>% filter(!is.na(!!yvar_quo)) %>%  
        select(yvar, index_vars, xvars_num, xvars_onehot) %>% 
        mutate(# some people have cash savings rate as big as 230, meaning 
                # cash saved > total labor income. This can happen because 
                # 1. they sold stocks and increased their cash position  
                # 2. they funded their cash position using non-labor income such 
                #    as inheritance or non-reported income 
                # 
                # frmpd does not allow yvar value to be 1 
                savings_rate_retirement = ifelse(savings_rate_retirement >= 1,  
                                                 0.999, savings_rate_retirement) 
        ) 
# hist(dat[[yvar]]) 
# glimpse(dat) 
 
# check missings: should have no missings 
na_pct = sapply(dat, function(col) sum(is.na(col))) / nrow(dat) 
stopifnot(length(na_pct[na_pct > 0]) == 0) 
 
# scale numeric data 
xvars_scaled = setdiff(xvars_num, "CAGR_sp500") # CAGR_sp500 doesn't vary within the 
same year, so cannot scale. Plus, it's already between 0 and 1.  
dat_norm = dat %>% group_by(year) %>% 
        mutate_at(xvars_scaled, scale_this) %>%  
        ungroup()  
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# exclude vars from entering the model due to high correlations 
drop_xvars = c("tot_labor_income_lastyr", # used to define y 
               "tot_wages_lastyr", # part of tot labor income, and hence indirectly defines y 
                 "chld_supprt_net",# correlated with chld_supprt_net 
               "gave_0live_birth", "gave_1live_birth", 
               "gave_2live_births", "gave_3live_births",              
               "gave_4live_births", "gave_5plus_live_births", "bequest_to_rels_important", 
"bequest_to_relorg_unimportant", 
               "bequest_to_charity_unimportant"  
               )  
 
# specify endo- and exdo-genous vars 
xvars_endo = c("remarried", "working", "num_of_chld_in_family",  
               "had_school_expenses","paid_chl_supprt","recd_chl_supprt", "net_worth" 
                
               )  
xvars_exdo = setdiff(c(xvars_num, xvars_onehot), c(xvars_endo, drop_xvars)) 
 
# make unique individual id 
id = as.integer(paste0(dat$family_id, dat$person_id)) 
 
 
# recommended approach: using both endo- and exdo-genous vars 
set.seed(42) 
frmpd::frmpd(id, dat$year, y = dat[[yvar]], x = dat_norm[xvars_endo],  
             z = dat_norm[xvars_exdo], x.exogenous=FALSE, 
             type="GMMww", bootstrap = TRUE, B=100, tdummies= T) 
 
 
# # --- experiment --- # 
#  
#  
# frmpd::frmpd(id, dat$year, y = dat[[yvar]], 
#         x = dat_norm[xvars_exdo], x.exogenous=T, 
#             type="GMMww", bootstrap = TRUE, B=100, tdummies= F) 
#  
# # interaction effects? 
#frmpd::frmpd(id, dat$year, y = dat[[yvar]], 
 #            x = dat_norm[c(xvars_exdo, xvars_endo)], x.exogenous=T, 
 #            type="GMMww", bootstrap = TRUE, B=100, tdummies= T) 
yvar = 'risky_share' 
yvar_quo = as.name(yvar) 
 
dat = df %>% filter(!is.na(!!yvar_quo)) %>%  
        select(yvar, index_vars, xvars_num, xvars_onehot) %>%  
        mutate(# frmpd does not allow yvar value to be 1 
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                risky_share = ifelse(risky_share == 1, 0.999, risky_share)) 
# hist(dat[[yvar]]) 
# glimpse(dat) 
 
# check missings: should have no missings 
na_pct = sapply(dat, function(col) sum(is.na(col))) / nrow(dat) 
stopifnot(length(na_pct[na_pct > 0]) == 0) 
 
# scale numeric data 
xvars_scaled = setdiff(xvars_num, "CAGR_sp500") # CAGR_sp500 doesn't vary within the 
same year, so cannot scale. Plus, it's already between 0 and 1.  
dat_norm = dat %>% group_by(year) %>% 
        mutate_at(xvars_scaled, scale_this) %>%  
        ungroup()  
 
# exclude vars from entering the model due to high correlations 
drop_xvars = c("tot_labor_income_lastyr", # correlated with tot_wages_lastyr 
               # correlated with chld_supprt_net 
               "chld_supprt_net","gave_0live_birth", "gave_1live_birth", 
               "gave_2live_births", "gave_3live_births",              
               "gave_4live_births", "gave_5plus_live_births"   
               )  
 
# specify endo- and exdo-genous vars 
xvars_endo = c( "paid_chl_supprt", "recd_chl_supprt","remarried", "working", 
"had_school_expenses", 
               "num_of_chld_in_family",  
               "tot_wages_lastyr",   "net_worth")  
xvars_exdo = setdiff(c(xvars_num, xvars_onehot), c(xvars_endo, drop_xvars)) 
 
 
# make unique individual id 
id = as.integer(paste0(dat$family_id, dat$person_id)) 
 
 
# recommended approach: using both endo- and exdo-genous vars 
set.seed(42) 
frmpd::frmpd(id, dat$year, y = dat[[yvar]], x = dat_norm[xvars_endo],  
             z = dat_norm[xvars_exdo], x.exogenous=FALSE, 
             type="GMMww", bootstrap = TRUE, B=100, tdummies= T) 
 
 
# # --- experiment --- # 
#  
# # what if we ignore the endogenous vars? 
# frmpd::frmpd(id, dat$year, y = dat[[yvar]], 
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#              x = dat_norm[xvars_exdo], x.exogenous=T, 
#              type="GMMww", bootstrap = TRUE, B=100, tdummies= T) 
#  
# # what if we treat both endo- and exdo-genous vars as exdogenous? 
# frmpd::frmpd(id, dat$year, y = dat[[yvar]], 
#              x = dat_norm[c(xvars_exdo, xvars_endo)], x.exogenous=T, 
#              type="GMMww", bootstrap = TRUE, B=100, tdummies= T) 
 
 
#*********BEGIN DATA ANALYSIS FOR BEQUEST OUTCOME LOGIT 
#MODEL************************* 
 
         
rm(list = ls()) 
 
source("R/00-set-up.R") 
#source("R/01-download-data.R") # comment out to run, and only need to run once 
 
cohort_year = 2007 
source('R/02-read-crossyear-individual-file.R') 
source('R/03-prep-data-fixed-vars.R') 
source('R/03-prep-data-yearly-vars.R') 
source('R/11-bequest-diff-divorced-vs-nondivorced/01-choose-cohort.R') 
source('R/11-bequest-diff-divorced-vs-nondivorced/02-derive-grouping-var-from-marital-
status.R') 
source('R/11-bequest-diff-divorced-vs-nondivorced/03-bin-xvars-n-deal-with-ord-xvars.R') 
source('R/11-bequest-diff-divorced-vs-nondivorced/03-bin-yvars.R') 
 
source('R/11-bequest-diff-divorced-vs-nondivorced/04-explain-bequest-rels.R') 
source('R/11-bequest-diff-divorced-vs-nondivorced/05-explain-bequest-relorg.R') 
source('R/11-bequest-diff-divorced-vs-nondivorced/06-explain-bequest-charity.R') 
 
# glimpse(dat) 
 
# check missings in xvars 
na_pct = sapply(dat, function(col) sum(is.na(col))) / nrow(dat) 
na_pct[na_pct > 0] 
# stopifnot(length(na_pct[na_pct > 0]) == 0) 
 
# drop records with NA in race, age,education_status_agg and employment_status_agg  
#       since there's tiny amount of them 
dat = dat %>% filter(!is.na(race), !is.na(age), !is.na(employment_status_agg), 
                     !is.na(education_status_agg)) 
 
# scale numeric data 
xvars_scaled = c('age', "tot_wages_lastyr", "net_worth") 
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dat_norm = dat %>% mutate_at(xvars_scaled, scale_this)  
# glimpse(dat_norm)         
 
# fit logit model 
f = formula(paste(yvar, paste(c(xvar_main, xvars_other), collapse = "+"), sep = '~')) 
fit_bequest_rels = glm(f, data = dat_norm, family=binomial) 
 
#+ include = FALSE 
knitr::opts_chunk$set(comment = "", tidy = F, echo = F, warning = F,  
                      message = F, fig.width = 8, fig.height = 6) 
options(scipen = 999) 
 
#' # `r cohort_year`  
#'  
#' This dataset contains info of the heads of families in `r cohort_year`.  
#'  
 
#+ results = 'asis' 
 
cap = 'Importance of leaving estate/inheritance to children/relatives' 
broom::tidy(fit_bequest_rels) %>%  
        mutate(signif = case_when(`p.value` < 0.01 ~ '***', 
                                  `p.value` < 0.05 ~ '**', 
                                  `p.value` < 0.06 ~ '.', 
                                  TRUE ~ '')) %>%  
        knitr::kable(caption = cap, digits = 3) %>%  
        print() 
 
cap = 'Importance of leaving estate/inheritance to religious organizations' 
broom::tidy(fit_bequest_relorg) %>%  
        mutate(signif = case_when(`p.value` < 0.01 ~ '***', 
                                  `p.value` < 0.05 ~ '**', 
                                  `p.value` < 0.06 ~ '.', 
                                  TRUE ~ '')) %>%  
        knitr::kable(caption = cap, digits = 3) %>%  
        print() 
 
cap = 'Importance of leaving estate/inheritance to charity' 
broom::tidy(fit_bequest_charity) %>%  
        mutate(signif = case_when(`p.value` < 0.01 ~ '***', 
                                  `p.value` < 0.05 ~ '**', 
                                  `p.value` < 0.06 ~ '.', 
                                  TRUE ~ '')) %>%  
        knitr::kable(caption = cap, digits = 3) %>%  
        print() 
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#average marginal effects 
#get from github 
 
if (!require("remotes")) { 
        install.packages("remotes") 
        library("remotes") 
} 
install_github("leeper/prediction") 
install_github("leeper/margins") 
 
# building vignettes takes a moment, so for a quicker install set: 
install_github("leeper/margins", build_vignettes = FALSE) 
 
library("margins") 
 
#fitted model for bequests to relatives 
#fit_bequest_rels 
 
marg_relatives <- margins(fit_bequest_rels) 
 
#call marginal effects 
summary(marg_relatives) 
 
#fitted model fro bequests for religious organizations 
#fit_bequest_relorg 
 
marg_relorg <- margins(fit_bequest_relorg) 
 
#call marginal effeicts 
 
summary(marg_relorg) 
 
#fitted model for bequests for non-religious charities 
#fit_bequest_charity 
 
marg_charity <- margins(fit_bequest_charity) 
 
#call marginal effects 
 
summary(marg_charity) 
 
 
 
 
